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Michigan Journal of International Law
Among those nations that incorporate into their legal systems the
institution of full adoption, recognition of the importance of informa-
tion concerning identity and genetic and social heritage to both adopted
persons and their adoptive and birth parents has developed slowly and
at an uneven pace. A comparative examination of legal regulation of
the collection and distribution of both identifying and non-identifying
(medical and social) information, however, reveals a growing global
recognition of the importance of each. Recent reform of the domestic
laws of many nations, as well as global and regional international con-
ventions, reflect increased awareness, to varying degrees, of the
importance of a post-adoption connection to biological origins.
In the United States, the paradigm of adoptive family as "replace-
ment family," embraced by professionals and reflected in legislative
reform during the mid-twentieth century, has evolved into a recognition
of the importance of an adopted person's connection with both her
birth heritage as well as her adoptive family. Within the past two dec-
ades, government-sponsored registries and/or search programs have
been created in almost every state, and the past five years mark an
emerging trend to release birth records to adult adoptees. Statutory
standards for the collection of full and complete medical and social
history, early disclosure to prospective adoptive parents, and post-
adoption supplementation of medical information for the benefit of
both adoptees and birth families have become the norm, mandated to
some degree in virtually every state. There is now widespread recogni-
tion in the United States that collection and disclosure of medical and
social history, though not a substitute for disclosure of identifying in-
formation to adopted adults, serve important purposes, i.e., facilitating
appropriate placement, fostering informed medical decisionmaking,
and enabling adoptive parents to provide their child with age-
appropriate information regarding her origins.
Other nations have undergone similar waves of reform, but in vary-
ing progressions. In some nations, birth records have been available for
many decades to adult adoptees upon demand.' Other countries have
more recently made identifying information available, or are consider-
ing such reform, in some instances in response to recent constitutional
scrutiny or the influence of international conventions. Recognition of
the importance of legal mandates for the thorough collection and
timely disclosure of health and social history is emerging as well, a
matter of particular importance since the age of children at the time of
1. See infra notes 238-49, 269 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 209-27, 292, 358 and accompanying text.
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adoption has been rising Birth parents' access to post-adoption infor-
mation is also beginning to receive legislative attention.
Nevertheless, in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States5
and many provinces in Canada,6 adult adoptees still are not permitted
access upon demand to their birth or adoption records. The remaining
obstacle to universal acceptance of swift, automatic access to such re-
cords is disagreement over the appropriate mechanism for resolution of
conflicts on those occasions when a birth parent opposes disclosure. In
addition, in the United States, the United Kingdom, many Canadian
provinces, and, until now, the Republic of Ireland, access to informa-
tion by birth parents, other than through the use of registries and
sometimes intermediary programs, has generally been disregarded .
Moreover, collection, retention, and disclosure of background informa-
tion to prospective adoptive parents outside of the United States has not
yet been effectively mandated in many parts of the world.8
As we consider directions for future reform in the United States,
we have much to learn from an examination of the reform efforts of
nations with legal institutions and a cultural heritage similar to our
own. Part One of this article provides an overview of the historical and
current development of legal norms regulating disclosure of identifying
and non-identifying information to adopted individuals, birth parents,
and adoptive parents within the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland. Changing social conditions and
mores, the influence of social science research and constructs, and dif-
fering constitutional approaches that have shaped legislative reform in
these nations are explored and compared.
Part Two of this article examines the extent to which international
law has and will potentially influence the direction of the reform and
implementation of adoption disclosure norms. Though it does not yet
appear that international law mandates recognition of an absolute right
to identifying information when such disclosure is opposed by a birth
parent or adoptee, examination of these conventions and the response
of the international community underscores the critical importance of
identifying information to many adoptees, and a growing movement to
afford primacy to their interests.
Drawing upon the insights of recent statutory proposals in both the
United States and other nations, as well as the legislative history and
3. See generally infra notes 47, 265-66 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 210-27, 292 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 95-145 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 213-27 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 146-51, 213-27, 270-73,292 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
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administrative and judicial interpretation of relevant international
conventions, Section Three sets forth a proposed model for future
reform. Under this proposal, birth and adoption records would be
opened retrospectively and prospectively for adult adoptees, a contact
preference system would be implemented, and a judicial or
administrative override would be created to afford birth parents the
opportunity to show good cause to delete identifying information in
compelling circumstances. In addition, the proposal would create
mechanisms to provide birth parents with non-identifying information
during an adopted child's minority, and identifying information
thereafter, similarly subject to a contact preference system and judicial
or administrative override. Regarding non-identifying information,
some of the American statutes that comprehensively regulate the
collection of medical and social history and its disclosure to
prospective adoptive parents, adoptive parents, adult adoptees, and
birth family members, might serve as models for American states and
other nations that have not addressed these issues in similar detail.
Federal legislation governing disclosure of medical and social history
in international adoptions, however, should be revised to create more
effective time frames for the provision of information to prospective
adoptive parents. Enacting such reforms serves the needs of adopted
individuals and birth families who wish to preserve a continuing link,
while attempting to balance the privacy interests of those who do not,
and facilitates appropriate placements and medical care for all adoptees
and their birth families.
I. A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE REGULATION OF ADOPTION
INFORMATION UNDER DOMESTIC LAW
Although the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
Republic of Ireland enacted their first adoption statutes at different
times throughout a 100 year span, by the mid-twentieth century similar
social conditions and cultural mores fostered legal regulations impos-
ing confidentiality and anonymity over the adoption process in each
nation. Almost every American state and Canadian province, as well as
England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland have all
at various times denied adoptees automatic access to birth records.
Birth parents in these countries were denied information regarding the
post-adoption identity and progress of their children, and legislation
mandating the collection, disclosure and supplementation of medical
and social history was neglected.
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This section examines the forces that produced that regime of se-
crecy, and the gradual transformation of the legal regulation of
adoption disclosure, albeit to varying degrees, that has occurred over
the past several decades in these nations, as well as proposals recently
proffered for further reform.
A. United States
1. Adoption as Rebirth and the Legacy of Secrecy
Although adoption existed in various forms in many ancient cul-
tures,9 adoption as a legal institution had virtually disappeared in most
European countries by the seventeenth century, and was not recognized
by English common law.10 Among those nations whose legal systems
were predominantly influenced by English jurisprudence, the first
modern adoption statutes are often regarded as those enacted in the
United States in the mid-nineteenth century.1' The institution of adop-
tion evolving from these statutes has been distinguished from earlier
forms of adoption in that its central focus was the welfare of children,
rather than the needs of adults for heirs or ancestral worship.'2 These
9. The ancient Babylonians, Hebrews, Egyptians, Greeks, Chinese and Romans; the
tribal societies of Oceania and Africa; the Teutonic aristocracies, Slavonic Russians, the Celtic
clan associations, and ancient Hindu law all recognized adoption in some form. E. WAYNE
CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION 3 (1998);
KATRINA WEGAR, ADOPTION, IDENTITY, AND KINSHIP: THE DEBATE OVER SEALED BIRTH
RECORDS 23 (1997); Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND.
L. REV. 743, 743-44 (1956).
10. CARP, supra note 9, at 4; Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law and
Practice, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 1-19 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed. 2000). Al-
though England had no general statutory adoption prior to the twentieth century, it utilized
wardships, guardianships, indentures, apprenticeships, and other arrangements which have
been referred to as "quasi-adoptive" in nature. Hollinger, supra note 10, at 1-19.
11. Mississippi passed an adoption statute in 1846, Texas and Vermont in 1850, and Mas-
sachusetts in 1851. Id. at 1-22. New Zealand is alleged to be the first nation in the British
empire to introduce legal adoption, doing so in 1881, although Maoris had practiced informal
adoption for hundreds of years. Keith Griffith, Adoption History and Reform in New Zealand,
available at http://www.ouareau.com/inverc/histkeith.htm. New Brunswick, in 1873, was the first
Canadian province to enact adoption legislation. BEREND HovIus, FAMILY LAW: CASES, NOTES
AND MATERIALS 993 (1992) (excerpting BALA & WILDGOOSE, CANADIAN CHILDREN'S LAW:
A COURSEBOOK 371 (1985)). New South Wales, Australia, enacted an adoption statute in
1923 as part of its Child Welfare Act. N.S.W. L. REFORM COMM'N, REPORT No. 69,
REVIEW OF THE ADOPTION INFORMATION ACT 1990 (1992) available at http://www.
lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R69TOC. The first general adoption statutes were enacted for
England and Wales in 1926, for Northern Ireland in 1929, and for Scotland in 1930; the Republic
of Ireland did not enact an adoption statute until 1952. ALAN JOSEPH SHATTER, SHATTER'S
FAMILY LAW 445-46 (4th ed. 1997).
12. WEGAR, supra note 9, at 23; Huard, supra note 9, at 749. Despite the fact that three
states had earlier adoption statutes, Massachusetts' statute is widely considered the first mod-
em adoption statute in the United States because it was the first American statute to emphasize
Summer 2001]
Michigan Journal of International Law
statutes also introduced the concept of judicial supervision over adop-
tion. Under these early American statutory regimes, adoption
proceedings, like other civil judicial matters, were open to the press
and the public, as well as to the parties involved.'3
Although secrecy between birth parents, adopters, and adoptees
would not become a hallmark of adoption practice in the United States
for almost a century after these statutes were first enacted, in the 1920s
and 1930s a new emphasis on confidentiality set the stage for the sub-
sequent envelopment of adoption in a blanket of anonymity. Beginning
in 1917 and continuing throughout the next few decades, a majority of
the states passed legislation requiring that adoption records be kept
confidential and sealed from public scrutiny. 4 These early confidential-
ity statutes were not intended to create anonymity between birth and
adoptive families, however, and initially permitted access to records by
parties and their attorneys." The statutes were motivated by the desire
to shield birth parents and their children from the social stigma at-
tached during this period to out-of-wedlock birth,'6 and to protect
adoptive parents from embarrassment or potential blackmail by an un-
scrupulous public.' They also served the interests of professional
social workers and agencies, who were the guiding force behind this
new legislation.'8 Jockeying to replace lawyers, doctors, clergy, and lay
volunteers, who up until the 1920s were the primary facilitators of
adoptions, professional adoption workers suggested that they could
better guarantee confidentiality, and saw implementation of confidenti-
ality legislation as an opportunity to solidify their "occupational
the child as the primary beneficiary of the proceeding. It was also the first to require judicial
supervision of adoption proceedings by a judge. By contrast, the earlier statutes in Mississippi
and Texas merely created a legal procedure to authenticate a public record of private adoption
agreements, in order to ease the burden on legislatures which had been asked to pass many
private adoption acts in the preceding decades. CARP, supra note 9, at 11; Hollinger, supra
note 10, at 1-22.
13. Prior to 1920, newspapers routinely reported accounts of adoption proceedings.
Adoption statutes in the 19th century did not address confidentiality, and, to the extent birth
certificates existed, they were available to adoptees who requested them. Hollinger, supra note
10, at 1-37.
14. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Aftermath of Adoption: Legal and Social Consequences, in 2
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 13-5 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed. 2000). Up until World War II,
however, twenty-three states had not yet enacted confidentiality statues, and thus their court
adoption proceedings and records were open to public view. CARP, supra note 9, at 42.
15. Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-5; CARP, supra note 9, at 42-43.
16. WEGAR, supra note 9, at 26; Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-5.
17. CARP, supra note 9, at 42. Professor Carp observed that the records of agencies were
typically not covered by these earlier statutes, and disclosure was left to agency discretion. Id.
at 43.
18. WEGAR, supra note 9, at 28. See Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-5; CARP, supra note
9, at 42.
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niche."' 9 Although members of the adoption triad (adoptive and birth
parents and adopted persons) thus initially retained access to their
adoption records after this first wave of legislative reform, inadequate
record keeping at the time often rendered these records of little use,
and highlighted the importance of birth records as a source of identify-
ing information.2 °
The stigma of illegitimacy, however, also motivated changes in the
laws regulating birth records. Statutory reform during this period
eliminated the term "illegitimate" from birth certificates and all public
documents. By 1941, the registrars of vital statistics in thirty-five states
were required to issue new birth certificates for adopted children, sub-
stituting the new name for the child and replacing the names of the
birth parents with those of the adoptive parents. Again, however, these
initial reforms generally preserved the right of the adopted person,
upon reaching adulthood, to inspect the original certificate, and in fact,
the retention of original certificates was required for just this purpose."
Gradually, however, the aura of confidentiality transformed into a
regime of secrecy imposed upon birth parents, adoptive parents, and
ultimately, adopted persons. Beginning in the mid-1930s and through-
out the 1940s and 1950s, states revised their statutes to close their
adoption records to everyone, rendering them accessible only with a
court order upon a showing of good cause.22 A similar shift occurred
shortly thereafter regarding access to birth certificates. Professor Eliza-
beth Samuels, in her recent study of disclosure of birth records to
adoptees, observed that in the immediate post-World War II era, very
few states had statutorily foreclosed the access of adult adopted per-
sons to their birth certificates, 23 and even in the mid-1950s, it was still
the prevailing view that adoptees could inspect their own birth records
when requested. By the end of the decade, however, a sea-change had
occurred. Only twenty states still permitted access upon demand by
1960. Of these twenty states, four closed their birth records to adult
adoptees during the 1960s, six additional states followed suit in the
1970s, and six more did so in the early 1980s. Alabama became the last
state to close its birth records to adoptees in 1990. 24
19. CARP, supra note 9, at 42.
20. Id. at 44.
21. Id. at 52-55.
22. Elizabeth Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult
Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 373-74 (2001); Hollinger, supra
note 14, at 13-16; see also Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitu-
tion: The Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 156-57 (1999).
23. New York closed birth records to adult adoptees in 1936, Maryland did so in 1939,
and Hawaii is reported to have closed its records in 1945. Samuels, supra note 22, at 377 n.57.
24. Id. at 375-84.
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This wave of statutory reform imposing anonymity between
adoptive and birth families reflected the prevailing practices of
adoption professionals of the era. Agencies placing Caucasian" infants
as early as the 1930s and 1940s routinely prevented the birth parents
from learning of the identity of the adopters, ostensibly to protect
adoptive families from the possibility of harassment and to ensure the
stability of the adoptive placement for the child. 26 By the 1950s,
complete severance between Caucasian birth parents and the adopted
person and his new family was supported not only by agency practice,
but also by lawyers (who often facilitated independent adoptions),27
psychologists, 28 and social service organizations.2 9 The Child Welfare
League of America (CWLA), described as "the international standard-
setting body in the field of social welfare," issued standards in 1938
and 1941 calling for anonymity and the sealing of birth records.30
Following surveys of adoption practices in 1948, 1951, and 1954,
CWLA again produced a Standards for Adoption Services Report in
1959 that supported the anonymity of all parties, the confidentiality of
agency records, and the sealing of court and birth certificates.3' By
25. The development of confidentiality policies by agencies during the first half of the
twentieth century reflected changing practices regarding white mothers. Although cultural
stigma, new psychological theories, and an increasing demand for infants following World
War II induced adoption professionals to encourage white unwed birth mothers to place their
children for adoption, black mothers were not similarly encouraged to relinquish their chil-
dren. See WEGAR, supra note 9, at 52. In addition, black unwed mothers found greater
acceptance and encouragement to keep their children from both their families and communi-
ties. RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE Up LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE
V. WADE 6-7, 156 (1992). During the decades when confidentiality and anonymity between
birth and adoptive families became the model for placement of white infants, informal place-
ment of children with relatives was the norm among black and immigrant families, when a
need for alternate care arose. See Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-6 to 13-7.
26. CARP, supra note 9, at 102-07; Samuels, supra note 22, at 385-86 (observing that the
U.S. Children's Bureau, an influential force in the development of adoption law in the mid-
twentieth century, repeatedly advised that birth and adoptive parents not have access to infor-
mation about each other, and voiced particular concern that children must be protected from
interference by birth parents after placement in an adoptive home).
27. Although the majority of non-relative adoptions were still arranged independently in
1950, the professional guidelines set by social workers still "set the parameters for the nation's
adoption policy." WEGAR, supra note 9, at 50.
28. By the mid-1940s, psychological theorists shifted their construct of white unwed
mothers, from the pre-war notion of immutable deviants whose fate was biologically and envi-
ronmentally determined, to a neo-Freudian view that such mothers suffered temporary
neuroses or maladjustment that could be treated and transcended by preparing themselves for
marriage, sans infants. SOLINGER, supra note 25, at 15-16.
29. Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-7 n.21 (observing that the Family Law Section of the
ABA consistently endorsed this position by the late 1960s).
30. CARP, supra note 9, at 107; Samuels, supra note 22, at 386.
31. Janette Thompson, Roots and Rights-A Challenge for Adoption, 47 SoC. WORKER
13, 13 (1979).
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1976, a survey of 200 public and private agencies found that 90% of
the agencies guaranteed adoptive and birth parents anonymity, and
agencies almost never revealed identifying information. Only one of
the 200 agencies reported that it would disclose the names of birth
parents when requested.32 Proponents of anonymity argued that birth
mothers and their children would be protected from stigmatization,
bonding between adoptive parents and their children would be
facilitated, and all parties would be permanently insulated from
unwanted interference in their lives.33
The movement to permanently separate adoptees and their adoptive
families from birth families was supported by more than the proffered
pragmatic considerations' and professional interests, 35 however. In
large part it reflected a paradigm of adoption embraced by child wel-
fare professionals during the mid-twentieth century. Adoption
constituted a rebirth, through which all ties with the biological family
would be severed and an illusion created that the adoptee was born into
the adoptive family.36 The prevailing practice of matching adoptive par-
ents and children on the basis of physical characteristics and the
32. CARP, supra note 9, at 173.
33. See e.g., Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-7 to 13-8, Cahn & Singer, supra note 22, at
156-57; CARP, supra note 9, at 170-71 (relating rationale of CWLA opposition in official
documents in the mid-1970s to open records).
34. Recently, historians have attempted to delve more deeply into the explanations previ-
ously proffered for the leap from legislation protecting the confidentiality of adoption
information from public scrutiny to legislation that prohibited adult adoptees from learning the
identities of their birth parents. Professor Carp, following an intensive study of the records of
one agency, postulates that the perception that secrecy was desired by the birth mothers, grow-
ing adherence to the principle of client confidentiality and the importance of professional
secrecy, and psychoanalytic theory prevalent at the time that viewed searching as a sign of
psychological disturbance all contributed to the switch. CARP, supra note 9, at 117-21. Profes-
sor Samuels counters by pointing to the absence in social welfare literature of the period of
any articulated rational based on birth mother fears regarding adoptee searching, but observes
that the earlier closing of records, because they were tied to concern over the stigma of ille-
gitimacy, may have contributed to the changing social meaning of searching by adoptees,
making it appear unnatural and a sign of a failure of adoption. Samuels, supra note 22, at 373-
74.
35. Professor Carp observed in his study of the records of the Children's Home Society
of Washington that in the pre-World War II era, the majority of birth mothers were married or
divorced, and only 35% of the children placed through the agency were born out of wedlock.
Following the war, the percentage of children placed through the agency born out of wedlock
rose to 95%. Increasing adherence to policies of secrecy, he suggests, was good for business,
given the perception that privacy was an important criteria for birth mothers choosing agen-
cies. CARP, supra note 9, at 110-13. See also WEGAR, supra note 9, at 52 (observing that white
mothers were expected to keep their babies born out of wedlock prior to World War II); SOL-
INGER, supra note 25, at 13 (the number of children born out of wedlock rose sharply during
the war and post-war years).
36. ARTHUR D. SOROSKY, ET. AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 38 (1978); Samuels, supra
note 22, at 373.
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issuance of new birth certificates were consistent with this philoso-
phy.37 Agencies, in fact, resisted the provision of post-adoption services
to adoptive families, referring them instead to the community network
of social services available to families in general, based upon the no-
tion that adoptive families were like any other families, and needed no
adoption-specific counseling.38 One of the leading proponents of closed
records, Austin Foster, argued in 1979 that, in contrast to the adoption
systems of many European countries:
[T]he American pattern is based upon a daring legal fiction:
our laws mean for the adopted child to become both in law and
in fact a complete member of the family with precisely the
same rights and privileges that would entail to a natural child,
with the clear implication that this membership extends to all
social, cultural, and emotional facets of that child's life. The
American procedure makes the child a member of this family
and no other.39
Allegiance to the philosophy of "rebirth" influenced not only the
increasing concealment of identifying information, but also an increas-
ing reluctance on the part of adoption agencies and other
intermediaries to provide information to adoptive parents about a
child's medical and social background or information about the
biological family.0 Although practices regarding the release of non-
identifying information in the 1930s and 1940s varied, by the 1950s
agencies increasingly disclosed to adoptive parents only favorable
medical and social information, or chose to reveal none at all.4' The
conventional wisdom was that adoptive parents and their child were
37. Sanford N. Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, 5 FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1982, at 9,
9.
38. Thompson, supra note 31, at 13.
39. WEGAR, supra note 9, at 29 (quoting Austin Foster, Who Has the 'Right' to Know?,
PUB. WELFARE, Summer 1979, at 34, 35).
40. See, e.g., SOROSKY, supra note 36, at 35-36; David Golden, When Adoption Doesn't
Work, BOSTON GLOBE, June 11, 1989, at 16 n.3; Elizabeth Neuffer, State Liable for Hiding
Key Records in Adoption, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 29, 1991, at 21 (explaining that Massachusetts
Department of Social Services did not require disclosure of medical history to adoptive par-
ents until 1990).
41. E. Wayne Carp, Adoption Disclosure of Family Information: A Historical Perspective,
74 CHILD WELFARE 217, 219, 225, 230, 233 (1995) (The author concludes that in the first half
of the twentieth century, agencies disclosed what little information they possessed. Id. at 219.
However, he also cites a 1937 study of 30 agencies which revealed that half disclosed all non-
identifying information while the other half disclosed as little as possible, and a 1947 study
concluding that 70% of the 95 agencies surveyed disclosed whatever non-identifying informa-
tion that they had. Id. at 225. By the 1950s, however, his own study reveals that a marked
change in attitudes had occurred that increasingly resulted in little or no disclosure of even
non-identifying information. Id. at 230-33.).
[Vol. 22:587
An Adopted Person's Identities and Heritage
better off without knowledge of the child's background, 2 and that the
potential impact of genetic inheritance should be downplayed.4 '3 This
"fresh start" approach was consistent with a swing in social science
literature during the mid-century that emphasized the importance of
nurture over nature.44 Adoption professionals suggested that to
strengthen the bond between a child and her adoptive parents, "adop-
tive parents should be provided with as little information as possible
regarding the 'shadowy figures' of the birth parents. 4 5 Negative infor-
mation regarding birth family members, such as criminal behavior,
mental illness, and alcoholism, was particularly likely to be withheld.46
As older children again47 began to comprise an increasingly significant
number of the children placed for adoption, essential information about
the child's own health and social history was also frequently not dis-
closed."
42. See Rob Karwath, Teenager's Parents Sue in 'Wrongful Adoption', CHI. TRIB., Dec.
29, 1989, § 1, at I (David Schneidman of the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services proffered this rationale in defending the policy of Illinois adoption agencies prior to
the enactment of disclosure laws in 1985).
43. See Rita B. Black, Genetics and Adoption: A Challenge for Social Work, in SOCIAL
WORK IN A TROUBLED WORLD 193, 200 (Miriam Dinerman, ed., 1981).
44. See Samuels, supra note 22, at 404.
45. SOROSKY, supra note 36, at 36-37 (citing Enid W. Rothenberg, et. al., The Vicissi-
tudes of the Adoption Process, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 590, 594 (1971)).
46. Id.; Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-7 n.21 ("Adoption agencies typically withheld
'sordid or irrelevant details' about a child's biological family from prospective adopters," (cit-
ing MICHAEL SHAPIRO, A STUDY OF ADOPTION PRACTICE 27-28 (CWLA 1956)), and
"adoptive parents were advised to 'try to keep [the biological parents] somewhat shadowy
figures in your child's thoughts'" (citing LOUISE RAYMOND, ADOPTION AND AFTER 28-29
(1955))); see also CARP, supra note 9, at 121-24.
47. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, older children were far more likely than
infants to be adopted. Older children were often preferred in rural areas for farm labor, and in
cities social workers disfavored placement of infants, due to high infant mortality rates and
eugenic concerns that prompted "trial" periods of supervised care before placement.
Hollinger, supra note 10, at 1-43 to 1-44. Recent decades have seen another shift, so that
adoptions of children under two now comprise fewer than half of all domestic unrelated
adoptions. National Committee for Adoption, 1989 ADOPTION FACTBOOK 4; Paul J. Placek,
National Adoption Data, in National Council for Adoption (formerly the National Committee
for Adoption), 1999 ADOPTION FACTBOOK III 24, 34.
48. See RICHARD BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION AND DISRUPTION: RATES,
RISK, AND RESPONSES 107-13 (1988); Lisa Belkin, Adoptive Parents Ask States for Help with
Abused Young, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1988, at Al; Golden, supra note 40, at 16; Dianne Klein,
'Special' Children, Dark Past Can Haunt Adoptions, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1988, at 1; Neuffer,
supra note 40, at 21.
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2. Current Regulation of Adoption Disclosure and Recent
Reform Efforts-A Shifting Paradigm
a. Identifying Information
i. Access by Adoptees
Certainly the nondisclosure policy that has generated the most pub-
lic controversy in the United States has been the denial to adopted
adults of access to their birth records. Beginning in the 1970s, an open
records movement, propelled by the formation of hundreds of advocacy
and search groups by adoptees and birth parents,49 gained widespread
media attention and influence. Fueled by the large numbers of adoptees
who for the first time were coming of age without access to identifying
information, 0 the concurrent development of the civil rights movement
and activist groups,' the burgeoning sexual revolution and concomitant
undermining of the stigma of illegitimacy,52 and the emergence of
forceful and visible leaders, 3 these groups challenged the prevailing
ideology of the social work profession that had cloaked adoption in-
formation in secrecy, and attacked the legal framework that perpetuated
it. Though the movement has not achieved complete success in the
United States in attaining its goal of unconditional access on the part of
adoptees to birth records, it has made significant progress in recon-
49. Although the first U.S. search organization, Orphan Voyage, was founded in 1953 by
Jean Patton, Professor Carp contends that it was the founding of Adoptee's Liberty Movement
Association (ALMA) by Florence Fisher in 1971 that prompted the creation of hundreds of
similar organizations, most of which have become members of the umbrella organization,
American Adoption Congress, which was formed in 1978. CARP, supra note 9, at 141-45. A
national group of birth parents, known as Concerned United Birthparents, also lobbies for
open records. WEGAR, supra note 9, at 4. Search groups spread internationally as well in coun-
tries that had closed records. Parent Finders and Birth Parent/Relative Group were created in
Canada; Genealogy Source in the U.K.; and the Adopted Peoples Association in the Republic
of Ireland. See PAUL SACHDEV, UNLOCKING THE ADOPTION FILES 2, 3 (1989); CARP, supra
note 9, at 144-45; Adoptionireland.com, available at http://adoptionireland.com, respectively.
50. The influx of large numbers of out-of-wedlock children into the adoption system in
the post-war years, combined with the movement in the 1950s and subsequent decades to
close birth records, plus the growing refusal of agencies during these decades to provide iden-
tifying information to adult adoptees created, by the 1970s, a burgeoning group of adult
adoptees without access to identifying information about their birth families. CARP, supra note
9, at 108-09, 138, 142.
51. WEGAR, supra note 9, at 19-20 (citing WILLIAM FEIGELMAN & ARNOLD R.
SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN: NEW PATTERNS OF ADOPTIVE KINSHIP 196 (1983)); CARP,
supra note 9, at 142-43.
52. CARP, supra note 9, at 142-43.
53. Florence Fisher, author of THE SEARCH FOR ANNA FISHER (1973), and Betty Jean
Lifton, author of TWICE BORN: MEMOIRS OF AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER (1975), both became
prominent leaders of the movement and spokespersons for the rights of adopted persons to
access their records. CARP, supra note 9, at 143-46, 162-63.
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structing the adoption paradigm, by moderating the policies of social
workers, prompting the creation of a multitude of private as well as
state-sponsored registries or intermediary services in virtually every
state, and inspiring re-examination of closed records legislation.
The reconstruction of the "adoption as rebirth" paradigm received
support from the work of social scientists in the 1970s and 1980s who
questioned its underlying assumptions. In the mid-1970s, a child psychia-
trist, Arthur Sorosky, and two social workers, Annette Baran and Reuben
Pannor, published numerous articles and a book challenging the model of
"adoptive family" as "replacement family" and popularized the phrases
"adoption triangle," later shortened to "triad," and "birth parents." Their
work reintroduced birth parents as visible members of the construct and
fostered an alternate paradigm of adoption as a lifelong experience creat-
ing adopted individuals who would be forever linked to members of both
their birth and adoptive families . They attacked the perceived notion
that searching was a sign of mental instability and suggested instead that
it was prompted by the need to "establish a clearer self-identity."5 Al-
though the flaws in their research design and methodology have
subsequently been criticized, particularly concerning their conclusions
regarding the incidence of identity conflicts in adoptees, the wide-
spread reference to their work in the media, professional journals, and
conferences caused significant impact. The reform movement also
relied upon the work of David Kirk, a Canadian sociologist who recog-
nized the importance of the acknowledgment of differences between
adoptive and biological parenthood,57 and John Triseliotis, whose study
of adoptee searches and reunions in Scotland concluded that continuing
access to open records was beneficial."
Gradually, the social work profession responded. Increasingly,
adoption professionals came to realize that adoption cannot "mirror
biology,"59 and that differences between families created by adoption
54. CARP, supra note 9, at 149.
55. Id. at 151 (citing Annette Baran, et. al., The Dilemma of Our Adoptees, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Dec. 1975, at 9, 38; Arthur D. Sorosky, et. al., The Reunion of Adoptees and Birth
Relatives, 3 J. OF YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE, 195, 203 (1974); Reuben Pannor, et. al., Open-
ing the Sealed Record in Adoption-The Human Need for Continuity, 51 J. OF JEWISH
COMMUNAL SERVICE, 188, 194 (1974)).
56. CARP, supra note 9, at 148-58; WEGAR, supra note 9, at 20. Ultimately, Baran and
Pannor (by the 1990s) became advocates for the abolition of traditional adoption and its re-
placement with a new status they label as "guardianship adoption." CARP, supra note 9, at 222.
57. CARP, supra note 9, at 198.
58. JOHN TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS: THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED PEOPLE
(1973). For further discussion of the influence of this work in Great Britain, see infra notes
242-44 and accompanying text.
59. See e.g., Katz, supra note 37, at 9; H.D. Sants, Geneological Bewilderment in Chil-
dren with Substitute Parents, 37 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 133, 140 (1964).
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and those created by birth should be appreciated and celebrated. 60 In
the 1978 revision of its standards, CWLA advised agencies that they
could no longer give birth or adoptive parents assurances of confidenti-
ality, :although they still advised disclosure of identifying information
only when ordered by the courts or when legislation permitted.6' Agen-
cies began assisting in searches for birth parents, but still did not reveal
identifying information without birth parent permission.62 Professional
journals, by the late 1970s reported favorably on the open records
movement.63 The most recent CWLA Standards of Excellence for
Adoption Services, issued in 2000, provides that agencies should
"promote policies that provide adopted adults with direct access to
identifying information." 64 Although opposition to opening records still
has some staunch adherents, 65 and social workers have not uniformly
endorsed automatic access to records, appreciation for the importance
to many adoptees of their connection to both birth and adoptive fami-
lies is now the dominant philosophy in the profession.
A combination of changing cultural mores, the media attention
captured by the issue of adoptee searches,66 and the new vision of adop-
tion espoused by adoption professionals have effected a shift in the
paradigm of adoption in the eyes of both the general public, 67 and birth
and adoptive families, as well. In the last few decades attitudes about
premarital pregnancy and infertility have changed, and fear of stigma-
tization related to both have diminished. Neither adoption nor single
pregnancies are the dark family secrets that they once were in the
1950s. Moreover, the process of adoption is now more open. Birth par-
ents of infants voluntarily placed frequently participate in choosing the
adoptive placement for their child, and open adoptions, involving some
communication and possibly ongoing contacts between adoptive and
birth families, are increasing.68 The majority of adult adoptees and birth
60. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law, 3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN-ADOPTION 43, 49-
50 (Center for the Future of Children, ed., 1993); H. David Kirk, Foreword to FEIGELMAN &
SILVERMAN, supra note 51, at xiv.
61. CARP, supra note 9, at 175.
62. Id. at 181.
63. Id. at 182.
64. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, CWLA STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE FOR
ADOPTION SERVICES § 6.22 (rev. ed. 2000) [hereinafter CWLA STANDARDS].
65. One of the leading critics of open records is the National Council for Adoption (for-
merly National Committee for Adoption). CARP, supra note 9, at 145.
66. See CARP, supra note 9, at 146-47, 154-62, 167-68, 223-24; WEGAR, supra note 9,
at 109-20.
67. Oregon's open records law, Measure 58, was passed by a voter referendum in No-
vember 1998.
68. See Irving Shulman & Richard E. Behrman, Adoption: Overview and Major Recom-
mendations, 3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN-ADOPTION 4, 14 (Center for the Future of Children,
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parents now express a willingness to be found.69 Moreover, the majority
of adoptive parents, once strong opponents of open records,70 now favor
the provision of identifying information to adult adoptees and do not
oppose reunions between their adult child and the child's birth family.7'
ed., 1993) ("[T]he question of whether adoption shall be open or closed is really moot because
older-child adoptions are clearly 'open' in most instances, and independent adoptions, which
now handle the majority of infant adoptions, are characteristically open."); see also Michael P.
Sobol & Kerry Daly, Adoption Practice in Canada: Emerging Trends and Challenges, 74
CHILD WELFARE 655, 661 (1995) (reporting that in Canada 54% of practitioners normally
have birth mothers choose adoptive parents from pre-selected family profiles without identify-
ing information; in 34% of adoptions, regular exchange of information occurs; in 18%,
preplacement meetings without exchange of identifying information occur, and in 13% of
adoptions, names were exchanged); Tammy Somogye, Opening Minds to Open Adoption, 45
U. KAN. L. REV. 619, 623, 628 (1997) (Somogye reports that, at the time of her research
(1996), at least three states-Tennessee, Washington, and New Mexico-regulated open adop-
tion by statute; eight states, by statute or judicial precedent, would enforce open adoption
agreements stipulated in the decree; and eight states, by statute or case precedent, specifically
permitted parties to privately enter open adoption agreements, even though the provisions of
the agreement would not be enforceable); Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Perspectives on
Open Adoption, 3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN-ADOPTION 119, 124 (1993); see generally,
Marianne Berry, Risks and Benefits of Open Adoption, 3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN-ADOPTION
125, 126 (1993).
69. See Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-12 n.28 (reporting that the Maine Task Force on
Adoption in its 1988-89 survey "found that nearly all of the 130 birth parents who responded
to the questionnaire were willing to be found, [and] only 5% of the 164 adoptees [surveyed]
did not want to be found") (citing MAINE DEP'T HUM RES. TASK FORCE, ADOPTION: A LIFE
LONG PROCESS 3, 15-20, App. A, 54-60 (1989)); Paul Sachdev, Adoption Reunion and After:
A Study of the Search Process and Experience of Adoptees, 71 CHILD WELFARE 53, 60-64
(1992) (a study by Prof. Sachdev, School of Social Work at the University of Newfoundland,
which surveyed 124 adoptees reunited with their birth parents and other relatives, revealed that
86.9% were pleased or moderately pleased to meet their birth parents and 93.6% had no re-
grets about it; additionally, three-fourths of the birth mothers reacted with moderate to strong
enthusiasm when contacted by an adoptee).
70. See CARP, supra note 9, at 145, 187 (reporting that following the formation of ALMA
in the early 1970s, The Adoptive Parents Committee, with membership of at least 1000,
quickly formed to denounce open adoption records; when commentary was solicited for the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Model Adoption Act in 1980, 90% of the
adoptive parents responding objected to the provision that would have opened adoption re-
cords to adopted adults upon demand).
71. See Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-12 n.28 (reporting that the Maine Task Force on
Adoption in its 1988-89 survey discovered that only 2% of the 248 adoptive parents who
responded opposed reunions between their adoptive children and members of their birth fami-
lies) (citing MAINE DEP'T HUM RES. TASK FORCE, supra note 69, at 15-20, App. A, 54-60);
What Adoptive Parents Think of Open Records, at http:www.homes4kids.org (reporting that a
1992 survey by Adoptive Families of America of their predominantly adoptive-parent mem-
bership, published in OUR Magazine, May/June 1993, discovered that 80% of adoptive
parents who responded stated that a birth parent should have the right to find the children
given up for adoption, and 68% of adoptive parents stated that all adults adoptees should re-
ceive a copy of their original birth certificates if the birth parents do not file a written
objection, although only 33% thought they should receive their original birth certificate if a
birth parent objected. The cite also reports that a survey of adoptive parents who had adopted
foster children through public agencies, conducted by New York State Citizens Coalition for
Children, Inc., revealed "overwhelming support" of the right of adult adoptees to have their
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In response to changing attitudes of both adoption professionals
and the public, and lobbying by all members of the adoption triad,72
state legislatures in almost every state have created either a mutual
consent registry, or a confidential intermediary service, or both, to
facilitate the ability of adult adoptees and members of their birth
families to find each other.73 Mutual consent registries are typically
passive. Identifying information is not revealed until both the adoptee
and 'the birth relative have filed consents with the registry, and no
attempt is made by registry administrators to contact the person the
registrant is seeking in order to solicit consent. Some require consent
from both birth parents; others require consent only from the
14registering parties. Because the adoptee and at least one birth parent
must independently contact the registry, passive registrants are often
unsuccessful in locating their relatives. 5
Confidential intermediary services, sometimes referred to as
"search and consent" programs, authorize a public or private agency to
actively search for the person the search initiator wishes to locate, and
to ascertain whether that person is willing to disclose identifying in-
formation and/or meet. About half of the states operate some type of
intermediary service, although in some its use is restricted to adoptees
only, or to instances of medical or other necessity.7 6 Though these ser-
original birth certificate); Sachdev, supra note 69, at 60 (a study by Prof. Paul Sachdev, who
surveyed 124 reunions between adoptees and their birth parents and other relatives, found that
the majority of adoptive parents supported their children's search efforts).
72. For example, during the mid-1990s when Oklahoma's Adoption Law Reform
Committee held public hearings, both adoptees and adoptive parents strenuously lobbied the
Committee to open adoption records. Adoptee advocacy groups and Concerned United
Birthparents also have been active lobbyists for open records. See CARP, supra note 9, at 183-
86, 189-90; WEGAR, supra note 9, at 4. Legislators sponsoring open records legislation this
year also report that they have been lobbied by both adoption advocacy groups and adoptive
parents in favor of the legislation. Telephone interview with John Turoski, Legislative
Assistant to Senator Ray Goodman, New York State Senate (June 5, 2001); Telephone
Interview with Catherine Harris, Legislative Assistant to Assemblyman Anthony Pescetti,
California Assembly (June 1, 2001); Telephone interview with Representative Jane Wood,
New Hampshire House of Representatives (June 1, 2001).
73. At least forty-three states now provide by statue for the operation of a mutual consent
registry or an intermediary service operated by the state. Of the remaining seven states, two
(Iowa and New Jersey) permit the release of identifying information from records of adoption
proceedings upon mutual consent, and two states (Alaska and Kansas) have permitted adult
adoptees access to their birth certificates for many years. Hollinger, supra note 14, at tables
13-A.01 to 13-A.03.
74. Id. at table 13-A.01.
75. A report by the State Department of Social Services on the first decade of the opera-
tion of Michigan's registry, 1980-1990, indicated that despite more than 6,000 consents on file
by birth parents, only 911 matches with adult adoptees were made during that time period.
Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-38; see also Cahn & Singer, supra note 22, at 164.
76. Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13A-5.
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vices have more potential for success than passive registries, they are
typically more expensive, and still dependent upon the diligence and
resources of the appointed intermediary.
7
State registries and intermediary services are also hampered by the
transient nature of the American populace. Adult adoptees may not
know the state in which they were born, or even the state in which they
were adopted, and birth parents may have no idea in which state an
adoptee might register. Though there have been efforts in Congress to
pass a federal mutual consent registry since 1980, such efforts have
thus far been unsuccessful. 8 Thus, while registries and search services
have provided adoptees with the potential to discover identifying in-
formation, and both adoptees and birth relatives with the possibility of
a reunion, they have not fully satisfied the desires of adoptees and birth
relatives to locate each other. They also fail to address the need for
self-affirmation that adoptee advocates attach to the ability to receive
71
an original birth certificate, a right enjoyed by non-adopted persons.
While disclosure of identifying information with mutual consent is
widely accepted, the major controversy in the United States now
concerns the best method for ascertaining the wishes of both the
individual adoptee and the birth parents, while accommodating the
interests of each, and whether disclosure of such information should be
made despite the objection of the person who is the subject of that
information. Even though the vast majority of birth parents are
amenable to or actively seeking a reunion,80 a small minority still
77. Cahn & Singer, supra note 22, at 165. When Oklahoma began operation of its mutual
consent registry and confidential intermediary service, the proposed fee for the registry was
$20, and for the intermediary service, $400 for the first search and $200 for any subsequent
searches on behalf of the same searcher. D. Marianne Brower Blair, The New Oklahoma Adop-
tion Code: A Quest to Accommodate Diverse Interests, 33 TULSA L. J. 177, 252 n.448, 255
n.461 (1997).
78. Cahn & Singer, supra note 22, at 163; see also CARP, supra note 9, at 190-92.
79. Some adopted adults who have located their birth parents still litigate in an effort to
obtain a copy of their original birth certificate. Telephone Interview with Representative Jane
Wood, supra note 72. Representative Wood sponsored legislation in the New Hampshire Leg-
islature in the 2001 session that would have provided adopted persons at the age of 18 or older
with an unequivocal right to their birth certificate and adoption records. See also Cahn &
Singer, supra note 22, at 166.
80. Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-12 n.28 (reporting on the 1988-89 survey of adoptees,
birth parents, and adoptive parents conducted by the Maine Task Force on Adoption, which
indicated that nearly all of the 130 birth parents who responded to the survey reported their
willingness to be found, citing MAINE DEP'T HUM RES. TASK FORCE, supra note 69, at 3, 15-
20, app. A, 54-60; Bonnie Miller Rubin, Opposition Forces Cite Mom's Privacy, State Bill
Would Let Adult Adoptees Fill in Missing Parts of Their History, CHI. TRIB., March 17, 1997,
at Al (reporting that both supporters and foes of open records concede that only a small per-
centage of birth parents do not want to be found).
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oppose contact or the release of their identity.8' In Delaware, where
adult adoptees may receive copies of their original birth certificates
unless a birth parent files an affidavit opposing disclosure, 13 birth
parents have denied access to certificates between January 1999 and
April 2001.82 During the first year that Oregon's new law opening birth
certificates to adult adoptees has been in effect, 79 birth parents filed
no contact preferences.83 Since August 1, 2000, when Alabama
reopened its birth records, approximately half a dozen "no contact"
preferences have been filed. 84
It is also true that, while most adult adoptees are not opposed to be-
ing found, and many are actively searching, some adoptees, like some
birth parents, oppose contact or open records legislation." In Tennes-
see, of the 805 requests for contact that have been processed from the
time the contact veto law took effect in 2000 through May 2001, 136
contacts were denied because the subject of the request objected. This
figure includes birth parents, relatives of birth parents covered by the
81. Joel Tennenbaum, Introducing the Uniform Adoption Act, 30 FAM. L. Q. 333, 340-41
(1996) (the author, a member of the drafting committee for the Uniform Adoption Act, model
legislation that was proposed in 1994 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, reports that the drafters heard from birth parents who "felt they had
contracted with an agency on condition of confidentiality and privacy" and did not want con-
tact at a time when they had established a life with a new family who was unaware of the
existence of the adoptee.); Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13-38 (relating that the Michigan State
Department of Social Services, reporting on the operation of its registry between 1980 and
1990, found that for children born before 1980, at least 6,000 consents to disclosure had been
filed by birth parents, and denials had been filed by fewer than 150 mothers and 60 fathers).
82. Telephone interview with Louise Wishhart, Vital Statistics Clerk, Delaware Office of
Vital Statistics (June 1, 2001). Ms. Wishhart reports that from January 1999 through April 30,
2001, 393 adopted persons requested copies of their birth certificates, 358 have been released,
and 13 were declined because the birth parents objected to the release by affidavit.
83. Telephone interview with Ms. Chan Vannarath, Assistant to Ms. Carol Sanders, Certi-
fication Manager for Oregon's Vital Records Unit (June 1, 2001). The Oregon law went into
effect on May 30, 2000. Janie Har, Local Stories, OREGONIAN, November 6, 2000, at El. Ms.
Vannerath reports that through May 30, 2001, 5,839 requests for birth certificates were re-
ceived from adult adoptees and 411 contact preference forms were filed by birth parents. Of
those 411, 305 preferred contact, 27 preferred contact only through an intermediary, and 79
preferred no contact.
84. Telephone Interview with Joan Stires, Vital Records, Ala. Dep't of Health (June 5,
2001). Ms. Stires reported that between August 1, 2000 and May 30, 2001, 1,366 requests for
certificates had been made by adoptees. Of the 68 contact preference forms that had been
filed, "perhaps half a dozen" preferred no contact.
85. See MAINE DEP'T HUM RES. TASK FORCE, supra note 69, (indicating that 5% of the
164 responding adoptees did not want to be found). See also, SACHDEV, supra note 49, at 42,
122x (study of 53 adult adoptees in Canada in 1980s revealed that 56.6% agreed that adoptees'
identity should be released to birth mothers and 43.4% disagreed); Melissa Fletcher Stoeltje,
Adopted Teens Seek Answers, Hous. CHRON., May 28, 1997, at 1 (reporting that 65% of
adopted adolescents Say that they want to meet their birth parents one day); Maureen M. Hart,
Another Voice in the Adoption Triangle Seeks a Hearing, CHI. TRIB., March 27, 1997, at 1
(adult adoptee writes in opposition to a proposed open records law).
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veto, and adoptees who declined to consent to contact by birth
parents8 6
These reports are consistent with the experiences of other countries
as well, whose no-contact or no-disclosure veto systems have been in
effect for longer periods of time. British Columbia, Canada, permits
disclosure of identifying information to adult adoptees and birth par-
ents, subject to no-contact declarations and disclosure vetoes that can
be filed by adopted persons and by birth parents of children adopted
before the new legislation took effect. Statistics released by the British
Columbia Vital Statistics Agency reveal that between November 4,
1996 and March 31, 2000, 7,188 applications for records were received
(21% from birth mothers, 2% from birth fathers, and 77% from
adoptees). During that same period, 3,046 disclosure vetoes were en-
tered" (75% from birth mothers, 8  2% from birth fathers, and 23% from
adoptees); and 323 no-contact declarations were received (65% from
birth mothers, and 35% from adoptees). 9 New South Wales, Australia
discovered that during the first year of operation of its contact veto reg-
istry, approximately 45% of the 3,432 contact vetoes registered were
filed by birth parents, and the remaining 55% were filed by adult
adoptees.90
It is primarily concern for birth parents who object to disclosure
that has thus far prevented most state legislatures in the United States
from following the example of the majority of European countries,9' by
86. Telephone Interview with Anita Cowen, Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs. (June 4,
2001). Ms. Cowen reported that the Department has completed 805 searches pursuant to con-
tact requests since the Tennessee contact veto law has been in operation. Of those persons who
were the subject of a search, 249 filed consents to contact, 21 could not be located, 174 were
deceased, 225 who had not filed a contact veto did not say yes or no to the request for contact,
and 136 objected to contact. The subjects of the search included both birth parents and rela-
tives and adult adoptees, although Ms. Cowen related that most of the requests they had
received had been from adoptees attempting to locate birth mothers or other birth relatives.
Many other searches are still being processed, where perhaps one relative has been located but
not others with whom contact was requested. In July 2001, a more complete and detailed
annual report will be issued by the Department.
87. Nineteen of these were removed during the same period. Canadian Council of Birth-
mothers, Provincial Info, at http://www.nebula.on.ca/canbmothers/prov.htm (last visited Sept.
14, 2001).
88. This figure includes approximately 600 no-contact vetoes that were transferred from
the British Columbia Adoption Reunion Registry and converted to no-disclosure vetoes under
the new Act. See id.
89. See id.
90. N.S.W. L. REFORM COMM'N, REPORT 69, supra note 11, § 4.8. The study notes, how-
ever, that some veto registrants later removed their vetoes, and others registered with the
reunion registry so as to have more control over the nature and timing of the contact.
91. Adult adoptees have had access to original birth certificates in England and Wales
since 1976, in Northern Ireland since 1987, and in Scotland since legal adoption was intro-
duced in 1930. See infra notes 240, 247-48 and accompanying text. Finland has also had open
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providing adult adoptees with automatic access to their birth certifi-
cates. Some state legislators have recently introduced bills that would
permit adoptees to receive a copy of their birth certificates upon re-
quest. Their staff members report that the principal rationale articulated
by other legislators opposing the bills is the reluctance to jeopardize
the privacy of birth parents.92 Concern that opening records would
prompt some birth mothers to choose abortion rather than adoption has
occasionally surfaced among opponents as well. 93 These recent reports
are consistent with the experience of reformers who have supported
open records over the past few decades.94
While there does appear to be an emerging trend to open birth re-
cords to adult adoptees in the United States, its progress is likely to be
laborious. Only six states appear to permit adult adoptees to access
their birth certificates upon demand. Kansas95 and Alaska96 never closed
birth records to adult adoptees; Tennessee, Oregon, and Alabama re-
cently passed legislation opening their records. In South Dakota, court
records, but not birth records, are available by statute to adult adoptees
on demand; however, the prevailing practice is to petition the court for
records for many decades. See TRISELIOTIS, supra note 58, at 1. Recently, Greece and Poland
opened records to adult adoptees. loannis Deliyannis, Greece-Reforming the Law of Adop-
tion, in 1995 THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 174, 194 (Andrew Bainham ed.,
1997); Wanda Stojanowska, Poland-Adoption: Revision of the Family and Custody Code,
1995 THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW at 402. The Canadian press reports that
France, Germany, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands permit adoptees
access to birth records as well. Michele Landsberg, Get with the 21st Century: Open Records
for Adoptees, TORONTO STAR, August 7, 1999, at LI; see also Ake Saldeen, Sweden-The
Rights of Children to Speak for Themselves and Obtain Access to Information Concerning
Their Biological Origins, in 1994 THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 441 (Andrew
Bainham ed., 1996).
92. See Telephone Interview with Barbara Cohen, Lobbyist who has worked closely with
Assemblyman Baggar, New Jersey State Assembly (June 1, 2001); Telephone Interview with
Catherine Harris, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with Andrea Stingley, Legislative Aide
to Representative Tony Goolsby, Texas House of Representatives (June 26, 2001); Telephone
Interview with John Turoski, supra note 72; Telephone Interview with Julia Venema, Legisla-
tive Director for Senator Susan Fargo, Massachusetts State Senate (June 1, 2001); Telephone
Interview with Representative Jane Wood, supra note 72.
93. Telephone Interview with Julia Venema, supra note 92 (reporting that although the
Roman Catholic diocese had previously opposed bills they had introduced to open records,
this year a Roman Catholic priest from the diocese testified in favor of this year's bill, which
contained a contact preference provision). This author, who was a member of the Oklahoma
Adoption Reform Committee in the mid-1990s, recalls that concerns over abortion surfaced
from one member of the Committee during the discussion of opening records as well.
94. CARP, supra note 9, at 229.
95. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (1992).
96. ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (Michie 2000).
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access to both court records and birth certificates, and it is reported that
the court will grant the petition pro forma.97
Six other states, Maryland," Indiana, 99 Delaware"' Oklahoma,0'
97. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-15 (Michie 1999) provides that adoptees may have ac-
cess to the court record upon reaching maturity without a court order, although access to birth
records requires a court order. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-16.4 (Michie 1999). However,
Prof. Samuels reports that the South Dakota Adoption Program Specialist at the Division of
Child Protective Services relates that as of Oct. 1999, the standard practice was for an adoptee
to petition the court for access to both court and original birth records, which request would
then be granted by the court. Samuels, supra note 22, at 436 n.71 and accompanying text.
98. For adoptions finalized after January 1, 2000, adoptees who are at least 21 years old
may obtain their original birth certificates and decrees of adoption, and birth parents may
obtain the new certificate of birth of the adoptee and the adoption decree, but both adoptees
and birth parents may file disclosure vetoes that would cause identifying information about
them to be deleted from the records before they are released. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§§ 5-3A-01 to -05 (1999).
99. An adoptee over the age of twenty who was adopted in an action filed after December
31, 1993 may obtain identifying information from the state registrar, the court, other state
agencies, a licensed agency or the attorney who arranged the adoption, unless the birth parent
has filed a non-release form. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-19-25-1 to -3. (West 1998).
100. Delaware's statutes are confusing. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3110(b) (Supp. 2000)
provides that the State Registrar shall provide a non-certified copy of an original birth certifi-
cate to an adoptee aged 21 or older. Enacted concurrently, however, is DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 923 (1999), which provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Delaware Code to the contrary, an
adoptee 21 years of age or older may obtain a copy of [an] original record of birth
from the State Registrar pursuant to § 3110(b) of Title 16, even if that record has
been impounded. This section shall not apply if the birth parent has, within the most
recent 3 year period, filed a written notarized statement with the Department of
Health and Social Services Office of Vital Statistics denying the release of any iden-
tifying information.
If the adoptee was born prior to January 18, 1999, the Office of Vital Statistics must determine
if a birth parent affidavit is on file. If an affidavit denying the release of information is on file,
or if no affidavit is on file, the Department must notify the birth parents by mail of the request
and the need to file a nondisclosure affidavit within 35 days. If a nondisclosure affidavit is not
received within that time, the record will be released. Louise Wishhart, Vital Statistics Clerk
for the Delaware Office of Vital Statistics, confirmed that birth parents can deny access by
affidavit. See Telephone Interview with Louise Wishhart, supra note 72. An adoptee who has
obtained a copy of the birth certificate may request an agency to assist in locating a birth par-
ent or birth sibling. The birth relative may make a no-contact declaration, after which further
assistance in the search will not be provided to the adoptee. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 962
(1999).
101. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-6.6 (West Supp. 2000). Adoptees whose adop-
tions were finalized after November 1, 1997 may obtain copies of their birth certificates, if a
birth parent has not filed an affidavit of nondisclosure. If only one birth parent has filed an
affidavit, only that birth parent's name will be removed from the copy given to the adoptee.
Birth parents are advised of their right to file an affidavit of nondisclosure at the time consent
is given, and may file or withdraw one any time thereafter, but there is no provision to notify a
birth parent at the time a request for the birth certificate is made. Adoptees cannot receive
copies of their original birth certificates if they have a minor birth sibling in an adoptive fam-
ily whose location is known to the adoptee.
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Montana,° 2 and Washington,' 3 have all within the past decade enacted
legislation permitting adult adoptees to obtain copies of their original
birth certificates, unless a birth parent has filed a disclosure veto. How-
ever, the statutes of Maryland, Oklahoma, Montana (with the exception
of adoptions finalized prior to July 1, 1967) and Washington operate
only prospectively, applying to adoptions finalized after the effective
dates of the amendments, and Indiana's statute applies only to adoptions
filed after December 31, 1993. Thus, adoptees who are currently adults
in those states have no recourse under the new provisions, except in
Montana, where those who were adopted before the records were closed
may utilize the statute. Adoptee advocacy groups object strenuously to
the restriction that identifying information on their original certificates
can be withheld from them if a birth parent objects, arguing that they
should have the same right to information concerning them contained in
public records that non-adopted individuals enjoy.'°4
Tennessee's open records law, passed in 1995, opened adoption re-
cords retrospectively as well as prospectively. The new law contains two
provisions designed to protect birth parent privacy. The first is an excep-
tion to disclosure of identifying information about a birth parent who
was the victim of rape or incest, unless consent has been given by the
parent.' 5 The other is a contact veto registry, modeled after the system
created in New South Wales, Australia.' ° A parent, sibling, spouse, lineal
ancestor or lineal descendant of an adopted person is eligible to file a
contact veto, or a consent to contact, with the registry at any time.' 7 In
addition, as part of the process for executing consent or surrender for
adoption, birth parents are asked whether they wish to file a consent to
contact or veto at that time. ' 08 When a contact veto is registered, the reg-
istrant's spouse, siblings or future siblings, lineal descendants and
102. Individuals adopted before July 1, 1967 or after October 1, 1997 may obtain copies
of their original birth certificates upon request, but for those adopted after October 1, 1997, a
court order is required if a birth parent has filed a nondisclosure request. Those adopted be-
tween July 1, 1967 and October 1, 1997 must have court orders to obtain their birth
certificates. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 42-6-109 (1999).
103. Adult adoptees whose adoptions are finalized after October 1, 1993 may obtain
noncertified copies of their birth certificates, unless the birth parent has filed an affidavit of
nondisclosure. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.345(3) (West 1997).
104. See, e.g., Bastard Nation, the website of one such advocacy group, at http://
www.bastards.org.
105. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (1996).
106. Adoption Information Act of 1990 (New South Wales, Australia), available at
http://www.austli.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consolact/aial990230.txt.
107. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-128.
108. Id. § 36-1-129.
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ancestors, and the spouses of any of those individuals, are automatically
included in the veto, unless specifically excluded by the registrant.' 9
Prior to acquiring information from adoption records, an adopted
person must identify in writing anyone eligible to file with the registry
whom the adoptee wishes to contact, and sign a sworn statement agree-
ing not to contact anyone eligible to register a veto until the Tennessee
Department of Children's Services has completed a search of the regis-
try." ° The Department then searches the registry, and if a veto or consent
is found, the Department contacts the person for whom the contact re-
quest is made to determine if the individual still wishes to consent to
contact, or to confirm, alter, or withdraw a contact veto. If the individual
withdraws consent, or a contact veto remains on file, the adoptee will be
notified that contact is not permitted."' If there is no registration for the
person whom the adoptee wishes to contact, the Department will search
for that person and provide notification of a ninety day period during
which the person may file a contact veto to prevent contact."2 Violation
of the contact veto is a misdemeanor and gives rise to civil liability for
both compensatory and punitive damages."3
Though the contact veto system is an attempt to accommodate the
interests of searchers and those who wish to remain undisturbed, it has
garnered criticism from both camps. Some argue that a contact veto
should be treated like any other injunction or restraining order, and that
birth parents should be required to prove the need for one in court, in a
hearing in which both sides receive due process. The Tennessee contact
system, they contend, treats adult adoptees in a condescending and pa-
ternalistic manner.' Others have argued that the protection the contact
veto affords birth parents desiring privacy is ineffectual, speculating that
prosecutors will be disinclined to prosecute violations, and birth mothers
will not want the publicity attendant with a civil suit for damages. An
examination of the New South Wales Contact Veto system, in its early
years of operation, however, revealed only one "arguable breach" by a
birth mother who made contact with an adult adoptee through an inter-
mediary, and no breaches by adoptees."5
Opponents also suggest that the automatic veto covering a spouse,
children, or other relatives of the birth mother will not protect her
109. Id. § 36-1-130.
110. Id. § 36-1-127.
111. Id. § 36-1-130.
112. Id. § 36-1-131.
113. Id. § 36-1-132.
114. See Bastard Nation, Contact Vetoes: Why They Are Not an Acceptable Solution,
(1998) at http://www.ibar.com/voices/activism/bn-contactvetoes.htm.
115. N.S.W. L. REFORM COMM'N, REPORT No. 69, supra note 11, § 5.182.
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privacy, since the Department is required to contact some of these
relatives to determine if they wish to withdraw the automatic veto, if the
adoptee has requested contact with them. They also note that if the
adoptee does not indicate on the form that she wishes contact, or if the
birth parent cannot be found, the birth parent will have no notice that her
identity has been released. Moreover, the contact veto statutes do not
prohibit an adoptee from contacting a birth parent's friends, neighbors,
clergy, co-workers, aunts or uncles," 6 contacts that might be attractive to
an adoptee who wishes to learn more about a birth parent he cannot
meet, but which could jeopardize her emotional well-being nonetheless.
It has also been suggested that a birth parent who cannot be found
should be presumed to have vetoed contact, which is not the current
application of the statute, and that the fees necessary to administer the
program should be assessed against those requesting records, so that
contact vetoes could be filed without cost."7
The most recent approach to opening records is to provide birth par-
ents with the opportunity to communicate their "preference" regarding
contact at the time that an adoptee receives his original birth certificate.
Oregon pioneered this system when its legislature passed legislation in
1999 to accompany implementation of Measure 58, the constitutional
referendum passed by voters in November 1998 that permits adoptees
age 21 or older to obtain a copy of their original birth certificates."' Birth
parents may contact the state's voluntary registry program to receive a
contact preference form, on which they may indicate that they desire
contact, desire contact only through an intermediary, or prefer no con-
tact."9 Before a "no contact" preference will be processed, however, the
birth parent must complete a Birth Parent Updated Medical History
form.' 20 When an adoptee requests a copy of her birth certificate, the
Contact Preference Form is also given to the adoptee. Alabama passed
legislation implementing a very similar contact preference system when
it reopened its birth records to adoptees over 18 years of age on August
1, 2000.121
116. See e.g., Carol Chumney, Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto Is Cold Comfort
to Birth Parents, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 843, 860-64 (1997).
117. Leslie J. Kelley, Tennessee's Adoption Law and the Limitations of the Constitu-
tional Arguments Regarding Open Records, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 223, 227 (2001).
118. Due to legal challenges (see infra note 159 and accompanying text) Measure 58 and
the accompanying legislation was not implemented until after May 31, 2000. See Oregon
Health Division, Center for Health Statistics, History of Ballot Measure 58, at http://
www.ohd.hr.or.us/chs/certif/58update.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2001).
119. See OR. REV. STAT. § 432.240 (1999).
120. See id. § 109.460; OR. ADMIN. R. 413-130-0355 (2001).
121. ALA. CODE § 22-9A-12 (2000). Although the Alabama law suggests that parents
must state that they have filed a medical history form when expressing a "no contact" veto, the
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"Contact preference" legislation has received positive reviews from
the advocacy groups for adoptees, because it provides them with birth
certificates upon demand and an alternative method to receive some
medical information from birth parents who desire not to be contacted,
and it avoids the mandates of the contact veto system. The degree to
which it will protect birth parents from disruption and breach of confi-
dentiality, in those instances in which contact is not desired, remains to
be seen, as the two statutes have both been in operation for only one
year.
Nevertheless, the combination of opening records on demand with a
contact preference system seems to be gaining in popularity. In 2001,
legislation modeled after Oregon's was introduced in four influential
states: Massachusetts,'22 New York, 123 California, 24 and Texas.2 5 How-
ever, the Texas bill did not make it out of the legislature before the
session ended, 26 and the prospects for the New York bill 2' and Califor-
nia'2 bill passing in 2001 were also predicted to be slim. The
Massachusetts bill was still under active consideration as of June 2001 .29
As in other years, there are also several bills pending in state legisla-
tures in 2001 to open birth records to adult adoptees,"' but none has
passed at the time of publication. There is also legislation pending in
New Jersey to open records, but permitting birth parents to exercise a
language is not quite as specific in mandating that the form should not be processed without
the medical history form.
122. See S. 670, 2001 Leg., 182nd Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2001).
123. See S. 5002, 2001 Leg., 224th Sess. (N.Y 2001).
124. See A. B. 1349, 2001 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (as amended in Assembly April 16,
2001).
125. See H.R. 1767, 2001 Leg., 77th Sess. (Tex. 2001).
126. Telephone Interview with Andrea Stingley, supra note 92. As the Texas Legislature
meets only biennially, the bill cannot be reintroduced until 2003. Representative Goolsby was
the sponsor of the bill.
127. Telephone Interview with John Turaski, supra note 72 (with three weeks left in the
session, it was doubtful bill would get out of Committee and passed this session). Senator
Goodman was the sponsor of the bill in the New York Senate.
128. Telephone Interview with Catherine Harris, supra note 72 (the bill had failed in
Committee and they were asking for reconsideration to make it a two year bill; opponents
wanted an amendment adding a disclosure veto provision). Assemblyman Pescetti was the
sponsor of the bill in the California Assembly.
129. Telephone Interview with Julia Venema, supra note 92 (the bill had just had a hear-
ing, which went well, and the contact preference provision seemed to get a more favorable
response than a bill sponsored the previous year that opened the records on demand with no
such provision). Senator Fargo was the sponsor of the bill in the Massachusetts Senate.
130. See H.R. 5407, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2001); S.B. 30, 2001 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (La. 2001); H.B. 355, 91st Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001); H.R. 449,
157th Sess., 2001 Leg. Sess. (N.H. 2001); G.A. 6271, 2001 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2001).
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disclosure veto if they fill out medical history forms.' A disclosure veto
bill was also introduced in Washington in 2001 that would open records
prior to 1993.3
At present, the majority of states still do not release identifying in-
formation to adult adoptees from birth or adoption records unless the
adoptee obtains a court order for "good cause shown.' '33 Even in states in
which birth parents can exercise a disclosure veto, adoptees who have
been refused records on this ground typically have the alternative to peti-
tion a court for records on the ground of good cause. The courts have
usually applied a balancing test to determine whether good cause exists,
focusing on the interests of the adoptee and the birth parent, but occa-
sionally articulating the state's interest in maintaining an effective
adoption procedure and the interests of adoptive parents as considera-
tions as well. '34 In proceedings seeking records initiated by adopted
adults, generally courts have been willing to find good cause to release
them only when birth parents have consented.'35 When the wishes of
birth parents were unknown, some courts have appointed an intermedi-
ary to determine their desires,'3 6 but others have refused,'37 or will do so
only upon a showing of compelling need.'
38
A review of the published opinions would indicate that adopted
adults have had great difficulty establishing good cause. Courts have
131. S. Comm. Substitute for S. 2002, 1932, and 300, 209th Leg., 2nd Ann. Sess. (N.J.
2001). Though this bill does not have the support of some advocacy groups because of its
disclosure veto, other adoptee's rights advocacy groups are supporting it as a step forward. See
also Telephone Interview with Barbara Cohen, advocate who has worked with the bill's spon-
sor, Assemblyman Bagger (June 1, 2001).
132. H.B. 1351, 57th leg., 2001 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2001).
133. See Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13A-4 & 13-26.
134. See Dixon v. Dep't of Pub. Health (In re Dixon), 323 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982); In re Application of George, 625 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Mills v. Atlantic
City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); Golan v. Louise
Wise Serv's, 507 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1987); In re Adoption of Spinks, 232 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1977); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383 (R.I. 1986); Bradey v. Children's Bureau of S.C.,
274 S.E.2d 418 (S.C. 1981); In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (consider-
ing objection by adoptive parent in denying access to records).
135. E.g., In re D.E.D., 672 A.2d 582 (D.C. 1996); In re Dixon, 323 N.W.2d 549; In re
Anonymous, 399 N.YS.2d 857 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1977) (disclosure necessary for applicant's men-
tal rehabilitation, and parents consented). See also In re Margaret Susan P., 733 A.2d 38 (Vt.
1999) (when birth parents consented to disclosure of information, adoption agency had no
privacy interest of its own that would preclude disclosure of its records).
136. In re Application of George, 625 S.W.2d 151; Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital
Statistics, 372 A.2d 646.
137. In re P.M.H., 18 F.L.R. 1314 (Md. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County 1992); In re Dixon,
323 N.W.2d 549; Backes v. Catholic Family & Cmty. Servs., 509 A.2d 283 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1985).
138. See In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383.
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rejected the desire to learn one's identity as good cause.'39 Although as a
general principle courts acknowledge that severe emotional or
psychological difficulties might, under some circumstances, be good
cause,'" in application, the psychological need to know has often been
rejected, even in cases in which the adopted person was under
professional treatment. 4' General genetic concerns and other medical
justifications have been found sufficient to obtain nonidentifying
information from records, but generally have been rejected as a basis for
obtaining identifying information. 42 The most compelling justification
was asserted in In re Application of George, 43 by an adopted adult with
leukemia who needed to find a bone marrow donor. The Missouri
appellate court found that the birth father must be contacted by an
intermediary, who could disclose any information offered by the father
anonymously. A similar approach has been taken in New York and New
Jersey when adoptees desired information in order to establish
membership in an Indian tribe. Several courts have held that the Indian
139. E.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. 1981); Backes v. Catholic Family &
Cmty. Servs., 509 A.2d 283; In re Linda F.M., 418 N.E.2d 1302 (N.Y. 1981); In re Assalone,
512 A.2d 1383; In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201.
140. In re Estate of Dodge, 413 N.W.2d 449 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (allegation of intense
psychological need entitles adoptee to a hearing); In re Wilson, 544 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989) (allegation of psychological problems necessitating disclosure constitutes prima
facie case, but must be remanded for hearing in which interests of birth parents are repre-
sented and balanced); In re Hayden, 435 N.YS.2d 541 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1981) (evidence from
physician that adoptee might have been a "DES" baby, and from psychologist that she is under
severe psychological strain and feels an enormous void, states a prima facie case for good
cause, entitling applicant to full hearing); In re Adoption of Spinks, 232 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1977) (remanded back to trial court for specific finding on best interest of adoptee,
whose interests are paramount).
141. See In re Dixon, 323 N.W.2d 549 (despite treatment for severe depression, suicide
attempts, and testimony from psychologist that disclosure would be in adoptee's interest, court
refused disclosure, finding lack of information was not the cause of her condition). Cf Backes
v. Catholic Family and Cmty. Servs., 509 A.2d 283 (alleged anxiety and irritability not suffi-
cient, when no pathological psychological problem had been diagnosed); Bradey v. Children's
Bureau of S.C., 274 S.E.2d 418 (S.C. 1981) (untreated emotional distress and anxiety not
good cause).
142. See In re P.M.H., 18 F.L.R. 1314 (generalized medical concern not good cause);
Golan v. Louise Wise Servs., 507 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1987) (disclosure of identifying informa-
tion denied to 54 year old adoptee with heart condition, despite evidence that medical history
would be helpful for his treatment and essential to his certification as a commercial pilot);
Sandra L.G. v. Bouchey, 576 N.YS.2d 767 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1991) (generalized genetic concern
is not good cause to open records, but non-identifying health information must be released
through statutory procedures); Coleman v. Weiner, 528 N.Y.S.2d 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988)
(neurological impairment of child is good cause for obtaining medical records of prenatal care
and birth, with identifying information redacted); In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201 (stating that Sage
failed to establish the good cause required to permit disclosure of identifying information).
See also In re Hayden, 435 N.YS.2d 541 (full hearing granted where adoptee-petitioner
claimed that she might be a "DES" baby).
143. In re Application of George, 625 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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Child Welfare Act requires that the information be released, but only to
the appropriate tribal officials, and not to the adoptee.'"
On the other hand, the utility of good cause hearings to adoptees
today is somewhat difficult to ascertain. Adoptees who have received
their records through good cause hearings have no reason to appeal, and
access to records is very dependent upon the predilections of the trial
judge. For example, one Oklahoma judge who believed the desire to
know one's identity was sufficient cause is reputed to have released
hundreds of records during his years on the bench. Reports from Texas
indicate that in at least one county records are currently very easy to
obtain from the court in a good cause hearing, whereas in some other
counties it is virtually impossible, even with compelling medical
reasons.4' Most of the published good cause decisions were issued in the
1970s and 1980s. By the 1990s, adoptees appear to have largely
abandoned appeals of good cause decisions and utilized other methods to
locate birth family, such as state registries or programs, private search
groups, the Internet, or private investigators, so current judicial thinking
about good cause is more difficult to discern.
ii. Access by Birth Parents
Though recognition of the continuing linkage between an adoptee
and a birth parent is the key characteristic of the new adoption paradigm,
American legislatures and courts have granted birth parents even fewer
rights to identifying information and search assistance than have been
afforded adoptees. Passive registries offer birth parents the opportunity
to locate adult adoptees, if both parties register. Some, but not all, of the
search programs offering the assistance of confidential intermediaries
can be utilized by birth parents to locate their children.'4 6 Although
twelve states permit adult adoptees access to identifying information in
their birth or court records, either upon demand or in the absence of a
disclosure veto, 1 7 only two of those states permit a birth parent to access
information in adoption or vital statistics records that will provide her
with information about the adoptive identity of her child.
In Maryland, a birth parent whose child was adopted after January 1,
2000 may obtain from state officials a copy of both the original and new
certificates of birth of an adoptee and the report of the adoption decree or
144. See In re Adoption of Mellinger, 672 A.2d 197 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); In
re Adoption of Linda J.W., 682 N.Y.S.2d 565 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998); In re Adoption of Re-
becca, 601 N.YS.2d 682 (N.Y Sur. Ct. 1993).
145. Telephone Interview with Andrea Stingley, supra note 92 (Representative Goolsby
is the sponsor of the bill in the Texas House of Representatives).
146. Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13A-I to A-2.
147. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
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judgment any time after the adoptee's 21st birthday, subject to a disclo-
sure veto by the adoptee. Thus, for future adoptions, Maryland law will
create relative parity between adult adoptees and birth parents, as each
may file disclosure vetoes using the same process."'
Tennessee permits birth parents access to adoption records existing
prior to March 16, 1951 for any children adopted or for whom an adop-
tion was attempted. For adoptions finalized after March 16, 1951, birth
parents are entitled to information from adoption records only with the
express written consent of the adult adoptee. 9 If a birth parent requests
information, state officials will attempt to locate the adult adoptee to de-
termine if she wishes to have contact. However, unlike the procedures
for birth parents to file contact vetoes, the adoptee is under no obligation
to file a veto, and no identifying information will be released to the birth
parent without the adoptee's written consent.'
50
The courts have also been unsympathetic to birth parents seeking
identifying information from court records through a good cause hear-
ing. Such requests have been uniformly rejected by courts, who find that
the desire to see a child, even combined with the desire to leave the child
an inheritance, does not constitute good cause."'
iii. Constitutional Challenges by Adoptees and Birth Parents
Both adult adoptees seeking identifying information and birth par-
ents challenging open records laws have attempted to assert
constitutional rights in support of their positions. In each such proceed-
ing, however, the courts have determined that resolution of the open
records debate is not to be resolved by resort to federal or state constitu-
tional law.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many adopted adults attacked the
constitutionality of statutory provisions that denied them an automatic
right to information regarding the identity of their birth parents. These
148. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-3A-05 (2000).
149. "IENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (2000).
150. Id. § 36-1-130.
151. See In re Adoption of Baby S., 705 A.2d 822 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (where
55 year-old adoptee had not filed a request for information, court refused to release informa-
tion to 75 year-old birth mother or to contact adoptee to determine his wishes); In re Robert
R.B., 558 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990); In re Christine, 397 A.2d 511 (R.I. 1979) (ap-
pellate court reversed order of lower court that would have permitted intermediary to contact
adoptive parents to see if they would agree to permit release of identifying information, or
permit birth mother to meet eleven year-old). Cf In re Baby Boy K., 701 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y
Fam. Ct. 1999), rev'd and remanded, 719 N.Y.S.2d 311, 313 (N.Y App. Div. 2001) (though
trial court found no statutory authority to open adoption records on petition of birth parent
who desired to communicate post-adoption medical information, appellate court interpreted
statute to permit this request, observing information could be conveyed through an intermedi-
ary to protect privacy).
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challenges were uniformly rejected.5 2 Plaintiffs' primary contention was
that a federal constitutional right of privacy includes the right to receive
information regarding. their identity. Analogizing to previously recog-
nized privacy rights to marry and procreate without unwarranted
governmental interference, plaintiffs asserted that the right to know their
own identity was fundamental, and under the doctrine of substantive due
process, could not be impaired absent compelling state interests.
The courts considering these claims, however, refused to recognize
the right to identifying information as a fundamental right or to invoke
strict scrutiny. '53 Instead, applying a rational relationship standard, the
courts readily determined that the states' desire to balance the interests of
adoptees with the privacy interests of birth parents and, in some cases,
adoptive parents, served a rational governmental objective and withstood
constitutional attack.
The courts also rejected the contention that "adopted persons," like
classifications based upon race or national origin, are a "suspect class,"
requiring strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause for statutes
that apply only to individuals who are adopted. Adoption is not a charac-
teristic immutable at birth, the courts reasoned, but rather is a legal status
created to protect the best interests of the children. Arguments that in-
termediate scrutiny'54  should be applied also failed.'55  Though
recognizing that courts have applied intermediate scrutiny to classifica-
tions based upon out-of-wedlock birth, for the reason that the state has
employed a questionable characteristic to distinguish those whom the
law should burden from those whom it should not, the courts found that
adopted adults are not denied access to birth records on the basis of out-
of-wedlock birth, and have not been subject to the same stigma and legal
disabilities that persuaded courts to give the protection of intermediate
scrutiny to classifications based upon "illegitimacy." Moreover, these
courts reasoned that adopted adults and nonadopted adults were not
152. Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979); Mills v. Atlantic City
Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); Schechter v. Boren, 535
F. Supp. I (W.D. Okla. 1980); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751 (I11. 1981); Dixon v. Dep't. of
Pub. Health, 323 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo.
1978); In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
153. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). To survive strict scrutiny by a
court, a classification must be found to be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Id.
at 381. Strict scrutiny is employed to review either governmental action that impairs funda-
mental rights under the doctrine of substantive due process, or governmental classifications
that distinguish between persons upon a basis that is deemed "suspect" or impair fundamental
rights under the doctrine of equal protection. See id.
154. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Intermediate scrutiny, which has
been applied to classifications based upon gender or "illegitimacy," requires a court to uphold
a statute only if it is substantially related to an important state interest. Id. at 767.
155. Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225; see also In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201.
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similarly situated, in that the state has no similar need to protect the con-
fidentiality of the parents of nonadopted adults. Therefore, statutes
sealing adoption records were upheld using the rational relationship
standard under equal protection analysis as well.
Several plaintiffs asserted additional constitutional arguments. Some
adoptees contended that their right to receive information under the First
Amendment was abridged. Rejecting such claims, the courts presented
with this argument determined that the First Amendment does not guar-
antee a constitutional right of access to information not available to the
public generally. 56 Moreover, the right to information is not uncondi-
tional, they reasoned, and is not unconstitutionally violated when the
state limits it to balance conflicting rights of privacy and to protect the
integrity of the adoption process.'57 A few plaintiffs also attempted the
novel assertion that the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery
and involuntary servitude was intended to abolish the "incidents" of
slavery, which included severance of parental relations, and thus pro-
tected their right to identifying information. Noting that no judicial
authority supports such an interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment,
this argument was summarily rejected as well.'58
In the 1990s, statutory reform in Tennessee and Oregon, which pro-
vided adopted adults with an unrestricted right of access to identifying
information, prompted litigation by birth parents, who asserted that
opening records violated their constitutional right to privacy. Petitioners
asserted that the right of privacy encompassed the right to freedom from
governmental interf-.rence in reproductive decisions, the right to marry
and bring up children, and a right to nondisclosure of private informa-
tion. They contended that a decision to relinquish a child for adoption
was analogous to decisions to abort or prevent pregnancy, which are con-
stitutionally protected. 159
In Jane Does v. State,'6° the Oregon Court of Appeals rejected this
analogy, reasoning that, unlike a decision to abort or use contraceptives,
156. In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751. See also, Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F Supp.
912 (S.D.N.Y 1978) (First Amendment argument was raised and summarily disregarded).
157. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760; Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372
A.2d 646.
158. Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912; Schechter v. Boren, 535 F Supp. 1
(W.D. Okla. 1980).
159. Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919
(Tenn. 1999); Does v. State, 993 P.2d 822 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied 6 P.3d 1098 (Or.
2000). In another case, a county official asserted that a mutual consent registry infringed birth
parents' constitutional rights because the respondent feared the registry would not sufficiently
ensure that the identity of birth parents would be safeguarded. Axelrod v. Laurino, 548
N.Y.S.2d 405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). The court rejected the claim, noting that the registry con-
tained safeguards limiting the disclosure of identifying information.
160. Does v. State, 993 P.2d 822, 836.
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a decision to place a child for adoption cannot be made unilaterally, but
requires a willing adoptive parent and approval of the state. Moreover,
births are a public event, which for a long time have been recorded by
state governments, and neither births nor adoptions "may be carried out
in the absolute cloak of secrecy that may surround a contraception or the
early termination of a pregnancy."' 6 Thus, no fundamental right to place
a child for adoption existed, the court determined, and no corresponding
right to place in secrecy could exist.
Addressing the same constitutional challenge to the Tennessee dis-
closure statute in Promise Doe v. Sundquist, 162 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals further concluded that even if a federal constitutional right to
place a child for adoption were to be recognized, the open records statute
did not unduly burden this right. Subsequently, reviewing the statute un-
der the Tennessee Constitution, the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed,
noting that the statutory right to place a child for adoption was created to
protect the interests of children, and not to advance a procreational right
of a birth parent. 63 Moreover, any effect of an open records law on a de-
cision to place a child was found to be much too speculative to
categorize it as an infringement of the right to procreational privacy.'"
The contention that opening records invaded a familial right to raise a
child was also easily defeated by the fact that the records would not be
opened until the adoptee reached adulthood.
6 1
None of these courts were willing to recognize that a right of privacy
under either the federal or applicable state constitutions encompassed a
general right to nondisclosure of personal information.166 Arguments that
opening records impairs contractual or vested rights in violation of the
federal and state constitutions also failed, because these courts deter-
mined that absolute confidentiality had never been guaranteed to birth
parents under either state's laws.
67
Though many commentators have eloquently argued for the recogni-
tion of constitutional rights on behalf birth parents or adoptees to support
161. Id.
162. Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702.
163. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 926.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court in dicta re-
ferred to one type of privacy right as "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" The nature of this right has never been elaborated upon by the Supreme Court, and in
Doe v. Sundquist the Sixth Circuit noted that it had previously held that the Constitution does
not "encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information." 106 F.3d at 706. The
Oregon Court of Appeals in Does v. State similarly noted that Whalen upheld a state records
law requiring doctors to report prescriptions of controlled substances to the state, suggesting
that a state's legitimate need for records outweighed any privacy right. 993 P.2d at 835.
167. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d at 925; Does v. State, 993 P.2d at 831-32.
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the sealing or opening of records,6 ' others have agreed with the U.S.
courts that constitutional rights analysis may be ill-suited to resolution of
this issue. Professors Naomi Cahn and Jana Singer have commented that
analogies to other cases involving fundamental familial rights are prob-
lematic, as the open records issue concerns relationships among families
and family members, and involves a member of the legally recognized
intact family, the adoptee, who desires to foster linkage with a biologi-
cally-related family member who may not desire a relationship. 6 9
Perhaps more importantly, as they correctly observed, "fundamental
rights" analysis under prevailing constitutional constructs is an awkward
vehicle for the necessary balancing and mediation of "the overlapping
identity issues at stake."'' °
b. Non-identifying information
By the 1980s, it was becoming apparent that the consequences of
withholding medical and social background information from adoptive
parents were frequently tragic. The failure to transmit available medical
history has caused some adopted children to receive inappropriate medi-
cal treatment, undergo unnecessary painful and sometimes hazardous
diagnostic testing, and in rare instances, suffer irreversible and prevent-
able permanent disability. '7' For others, delayed or inappropriate
psychiatric care resulted in years of turmoil for the child and adoptive
family, and on occasion, institutionalization in adolescence for mental
168. See, e.g., Chumney, supra note 116, at 864-84; Heidi Hildebrand, Because They
Want to Know: An Examination of the Legal Rights of Adoptees and Their Parents, 24 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 515, 531-35 (2000); I. Franklin Hunsacker, Oregon's Ballot Measure 58: A Grossly
Unfair and State-Sanctioned Betrayal of Birth Mothers, 39 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV.
75, 76-81 (2001); Claudine R. Reiss, The Fear of Opening Pandora's Box: The Need to Re-
store Birth Parents' Privacy Rights in the Adoption Process, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 133, 141-51
(1998).
169. Cahn & Singer, supra note 22, at 160-61 (noting that a case considering rights of
putative fathers opposing stepparent adoption involved an outsider imposing a claim on an
intact family unit (as does the more recent decision of Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000),
the grandparents visitation action decided after their article was published), and that the "right
to marry" cases did not involve previous familial choices made by other family members).
170. Cahn & Singer, supra note 22, at 153.
171. See Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 976 (Miss. 1990) (child suffered brain damage
due to phenylketonuria following failure of agency to confirm no screening test had been per-
formed); John R. Ball & Gilbert S. Owen, Genetics, Adoption, and the Law, in II GENETICS
AND THE LAW 277 (Aubrey Milunskey & George J. Annas eds., 1980); Bonnie Franklin, What
a Child is Given, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 3, 1989, at 40-41 (adoptee underwent painful
testing for juvenile chronic arthritis, which he later discovered was prevalent in his birth fam-
ily); Ginny Whitehouse, Consumers Viewpoint, Panel Discussion, in GENETIC FAMILY
HISTORY: AN AID TO BETTER HEALTH IN ADOPTIVE CHILDREN 19 (Nat'l Ctr. For Educ. In
Maternal and Child Health ed., 1984) (discovery of history of fibrous breast lumps avoided
repetition by adoptee of otherwise unnecessary painful treatment).
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disorders that could have been successfully treated at a younger age.171
Siblings have frequently been subject to sexual molestation, torture, and
threats by adopted children whose parents received no warning about
similar past behavior or psychiatric problems of the child. '7 On a wider
scale, children were placed with adoptive families unprepared emotion-
ally and financially to cope with their child's special needs, sometimes
contributing to disruption of the parents' marriage' 74 or of the adoptive
placement. 75 Past practices and the continued failure of some facilitators
to satisfy their disclosure responsibilities has prompted hundreds of law-




Corresponding to the shift in adoption paradigms underpinning
adoption practice, however, 7  the last two decades have witnessed a
dramatic shift in the attitudes of adoption professionals regarding the
172. See e.g., BARTH & BERRY, supra note 48, at 176; Bonnie Jacob, Raising Cain, NEW
DOMINION, May/June 1989, at 48. For additional sources, see also, Marianne Blair, Liability
of Adoption Agencies and Attorneys for Misconduct in the Disclosure of Health-Related In-
formation, in 2 ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 14, at 16-13 to -15.
173. David Postman, Sins of Silence, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, at A1 (adopted chil-
dren in two families raped or sexually assaulted younger siblings); Jane Hadley, Parents Sue
Over Adoptions, State Blamed for Failure to Disclose Children's Sexual Problems, SEATTLE
POST INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 23, 1995, at B I (adoptive son sexually abused adoptive daughter);
Patricia G. Miller, State Court Weighs Law to Protect Against Dishonest Adoption Agents,
PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Apr. 17, 1994, at L4 (reporting that adoptive son removed from
home after threats to younger brother); Belkin, supra note 48, at I (child with undisclosed
history as both victim of physical abuse and perpetrator of previous attacks attempted to burn
down home and threatened young sibling with knife); Golden, supra note 40, at 79, 82 (child's
attempted suicide resulted in death of two younger brothers by fire); Klein, supra note 48, at 1
(child twice attempted to suffocate baby sister and threatened adoptive mother three times
with knife); Andrea Sachs, When the Lullaby Ends, TIME, June 4, 1990, at 82 (adoptee whose
psychiatric record was hidden attempted to amputate cousin's arm and set fire to another
cousin's bed); Cf., W. v. Essex County Council, 3 All E.R. 111, 1998 WL 1043747(CA) (C.A.
1998) (parents sued local authority on behalf of four children sexually abused by foster child
whose history of sexual abuse was unknown to them).
174. See Golden, supra note 40, at 79, 82 (relating one such breakup and quoting leader
of workshops for adoptive families: "A lot of people stay in the [adoptive] commitment after it
doesn't work out. And to me, that's really unhealthy because it affects the rest of the family.
I've seen so many marriages break up over it."); Jacob, supra note 172, at 35.
175. BARTH & BERRY, supra note 48, at 20, 108-109 ("Among families that reported no
information gaps, the disruption rate was only 19%. Among families reporting one or more
gaps, the disruption rate was 46%." The term "disruption" is used here to describe any adop-
tive placement that has ended, whether before or after finalization.); see also KATHERINE
NELSON, ON THE FRONTIER OF ADOPTION: A STUDY OF SPECIAL NEEDS ADOPTIVE FAMILIES
71, 74-77 (1985); Klein, supra note 48, at 32 (between 1983 and 1987, 69 adoption annul-
ments in California were attributed to fraudulent misrepresentation by a county agency
regarding a child).
176. For detailed discussions of these suits and the theories of liability, see Blair, supra
note 172, at 16-1 et seq.; D. Marianne Blair, Getting the Wholc Truth and Nothing But the
Truth: The Limits of Liability for Wrongful Adoption, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 851 (1992).
177. See supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
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disclosure of health-related information. Professional guidelines cur-
rently endorse thorough collection and full disclosure of all pertinent
non-identifying background information to prospective adoptive par-
ents,"' as well as ongoing supplementation of medical information and
family history 79 and full provision of this information to adopted
adults. 80 Experts now conclude that disclosure strengthens the bond be-
tween adoptive parents and their child by facilitating a more appropriate
placement, and a better understanding of, and ability to provide for, a
child's needs.' 8 ' Not only are medical and psychological care enhanced,
but adopted adults are better able to make their own decisions about
childbearing and medical treatment. 82
Reflecting these changing attitudes, in the United States almost
every state has now enacted legislation compelling the disclosure of at
least some health-related information to prospective adoptive parents.. '83
178. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 64, § 3.10.
179. Id. § 6.16.
180. Id. § 6.21.
181. Id.§ 5.5.
182. Black, supra note 43, at 198; see also Gilbert S. Omenn et al., Genetic Counseling
for Adoptees at Risk for Specific Inherited Disorders, 5 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 157, 162
(1980); Diane Plumridge et al., ASGH Activities Relative to Education: Heredity and Adop-
tion, 46 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 208, 209 (1990).
183. ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-19 (1995 & Supp. 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (Michie
2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (West 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie
1998); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8608, 8706, 8801.3, 8817, 8818, 8819, 8909, 9202 (West 1994 &
Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-5-207, 19-5-402 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-746,
45a-749 (Supp. 2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 63.162 (Supp. 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (1999);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-14.5 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 16-1506(3) (Michie 2001); 20 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 505/22.3 (West 1993); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/18.4 to 18.4a (West 1999);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-19-2-7, 31-19-18-1 to 31-19-21-6; 31-19-23-1 to 31-19-24-13 (West
1999); IowA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 59-2122, 59-2130 (1994);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520 (Michie 1998); LA. CHILD. CODE, arts. 1124-27 (1995 &
Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 9-304 to 9-310 (West 1992); id. tit. 22, § 8205
(West Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-328 to 5-329.1 (1999); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 210, § 5D (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 710.27, 710.68 (West Supp. 2001);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.27, 259.43, 259.47 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-17-205 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121 (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 42-3-101,
42-3-102, 42-6-102, 42-6-105 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-107 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT.
127.152 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:19 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West
Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-3, 32A-5-12, 32A-5-14 (Michie 1998); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 373-a (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2001); N.Y DOM. REL. LAW §§ 112, 114, 115a
(McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2001); N.Y PUB. HEALTH LAW. § 2782 (McKinney Supp. 2001);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-3-205, 48-9-103 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16 (1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.091, 3107.12, 3107.17, 3107.60, 3107.65, 5103.16 (Anderson 2000
& Supp. 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 7504-1.1, 7504-1.2 (Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.342 (1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101, 2503, 2504, 2511, 2533, 2905, 2909
(West 1991 & Supp. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-6-15.2, 25-6-22, 25-6-23 (Michie
1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-133 (1996); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 162.005 to .008,
162.018 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15A, § 2-105 (Supp. 2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-219.35, 63.1-219.45 (Michie Supp.
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During the past decade most states have amended these statutes to pro-
vide detailed guidance regarding the methods for collection and the
content of the information that must be gathered, if reasonably avail-
able.'84 Following the recommendations of both national standards 8' and
model legislation drafted by adoption experts, 86 these statutes require the
preparation of reports, often on standardized forms, ' to ensure compre-
hensiveness.
Particularly important are requirements specifying that any history
of physical and sexual abuse of the child be included, as this has been
one of the topics most frequently subject to nondisclosure in the United
States in the past.8 8 Another critical component is medical history of
both birth parents,8 9 as well as extended family, "' and particularly in-
2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.33.350, 26.33.380 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-4A-6
(1999); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West 1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-116 (Michie Supp.
2001).
Other states permit the release of health information without a court order: DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 924, 1112 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7.2-10 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-7-1740, 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000).
184. For examples of particularly comprehensive statutes, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,
§ 7504-1.1 (Supp. 2000); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 710.27 (Supp. 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A,
§ 2-105 (1989 & Supp. 2000).
185. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 64, at 41-43.
186. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-106(a), 9 U.L.A. 36-37 (1999). For a detailed commen-
tary on this section, see D. Marianne Brower Blair, The Uniform Adoption Act's Health
Disclosure Provisions: A Model That Should Not Be Overlooked, 30 FAM. L.Q. 427 (1996).
187. For example, the medical and social history form published by the Oklahoma De-
partment of Health, to be used in compliance with OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7504-1.1 (2000), was
drafted by members of Oklahoma's Adoption Law Reform Committee. It incorporated sub-
stantial portions of a Model Medical/Genetic Family History Form for Adoptions prepared by
the [Oklahoma] Education Committee, Genetics and Adoption Subcommittee of the Council
of Regional Networks for Genetic Services, and was reviewed by geneticists at Children's
Medical Center in Tulsa and the Oklahoma Department of Health prior to its publication.
188. Information regarding past physical and sexual abuse of the child is critical to
proper diagnosis and treatment when subsequent mental, emotional, and behavioral problems
develop. See BARTH & BERRY, supra note 48, at 15. Yet the study conducted by Richard Barth
and Marianne Berry in the early 1980s indicated that over half of the families interviewed had
not been told of prior sexual abuse of their child, and almost one-third of the families whose
adoptee had been physically abused were not informed. Id. at 78-87, 108. See also James A.
Rosenthal, Outcomes of Adoption of Children with Special Needs, in 3 FUTURE OF
CHILDREN-ADOPTION 81 (Center for the Future of Children ed., 1993) (A history of physical
and particularly sexual abuse prior to adoption is a key predictor of increased risk for adoption
disruption); D. Marianne Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil: A Blueprint for Legislative Re-
form of the Disclosure of Health-related Information in Adoption, 70 N. CAR. L. REV. 682,
696, 715-717 (1992).
189. Unfortunately the prevailing practice in the United States until the past decade was
for adoption facilitators (agency staff or private attorneys) to collect information regarding the
birth father's family only from the birth mother. As birth mothers often lacked sufficient
knowledge about the birth fathers' medical and genetic history, critical information was lost.
190. The failure of some states to require inquiry regarding the health history of relatives
other than birth parents has been problematic. Many medical conditions skip generations, or
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formation regarding mental and emotional disorders, another type of in-
formation that formerly was frequently withheld.' 9'
Because much of the information regarding medical and social his-
tory is of a sensitive or personal nature, the privacy interests of birth
parents must be respected. These statutes do not focus on efforts to co-
erce birth parents into providing information, but rather, the best
statutory schemes provide guidance regarding the steps a professional
facilitating the adoption must take in order to make "reasonable ef-
forts""'9 to gather the appropriate information. Information that cannot be
obtained from birth parents, preferably through personal interviews, can
be sought in interviews of other caretakers of the child, and other family
members, as well as from providers of medical or psychological treat-
ment or educational services to the child.
93
Moreover, the statutes focus on information that would otherwise ex-
ist absent adoptive placement, and do not encourage genetic testing
solely for the purposes of adoptive placement. While recent medical ad-
vances make such testing possible, adoption experts and geneticists
concur that genetic testing creates many potential risks for psychological
well-being, availability of insurance, diminished expectations, and stig-
matization,' 94 and cannot be justified simply to provide prospective
adoptive parents with information that would not otherwise be available
may not be detectable in birth parents, who are themselves often young at the time their infant
is placed for adoption.
191. See generally Blair, supra note 172, at 16-23 to -25, 16-31 to -32,16-39, 16-41.
192. The language in many statutes regarding all "reasonably available" information im-
plies a duty to use reasonable efforts to investigate medical history. See Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Unif. Adoption Act § 7-105 (1994) and Cmt., 9A Uniform
Laws Annotated (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7504-1.1 (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 710.27 (Supp. 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-105 (Supp. 2000).
193. Oklahoma's statute requires that along with the report, all medical, psychological,
and dental records of the child be attached to the form. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7504-1.1(A).
Even for adopted infants, complete records are essential. In one tragic case, a newborn who
went straight to his adoptive home from the hospital suffered irreversible brain damage be-
cause information on the lack of phenylketonuria testing was not effectively communicated by
the form given to the child's adoptive parents. Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 971-72 (Miss.
1990).
194. See CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 64, at 44. These standards suggest that genetic
testing should be conducted only on a physician's advice "when a child presents symptoms
suggesting the presence of a genetically linked condition or illness." Id. In response to increas-
ing requests by prospective adoptive parents and adoption agencies for a wide range of genetic
testing, the American Society of Human Genetics and the American College of Medical Ge-
netics recently issued a statement recommending that testing occur only when it would
otherwise be performed on children of a similar age for purposes of diagnosis and prevention
of conditions which have manifested or for which preventive action may be taken during
childhood. Geneticists Propose Rules for Testing Kids, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 20, 2000, at 4.
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to birth parents.'95 On the other hand, the importance of genetic testing
to legitimate medical treatment in future decades has been recognized
by California, which recently amended its medical history statute to
permit birth parents to provide a blood sample to the State Department
of Health Services, which is required to store the sample for a period
of thirty years after the adoption. The sample can be used for DNA
testing at the request of the adoptive parents or the adoptee, but only
after the adoption order has been entered.' 96
Once the information is initially collected, many states mandate
retention for a substantial length of time'97 by a governmental entity98
to ensure lifetime access by the adoptee. The best of these statutes also
create procedures to facilitate post-adoption supplementation of re-
cords by birth and adoptive family members and the adult adoptee
with a notification process to ensure that information about serious
genetic conditions is transmitted to those who could be affected.' 99
Of critical importance is the fact that many disclosure statutes now
require that a report containing all medical and social history currently
available be provided to prospective adoptive parents before
placement,2°° and some require its disclosure "as early as practicable"
before the adoptive parents even meet the child, and in any event,
before they receive custody. 2°' Following the adoption, adoptive
195. Madeleine Freundlich, The Case Against Preadoption Genetic Testing, 77 CHILD
WELFARE 663, 667-70, 675-77 (1998).
196. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8706, 8817, 9202.5 (West Supp. 2001).
197. The best statutes require retention of the records for at least 99 years. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(B) (West 1999); 750 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 50/18.4 (West
1999); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.006 (Vernon 1996).
198. Because adoptions are facilitated by governmental entities, private agencies, and
private attorneys, and are finalized through hundreds of county courts, the states that have
most effectively regulated record retention have created a central registry for copies of medical
and social history records for all adoptions in the state. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-31
(1995 & Supp. 2000); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.50.510, 25.23.185 (Michie 2000); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-19-2-7, 31-19-18-3, 31-19-20-2 (West 1999); NEaB. REV. STAT. § 43-107 (1998).
199. For example, Oklahoma's statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7504-1.1 (Supp. 2000), re-
quires the initial investigator to advise all who contribute information that additional
information, as it becomes available, may be submitted to the agency that prepared the report
or the clerk of the court that issued the adoption decree. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7504-1.2 (Supp.
2000), requires court clerks and agencies to retain any supplemental medical information and
current mailing addresses filed with them and to send a birth parent, adoptive parent, or adult
adoptee, at the last address on file in the court's records, a notice when supplemental health
information has been received. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 710.68 (West Supp.
2001); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.09 to .091 (Anderson 2000).
200. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (West 1999); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8706 (West
Supp. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.27 (West Supp. 2001); T)Ex. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 162.005 (Vernon 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-105 (Supp. 2000).
201. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7504-1.2 (Supp. 2000). See also TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 162.005 (Vernon 1996).
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parents have a right to any additional information that becomes
available, at least during the adoptee's minority, and the adoptee has a
statutory right to all medical and social history, plus any supplementary
material that has been added, upon reaching adulthood.2 °2 Some states
offer equivalent disclosure rights to adults whose parents' rights were
terminated, but who were never adopted.2 3 In several states birth
parents and birth siblings also have a statutory right to disclosure of
genetically significant supplemental information, such as the onset of
a hereditary disorder in the adoptee or foster child, that has been
provided by an adoptive or foster parent or adult adoptee after a final
decree of adoption or termination of parental rights has been issued. °"
Despite the progress most states have made to regulate in this area,
many gaps remain in current legislation. Not all statutes describe the
information that must be collected or the sources that must be investi-
gated in a comprehensive fashion. Some still require information to be
transmitted to adoptive parents upon or after finalization, thus failing
to address the need of adoptive parents to have this information prior
to placement. Moreover, statutory enforcement provisions and sanc-
tions for noncompliance are still generally absent.2°6
B. Canada
Like the United States, Canada has a federal system of govern-
ment. Adoption is regulated by the provincial governments. Although
New Brunswick enacted adoption legislation as early as 1873, most
202. Many disclosure statutes provide for disclosure of health-related information to
others, such as legal guardians of minor adoptees, adult direct descendants of deceased
adoptees, and the parents or guardians of minor descendants of deceased adoptees. See, e.g.,
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7504-1.2 (2000); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109.500 (1999); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.006 (Vernon 1996); UNIF. ADOPTION
ACT § 6-103, 9 U.L.A. 119-20 (1999). Oklahoma limits the information available to descen-
dants and their custodians to medical, rather than social information, as the social history
would be of less importance to descendants and the privacy interests of those whose history is
reported becomes paramount. For a detailed discussion of disclosure statutes, see Blair, supra
note 188, at 730-31.
203. These statutes often apply to the descendants and guardians of these individuals as
well. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West Supp. 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7504-1.2
(2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West 1997).
204. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-31 (Sup. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.68
(West Supp. 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7504-1.2 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17
(1996). Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 192, § 6-103. For fur-
ther discussion of the importance of disclosure to birth relatives, see Blair, supra note 188, at
730-31.
205. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (Supp. 2001) (not later than finalization);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.520 (Michie Supp. 2000) (same); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2909
(Supp. 2001) (prior to finalization).
206. See Blair, supra note 172, at 16-139 to 16-143.
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Canadian provinces did not do so until after the First World'War, when
changing social conditions prompted a dramatic increase in the num-
ber of children born out of wedlock.20 7 As in the United States, secrecy
was the prevailing paradigm in Canada for many decades during the
mid-twentieth century.208
In recent years, however, many adoption professionals in Canada
have been promoting more openness in adoption. In fact, the research
studies of Canadian social scientists have been influential in both
Canada and the United States in creating awareness of the new para-
digm of adoption as a lifelong experience connecting adopted persons
with their birth, as well as their adoptive, families.2°
Almost every Canadian provincial government has responded
by enabling both adult adoptees and birth parents 210  to seek
identifying information and reunions through active government-
sponsored search programs that release information with the consent
of the subject of the search, ' in addition to operating passive
207. BEREND Hovius, FAMILY LAW: CASES, NOTES AND MATERIALS 1051 (5th ed.
2000); BALA & WILDGOOSE, CANADIAN CHILDREN'S LAW: A COURSEBOOK 371 (1985).
208. See Thompson, supra note 31, at 13 (article by Canadian social worker and adop-
tion expert, who served on the Advisory Committee on Standards of the Child Welfare League
of America, observing the international impact of CWLA's standards during the mid-twentieth
century).
209. See, e.g., id. at 16 (reporting on implications of study conducted by Children's Aid
Society of Metro Toronto of adoptees asking for birth family information); SACHDEV, supra
note 49; Sachdev, supra note 69; Kirk, supra note 60; Michael Sobol, Adoption Trends and a
Political Agenda for Ontario, Address at the 10th Annual General Meeting of the Adoption
Council of Ontario, available at http://www.adoption.ca/sobol.htm (last visited on June 26,
2001).
210. Most of these programs enable other selected family members, such as birth sib-
lings and grandparents, to register as well. Searches by other birth relatives and descendants of
adoptees, however, are beyond the scope of this article.
211. Child Welfare Act, R.S.A. ch. C-8.1, § 66.2 (1984), as amended by Child Welfare
Amendment Act, R.S.A. ch. C-8.1, § 66.2 (1999), available at http://www.gov.ab.ca/qp/ascii/
Acts/WPD/C08P1.TXT (last visited Oct. 22, 2001); British Columbia Adoption Act, R.S.B.C.
ch. 5, § 71 (1996), available at http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/A/96005_01.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 2001) (adoptee who obtains identifying information or birth parent, unless
disclosure veto or no-contact veto has been filed); Manitoba Adoption Act, R.S.M. ch. 47,
§§ 111, 114-16, 118 (1997), available athttp://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/statpublfree/pdf/a002.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001); New Brunswick Family Services Act, R.S.N.B., ch. C-16, § 9,
92(3) (1983), available at http://www.gov.nb.ca/acts/acts/f-02-2.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2001). On December 14, 2000, the New Brunswick Family and Community Services Minister
announced that the search program, previously open only to adult adoptees, would now be
accessible for searches initiated by birth relatives as well. See Percy Mockler, New Brunswick
Family and Cmty. Servs. Minister, Announcement of Change to New Brunswick Post Adop-
tion Disclosure Register, at http://www.parentfinders.org/NewsNew%2Brunswick.htm (last
visited Oct. 28, 2001)). Nova Scotia Adoption Information Act, S.N.S. ch. 3, § 12 (1996),
available at http://www.gov.ns.ca/legi/legc/statutes/adoption.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2001);
Ontario Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. ch. C-11, § 169 (1990), available at
http://l92.75.156.68/DBLaws/Statutes/English/90c I l-e.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2001); Prince
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S • 2122124registries Six provinces-Alberta,2 3 Manitoba,2 4 and Saskatche
wan,m  for prospective adoptions only, and British Columbia,2 6 the
Northwest Territories,2 7 and Nunavut,2 8 for adoptions under acts preced-
ing their current act-also permit the release of identifying information
Edward Island Adoption Act, R.S.P.E.I. ch. A-4.1, § 50 (1992), available at
http://www.gov.pe.ca/law/statutes/pdf/a-04-I.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2001). See also Civil
Code of Quebec, tit. 2, C.C.Q. § 583, available at http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ccq/en/12/
t2/c2/s4/0582a0584.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2001) (identifying information may be given to
adoptee over 14 or birth parents if the subject of the information has previously consented);
Canadopt, Quebec Government Information, at http://www.canadopt.ca/pqgov.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 28, 2001) (information on Quebec's search program and active registry);
Saskatchewan Social Services, Common Questions, at http://www.gov.sk.ca/socserv/
commonq/adoption.htm1 (last visited Oct. 28, 2001); Yukon Children's Act, S.YT. ch. 22, § 96
(1986) (permits a government official to disclose identifying information regarding birth rela-
tives "subject to any regulations that may be prescribed"); Canadian Council of Birthmothers,
Provincial Information & Regional Updates, at http://www.nebula.on.ca/canbmothers/
prov.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2001); Parent Finders, Yukon Territory, at http://
www.parentfinders.org/NewsYukon.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2001) (reporting on Order in
Council signed January 27, 1997, permitting release of identifying information where birth
parents cannot be located in search).
212. British Columbia Adoption Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 5, § 69 (1996), available at
http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/bcstats/96005_01 .htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2001); Manitoba Adop-
tion Act, R.S.M., ch. 47, § 117 (1997), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/statpub/free/
pdf/a002.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2001); New Brunswick Family Services Act, R.S.N.B., ch.
16, § 9, 92(2) (1983), available at http://www.gov.nb.ca/acts/acts/f-02-2.htm (last visited
Oct. 27, 2001); Nova Scotia Adoption Information Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 3, § 9 (1996), available
at http://www.gov.ns.ca/legillegc/statutes/adoption.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2001); Ontario
Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O., ch. C-11, § 167 (1990), available at http://
192.75.156.68/DBLaws/Statutes/English/90c 1l_e.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2001); Prince Ed-
ward Island Adoption Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. A-4.1, § 49 (1992), available at http://
www.gov.pe.ca/law/statutes/pdf/a-04-I.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2001); Canadopt, Quebec
Government Information, at http://www.canadopt.ca/pqgov.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2001)
(information on Quebec's search program and active registry); Saskatchewan Adoption Act,
S.S., ch. A-5.1, § 30 (1989-90), available at http://www.qp.gov.sk.ca/documents/English/
Statutes/Statutes/A5-1.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2001); Saskatchewan Social Services, Com-
mon Questions, at http://www.gov.sk.ca/socserv/infocntrl/progserv/Family (last visited Oct.
28, 2001); Yukon Children's Act, S.YT., ch. 22, § 96 (1986) (permits a government official to
disclose identifying information regarding birth relatives subject to any regulations that may
be prescribed).
213. Child Welfare Amendment Act, R.S.A., ch. C-8.1, § 66.12 (1999), available at
http://www.gov.ab.ca/qp/ascii/Acts/WPD\C08P1.TXT (birth certificates and other adoption
records may be released in adoptions prior to January 1, 2000 with written consent of a birth
parent or upon birth parent's death).
214. Manitoba Adoption Act, R.S.M., ch. 47, §§ 112(1), 112(7), 113(1), 113(4), 115, 116
(1997), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/statpub/free/pdf/a002.pdf.
215. Saskatchewan Social Services, Common Questions, at http://www.gov.sk.ca/
socserv/commonq/adoption.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2001).
216. British Columbia Adoption Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 5, §§ 63-66 (1996), available at
http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/bcstats/96005_01 .htm.
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to adult adoptees and birth parents upon request, subject to a disclosure
veto or a contact veto, either of which the subject of the information can
choose to file. No active search is required in those provinces to release
identifying information, however, unless a disclosure veto has been filed.
In Alberta, an adopted person age 18 or older is also automatically enti-
tled to disclosure of his or her birth surname upon request,2 9 a provision
that is not dependent upon birth parent approval. Moreover, by the end of
this year, four provinces will release identifying information upon de-
mand for prospective adoptions to both adopted individuals and birth
parents. British Columbia's statutes currently entitle those adopted under
the 1996 Adoption Act who are aged 19 or over to copies of their origi-
nal birth registration and adoption orders, and provide birth parents of
those individuals a right of access to records that convey any change of
name resulting from the adoption.220 Newfoundland is scheduled to pro-
claim its new Adoption Act, which follows British Columbia's
approach,22' by the end of 2001 .222 The statutes of Nunavut and the
Northwest Territories also appear to open adoption registry records con-
taining identifying information upon request to adult adoptees and birth
parents "in accordance with regulations" for prospective adoptions (post
November 1, 1998).223
Most of these statutes that permit disclosure of identifying informa-
tion outside of search programs and registries have been the result of
reform efforts initiated since the mid-1990s. There have been efforts to
reform the laws regulating disclosure of identifying information in other
provinces as well, but they have not yet come to fruition. For the past
three years Marilyn Churley, a birth mother and Member of the Provin-
cial Parliament, has introduced adoption bills in Ontario that would
provide access to birth and adoption records to adult adoptees and birth
parents upon demand, implement a no-contact notice, and make counsel-
ing available upon request.22 Despite the fact that the government's
219. Child Welfare Act, R.S.A. ch. C-8.1, § 66.9 (1984), amended by R.S.A., ch., 4 § 6
(1999), available at http://www.gov.ab.ca/qp/ascii/Acts/WPD/C08P1.TXT.
220. British Columbia Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 5, §§ 63-65 (1996), available at
http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/bcstats/96005_01 .htm.
221. See Newfoundland Adoption Act, S. NFLD. ch. A-2.1, §§ 50, 51 (1999).
222. Telephone Interview with Mr. Coats, Newfoundland Department of Health (June
26, 2001) (Mr. Coats advised that the Act is scheduled for proclamation at the end of this
calendar year, 2001.).
223. Consolidation of Adoption Act, O.N.W.T., ch. 13, ch. 9, §§ 64, 66 (2000); Consoli-
dation of Adoption Act, O.N.W.T., ch. 9, §§ 64, 66 (1998) (both use a disclosure veto only, not
a contact veto).
224. See Churley Press Release Bill 77, MPP Marilyn Churley Introduces Adoption Bill,
at http://www.nebula.on.ca/canbmothers/churley.htm (last visited June 26, 2001). See also
Shirley Senoff, Open Adoption in Ontario and the Need for Legislative Reform, 15 CAN J.
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Standing Committee on Social Development in Ontario proposed as
early as 1994 enacting legislation that would provide adult adoptees and
birth parents with greater access to information, these efforts have not
yet succeeded.22 5 Reform legislation that would provide identifying in-
formation to adult adoptees and birth parents was introduced in Nova
Scotia as well in 2000, by the new Premier, John Hamm, but failed to
make it through the legislature. 6 Reforms have also been suggested in
Quebec to implement a disclosure veto system, but have not yet resulted
in new legislation. 7
Thus, regarding the disclosure of identifying information, Canada
appears to be following a track similar to that of the United States, but it
is further down the path. The disclosure of identifying information to
both adults and birth parents through governmental search programs,
with consent of the subject of the search, is almost universal in Canada,
and disclosure subject to a disclosure veto is in wider use among the
provinces than it is among American states. Release of identifying re-
cords upon demand to adult adoptees, at least in prospective adoptions,
is gaining broader acceptance as well, and at a proportionately faster rate
than in the United States. Moreover, the Canadian provinces appear to be
more willing, when they open records, to grant birth parents privileges to
obtain identifying information similar to those granted to adult adoptees,
once the adopted children have reached the age of majority.
Less legislative attention appears to have been paid to the disclosure
of medical and social history information in Canada. In British Colum-
bia22 and Manitoba,29 and under the soon-to-be proclaimed Adoption
Act of Newfoundland,230 birth parents who file a disclosure or contact
veto may, but are not required, to file medical and social history informa-
tion. The provincial statutes generally make non-identifying information
FAM. L. 183 (1998); Michele Landsberg, Get with the 21st Century: Open Records for
Adoptees, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 7, 1999, at Li.
225. LAW REFORM COMM. OF THE L. Soc'Y OF IR., Adoption Law: The Case for Reform
(2000), at http://www.lawsociety.ie/Adoption(report).htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2001).
226. PARENT FINDERS OF CAN., NOVA SCOTIA, UPDATE OF JANUARY, 2000, at
http://www.parentfinders.org/NewsNS.htm (last modified June 15, 2001).
227. Canadian Press Newswire, Quebec May Become Second Province to Open its
Adoption Records, GLOBAL NEWS, Jan. 24, 2000 (reporting on expected release of government
report recommending opening records with disclosure veto option); see also, Bill Modifying
the Civil Code of Quebec and the Youth Protection Act, September 27, 1996, presented to
the National Assembly by Desaulniers, available at http://www.total.net/adoption/
a.propositionde.projetloi/bill of law.htm.
228. British Columbia Adoption Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 5, §§ 65-66 (1996), available at
http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/stat/A/96005.01.htm.
229. The Adoption and Consequential Amendments Act, R.S.M., ch. 47, §§ 112(3),
113(3) (1997), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/statpub/free/pdf/a002.pdf.
230. Adoption Act, S. NFLD., ch. A-2.1, §§ 50, 51 (1999) (Assented to December 14,
1999, not yet proclaimed), available at http://www.gov.nf.ca/hoa/statutes/a02-I.htm.
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available to adoptive parents, at least during their child's minority, and to
adopted adults. 3' British Columbia specifically regulates by statute the
collection and retention of medical and social history and requires dis-
closure to prospective adoptive parents,232and Manitoba specifically
requires it in private adoptions. 33 Prince Edward Island permits, but does
not require disclosure of background information to prospective adoptive
parents,3 and many of the other provinces do not appear to address pre-
adoption disclosure to adoptive parents in their statutes.
Thus, although reform addressing the disclosure of identifying in-
formation to adult adoptees and birth parents in Canada is more
widespread than reform efforts in the United States, Canada's legislation
addressing the collection, disclosure, and supplementation of medical
and social history is far less comprehensive. Both countries have lagged
behind the United Kingdom, which embraced legislation opening re-
cords to adoptees and addressed the collection of non-identifying
information decades earlier. As will be seen in the following section,
however, the recent reform efforts in Canada and the United States have
been more receptive to the interests of birth parents than have been re-
cent reform movements in the United Kingdom.
C. United Kingdom
Although earlier English law incorporated some practices that were
"quasi-adoptive," statutory adoption came later to the United Kingdom
than it did to the United States or Canada. This is often attributed to the
importance of blood lineage in the British social hierarchy and legal sys-
tem at the time, as well as to the strong disapprobation associated with
231. E.g., Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O., ch. C- 1l, § 166 (1990), available at
http://192.75.156.68/DBLaws/Statutes/English/90cl 1_e.htm.
232. British Columbia Adoption Act, R.S.B.C., ch.5, §§ 6, 8, 9 (1996), available at
http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/A/96005_01 .htm.
233. The Adoption and Consequential Amendments Act, R.S.M. ch. 47 §§ 50(g)(i), 56(b),
67(g)(i) (1997), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/statpub/free/pdf/a002.pdf (medical and
social history must accompany application for order of adoption; in private adoptions, the
agency is required to obtain medical and social history of child and birth parents and share it
with prospective adoptive parents).
234. Prince Edward Island Adoption Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. A-4.1, § 48 (1992), available at
http://www.gov.pe.ca/law/statutes/pdf/a-04- I.pdf.
235. New Brunswick requires adoptive parents to include with their adoption petition to
the court a social and health history of the child, the parents, and the adopting parents pre-
pared in accordance "with the regulations" New Brunswick Family Services and Family
Relations Act, R.S.N.B., ch. 16, § 8, 75(3) (1983), available at http://www.gov.nb.ca/
justice/acts/f%2D02%2D2.htm. The collection of medical and social history and its disclosure
to prospective adoptive families may be regulated in other provinces by administrative regula-
tions that are not readily accessible to this author.
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illegitimacy.236 The first general adoption statute was enacted in 1926 for
England and Wales, in 1929 for Northern Ireland, and in 1930 for Scot-
land. 237
Under early English adoption law, the same paradigm that fostered
closure of records in the United States and Canada in mid-century was
reflected in provisions requiring a court order for adult adoptees to ac-
cess records containing identifying information.238 Pointing to the "twin
stigmata of infertility and illegitimacy" that has shaped many Western
adoption systems, scholars suggest that adoption in Great Britain was
"associated with secrecy, which has served to preserve certain social
standards of morality and normality, as well as, within certain con-
straints, the reputation of individuals.
239
Only in Scotland were adoption and birth records made accessible to
adult adoptees continuously since the introduction of statutory adoption.
Dr. John Triseliotis, who published an important study regarding access
to identifying information and reunions in the 1970s, concluded that it is
improbable that in 1930 the open records provision was motivated by
recognition of the importance of identity."0 It was more likely prompted,
he suggests, by inheritance laws that until 1964 permitted adopted indi-
viduals to inherit from birth parents but not their adoptive parents.2 4 '
By the 1970s, the shift to the new paradigm of adoption had clearly
superceded the "rebirth" philosophy in Great Britain and motivated sig-
nificant reform. In the early 1970s a group of professionals in the fields
of law, social work, psychiatry, government, and medicine were commis-
sioned to perform a major assessment of adoption law in Great Britain,
including the issue of access to information. Although an earlier working
draft of this Departmental Committee on the Adoption of Children (often
referred to as the Houghton Committee) expressed a preference for re-
taining English law and recommending that Scottish law be amended to
close access, the Committee reversed this position in its final report, in
236. Hollinger, supra note 10, at 1-19; WEGAR, supra note 9, at 24.
237. Shatter, supra note 11, at 445.
238. Cf TRISELIOTIS, supra note 58, at I (observing that the provision in Scottish law
making identifying information available to adopted persons was not included in the English
Adoption Act of 1926, and that English law required a court order to inspect registers that
would provide identifying information).
239. WEGAR, supra note 9, at 36-37 (quoting ERICA HAIMES & NOEL TIMMs, ADOPTION,
IDENTITY AND SOCIAL POLICY: THE SEARCH FOR DISTANT RELATIVES 77 (1985)).
240. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 58, at 1. No minutes of the discussion of the Scottish
Standing Committee in the House of Commons that inserted the relevant section in the Scot-
tish Adoption Act of 1930 were kept. Id.
241. Id.
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large part due to the influence of the research of Dr. Triseliotisf 2 Inter-
views with 70 adoptees who had obtained their original birth records
suggested that access was valuable to these adults in fostering their sense
of identity,2' and the Scottish Registrar who released records had re-
ceived no complaints from birth parents who had been traced.' The
Committee was also influenced by the changing perceptions of adoption
professionals, observing in its report the "growing acceptance that bring-
ing up children by adoption is different from bringing up natural
children."' ' Recognizing that disclosure of information about birth fami-
lies "is not easily reconciled with some aspects of the concept of
adoption as a completely new start," the Committee supported "changing
attitudes" toward "more openness about family and social matters" and
"more honesty about the adoptive status" of the child. 46
The Houghton Committee recommended that access remain open in
Scotland and that the law of England and Wales be revised to permit all
adopted persons to obtain access to their original birth records upon
reaching the age of 18.247 This reform was accomplished in the English
Adoption Act of 1976,248 which also established a passive register to
facilitate searching.
2 49
In addition, the Committee suggested that agencies utilize pediatric
advisors to consult prior to placement, and that a full health history of
the child and his family be obtained and provided to prospective adop-
tive parents, to enable them to make a decision regarding the child with
full knowledge of any potential medical problems or special needs the
child might have in the future.20 These suggestions were implemented in
England and Wales through adoption agencies regulations in 1983,251 and
242. HOME OFFICE, SCOTTISH EDUC. DEP'T, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON
THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 84-86 (1972) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL
COMM.].
243. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 58, at 159-60, 166.
244. REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMM., supra note 242, at 85.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 8, 85.
247. Id. at 86-87.
248. Adoption Act, 1976, c. 36, §§ 50-51 (Eng.).
249. Id. § 51A.
250. REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMM., supra note 242, at 95-97 (observing that
prior practice utilized a form that omitted the family health history and required little com-
ment on the child's development).
251. Adoption Agencies Regulations, (1983) SI 1983/1964 Regs. 6, 7, 12, 13A (Eng.).
Regulation 12 requires an adoption agency that has located a prospective adoptive parent for a
particular child to provide to the prospective adopter written information about the child, his
personal history and background, including his religious and cultural background, and his
health history and current state of health. If the placement is accepted by the prospective
adopter, a written report of the child's health history and current state of health must be sent to
the prospective adopter's registered medical practitioner before placement. Regulation 13A
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in Scotland through similar regulations,252 which mandate the appoint-
ment of medical advisors and a thorough collection of health and social
history from both mother and father, and require that a written report
about medical and social history be provided to prospective adopters
before placement. These regulations also mandate that adoption agency
records be maintained for 75 years,253 in accordance with another of the
Committee's recommendations.254
Adoption law and practices have been the subject of another major
review in England during the past year, in which disclosure issues have
surfaced in two contexts. Although adult adoptees now have access to
their birth records by law, access to information in court records is sub-
ject to court discretion. 2" A government Performance and Innovation
Unit Report issued in July 2000256 and a White Paper257 addressing adop-
tion presented to Parliament in December 2000 revealed that the exercise
of that discretion resulted in inconsistent access to information across the
country. In addition, the requirement in current law that counseling be
required for those adopted before November 12, 1975 and offered to
those adopted after that date, before they receive their birth records,
proved unduly restrictive, given the limitations upon who could provide
such counseling and the other duties required of those professionals.
One of the eight recommendations for legislative reform included in the
White Paper was to "provide adopted people with access to information
about their history.' 259 To implement this recommendation, an Adoption
and Children Bill was introduced in Parliament in 2001 that would give
adopted adults the right to certain documents in court records, and any
information in court records that the agency provided to the adoptive
requires agencies to provide adopters with "such information about the child as they consider
appropriate" as soon as practicable after making the adoption order.
252. The Adoption Agencies Regulations, (1996) SIl 1996/3266, Regs. 6, 8, 9, 19, 25
(Scot.).
253. Adoption Agencies Regulations,(1983) SI 1983/1964 Reg. 14 (Eng.); The Adoption
Agencies Regulations, (1996) SI 1996/3266, Reg. 23 (Scot.).
254. See REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMM., supra note 242, at 86.
255. Adoption Rules, Rule 53 (1984) SI 1984/265, (Eng.). The Court Rules of Scotland,
by contrast, give an adopted person access to court records at the age of 16. Act of Sederhunt
(Child Care and Maintenance Rules) (1997) SI 1997/291, Rules 2.4 § 2, 2.33 § 2 (Scot.).
256. Performance and Innovation Unit Report, Cabinet Office, July 2000 [hereinafter
PIU Report], Part 3, at 31, available at http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/innovation/2000/
adoption/html/o3.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2001).
257. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, ADOPTION: A NEW APPROACH, White Paper at
16 (2000), available at http://www.doh.gov.uk/adoption/whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter White
Paper].
258. PIU Report, supra note 256, Part 3, at 31, Part 5, at 7.
259. White Paper, supra note 257, at 5.
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parents pursuant to regulation.2'6 The Act also broadens the types of
agencies permitted to provide predisclosure counseling.6
The other concern has been that the amount of information given to
prospective adopters and the time of its disclosure are up to the discre-
tion of the agency.262 The practice is in fact quite variable. Mr. James
Payton, Department of Health Bill Principal for the Adoption and Chil-
dren's Bill, observed that adopters have expressed dissatisfaction over
the issue of release of information, sometimes contending that they are
not getting full information early enough in the process for them to take
it into consideration when making a decision. The White Paper alluded
to this problem, suggesting that prospective adopters must be given full
written information on children currently waiting to be adopted.2 63 Draft
National Adoption Standards issued by the British Department of Health,
scheduled to be implemented soon, will require that approved adopters
be given "full information to help them understand the needs and back-
ground of the particular children awaiting adoption, including any risks
to the family or to other children. '2' The Department of Health currently
anticipates developing a Code of Practice, after the fate of the Adoption
and Children's Bill has been determined, which would underpin the
broad statements in the regulations about the provision of information to
prospective adoptive parents and examine what information should be
provided when.265
260. Adoption and Children Act 2001, No. 113, § 48, available at http://
www.baaf.org.uk/home.htm. The Act was not enacted during the Parliamentary session in
which it was introduced. Ben Russell, Hunting Bill among Seven Statutes Abandoned in Deal
with Tory Whips, INDEP. (LONDON) May 9, 2001, at 2. The bill failed because a general elec-
tion was called before consultation could be completed, and not due to strong political
opposition. It is likely that it will be reintroduced when Parliament reconvenes, and has sup-
port from both parties. E-mail from Jennifer Lord, Child Placement Consultant, British
Agencies for Adoption and Fostering, to Marianne Blair, Professor, University of Tulsa Col-
lege of Law (June 6, 2001) (on file with author); E-mail from Phil Bates, Professor, Law
School, King's College, London, to Marianne Blair, Professor, University of Tulsa College of
Law (May 30, 2000) (on file with author).
261. Adoption and Children Bill, 2000-01, Bill 66, § 64 (Eng.), available at http://
www.baaf.org.uk/home.htm (this bill has not passed into law during this session).
262. See Children and Young Persons, (1983) SI 1983/1694, Reg. 12 (Eng.).
263. White Paper, supra note 257, at 33.
264. UK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DRAFT NATIONAL ADOPTION STANDARDS FOR ENG-
LAND, SCOTLAND AND WALES, at http://www.doh.gov.uk (last visited Oct. 20,2001). Mr.
James Payton of the Department of Health reported that the Draft National Standards would
be implemented if the current government was retained in the election, which occurred subse-
quent to our conversation. E.g., Warren Hoge, Blair Leads Labor to Second Sweep Over the
Tories, N.Y Times, June 8, 2001, at Al. Mr. Payton also noted that implementation of the
Standards was not dependent upon passage of the Adoption and Children's Bill Act. Telephone
Interview with Mr. James Payton, Bill Principal for the Adoption and Children's Bill, Dep't of
Health, Gr. Brit. (May 20, 2001).
265. Telephone interview with Mr. James Payton, supra note 264.
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The inspiration for the current examination of adoption through the
PIU report and the White Paper was to facilitate increased use of adop-
tive placement for the 58,000 children currently in protective care in
England.2 Among many other reasons suggested for the perceived un-
derutilization of adoptive placement, the report noted that in 1999-2000,
18% of adoptive placements of children in protective care broke down
before an adoption order was made.2 67 Given the link social scientists
have discovered between incomplete disclosure of background informa-
tion prior to placement and adoption disruption,268 increased regulation
promoting uniformity and comprehensiveness in the release of informa-
tion may well be an important goal to be pursued.
Scotland has also engaged in recent reform of its adoption disclosure
legislation. In 1997 the age at which an adoptee can seek identifying in-
formation from the Registrar General was lowered from 17 to 16 years
of age.269
Despite the current interest in Great Britain in the disclosure of
adoption information, however, there has been no corresponding move-
ment to afford birth mothers access to records or information enabling
them to find their adopted children, other than through passive registries
that require an adoptee to initiate a registration before a match can be
made. In fact, in the recent appellate case of In re L2 71 the court con-
firmed the denial of a request by a birth mother for a confidential
intermediary to obtain non-identifying information regarding how her
daughter was faring. The daughter, an adult in her mid-30s who had been
placed for adoption in infancy, had not registered with the passive regis-
try.27 The Court, expressing concern that the adult adoptee might be
distressed by the request, or that she may be unaware that she was
adopted, determined that the circumstances must be exceptional to grant
such a request, and the understandable emotional desire of a birth parent
to obtain information about her child was insufficient justification.2 Al-
though apparently some consideration was given during the development
of the recent adoption reform legislation to moving towards an active
266. See White Paper, supra note 257, at Foreword, Executive Summary at 4; PIU Re-
port, supra note 256, at Foreword.
267. White Paper, supra note 257, at 15 ; PIU Report, supra note 256, Part 2, at 11.
268. See BARTH AND BERRY, supra note 48; supra note 175 and accompanying text.
269. Adoption (Scotland) Act, 1978, c. 28, § 45(5) (Eng.), amended by Children (Scot-
land) Act, 1995, c. 36, sched. 2(22) (Eng.).
270. In re L, 1996 Fam. 19 (Eng. C.A. 1996), 1996 WL 1091028 (Eng. CA Dec. 12,
1996).
271. Id. at 21, 24.
272. Id. at 22, 28.
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registry that would afford birth parents the ability to search, there was
273
not sufficient support for the idea to pursue it at the time.
It is interesting to contrast the approach of the British on this issue
with the recent reform proposals introduced in the Republic of Ireland.
Though the Irish government has been far slower than American, Cana-
dian, or British governments to open records or create governmental
systems for the disclosure of information, legislation now under consid-
eration would surpass most jurisdictions in all three countries in the
access to identifying information that it would afford both adult adoptees
and birth parents, as will be examined in the next section.
D. Republic of Ireland
Because the first adoption statute was not enacted in the Republic of
Ireland until 1952,27 ' when concern over anonymity was at its peak in
other Western countries, it is not surprising that closed records have been
the prevailing norm in Ireland during much of the past half century. As
of now, adoptees do not have a statutory right of access to identifying
information, nor do birth parents have a statutory right to information
that would facilitate a search for a child who was adopted. A court or the
Adoption Board, An Bord Uchtila, may release records if they find it is
in the best interest of the child to do so."' Until recently, An Bord
Uchtdila very rarely released records to adoptees,76 but in the past few
273. Telephone interview with Mr. James Payton, supra note 264. The approach of the
United Kingdom thus far, suggested Mr. Payton, is that the call is the adopted person's choice.
274. SHATTER, supra note 1I, at 445-46. The vast increase in the number of orphans and
illegitimate children in the aftermath of World War I gave impetus to the enactment of adop-
tion statutes in many European countries between the two World Wars. Id. Mr. Shatter
suggests that the reluctance of Ireland to enact legislation sooner was due to a variety of fac-
tors, including (1) a fear parents would place their children with inadequate people or sell
them, (2) opposition by the Roman Catholic Church grounded in concern that Protestant fami-
lies would adopt Catholic children, (3) recognition that adoption of a child could interfere
with another child's inheritance rights, and (4) concern that it would be unjust and perhaps
unconstitutional to permit parents to permanently waive their rights to their child. Id.
275. Section 22 of the Adoption Act 1952 provides that the index that records the con-
nection between an entry in the Adopted Children Register and the corresponding entry in the
Register of Births is not open to public inspection; information from that index may be re-
leased only by order of the court or by An Bord Uchtila. Adoption Act 1952. Pursuant to
Section 8 of the Adoption Act 1976, a court may order release of information in the records of
An Bord Uchtila only if the court is satisfied that it is in the best interests of the child to do so.
Adoption Act 1976. In C.R. v. An Bord Uchtdla, the High Court confirmed that An Bord
Uchtila must apply the same best interests standard as would the court when it receives an
application for release of confidential information. [1993] 3 I.R. 535, 541 (Ir. H. Ct.).
276. In CR. v. An Bord Uchtdla, the High Court rejected what it viewed as a "blanket
policy" of refusal to open records, and determined that An Bord Uchtila must conduct an
individualized determination involving screening both the adopted person and the birth parent
who is being traced. [1993] 3 I.R. 535 (Ir. H. Ct.). Though the decision must be made by An
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years, that policy has changed. Currently, the Board makes a case by
case determination277 after contacting the birth parent and providing
counseling to the adoptee. Though the consultation process creates de-
278lays, most requests for records have been granted in the past few
279years.
Like many U.S. courts,2 0 the Supreme Court of Ireland in 1998 was
called upon to address the conflicting constitutional interests implicated
in a request for disclosure of identifying information. LO'T v. B.28' con-
solidated actions brought by two women who had been placed for de
facto adoption (before legal adoption became available in Ireland), who
were seeking an order directing the agency that placed them to disclose
to them the identities of their birth mothers. Four of the five justices
hearing the case determined that the right of a child to know the identity
of her parents, though not absolute or unqualified, is an unenumerated
right of privacy guaranteed by Article 40.3.1 of the Irish Constitution,282
which requires the state to guarantee the "personal rights" of its citizen.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hamilton declared:
'Though not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution, the
right to privacy is one of the fundamental personal rights of the
citizen which flows from the Christian and democratic nature of
the State. It is not an unqualified right. Its exercise may be re-
stricted by the constitutional rights of others, by the
requirements of the common good and it is subject to the re-
quirements of public order and morality.' The right to know the
identity of one's natural mother is a basic right flowing from the
natural and special relationship which exists between a mother
Bord Uchtdla, the Court held, adoption agencies may perform the screening and counseling
and provide advice on the issue of disclosure. Id. at 538, 541-42.
277. Telephone Conversation with Thomas Doyle, Exec. Officer, An Bord Uchtila (Nov.
30, 1999); Letter from David Wolfe, Registrar, An Bord Uchtd.la, to Prof. Marianne Blair (Oct.
21, 1999) (on file with author).
278. Recent media reports suggest that the consultation process is lengthy, and that dur-
ing the previous year only forty-five certificates were issued, even though 139 requests had
been received. Padraig O'Morain, Adopted People May Get Access to Birth Certificates, IR.
TIMES, May 21, 2001, at 1.
279. Padraig O'Morain, Adoption Board Is Granting Access to Names of Mothers, IR.
TIMES, June 30, 1999, at 1; Adoption Files Open, IR. MIRROR, July 1, 1999; New Chance to
Reunite with Missing Parents, IR. INDEPENDENT, July 3, 1999; New Policy Is a Welcome Boost
for Adoptees, EXAMINER, July 1, 1999. It was reported that in 1999 only two applicants were
refused their original birth certificates. O'Morain, supra note 278.
280. See supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
281. I.O'T. v. B., [1998] 2 I.R. 321 (Ir. S.C.).
282. Article 40.3.1 provides: "The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen." Art. 40.3.1,
Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
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and her child, which relationship is clearly acknowledged in
[prior case law]. The existence of such right is not dependent on
the obligation to protect the child's right to bodily integrity or
such rights as the child might enjoy in relation to the property of
his or her natural mother but stems directly from the aforesaid
relationship. It is not, however, an absolute or unqualified right:
its exercise may be restricted by the constitutional rights of oth-
ers, and by the requirement of the common good.283
At the same time, all five justices found that a birth mother who op-
poses disclosure and who was promised confidentiality at the time of
placement has her own constitutional right to privacy, although her right
to privacy also is not absolute. Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice
created a balancing test to be used when those rights cannot be harmo-
nized, suggesting consideration of the following factors:
the circumstances giving rise to the relinquishment;
the birth mother's present circumstances and the effect of
the disclosure on her;
the birth mother's attitude toward disclosure and her
rationale;
the ages of the birth mother and adoptee at the time of the
disclosure request;
the reasons the adoptee wishes to know and meet the birth
mother;
the present circumstances of the adoptee; and
the views of the adoptive parents.i
The court recommended that a social worker should contact the birth
mothers to determine their wishes and report to the court, so the court
could make a determination as to whether it was necessary to require
them to participate in the proceedings. Given the advanced age of many
birth mothers, the Chief Justice agreed with the following assessment of
the Circuit Court Judge:
I would not be at all happy, nor do I think it would be a safe
course for the court to adopt, to compel a natural mother of her
age to endure what, may be for her a significantly traumatic and
anxiety provoking participation in these proceedings without a
283. I.O'T. v. B., 2 I.R. at 348 (quoting Kennedy v. Ireland, [1987] 1 I.R. 587, 592 (Ir. H.
Ct.)).
284. Id. at 355.
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full report from an appropriate professional skilled person in this
285
area.
The applicability of the decision to legal adoptees remains an open
question. At one point the court distinguished the petitioners, de facto
adoptees who remain legally the children of their birth parents, from le-
gal adoptees who are the legal children of their adoptive parents.s 6
Nevertheless, the court also observed that the right to know one's iden-
tity was a basic right and not dependent upon the child's right to bodily
integrity or the existence of property rights (which would be retained by
de facto but not legal adoptees) .1 7 As Justice Barron observed in his con-
cuffing opinion, the emotional impact of disclosure on the adoptee and
the birth parent should be the primary consideration. If psychological
needs are in fact at the center of recognition of a constitutional right to
know one's identity, extension of this right to the legally adopted would
seem inevitable.289
It is interesting to contrast the Irish Supreme Court's constitutional
treatment of the disclosure of identifying information with that of U.S.
courts. Though Ireland's Supreme Court found both the interests of
adoptees who seek identifying information and the privacy interests of
birth parents opposing disclosure to be constitutionally protected, and
the U.S. courts rejected the constitutional claims of both groups, in
neither constitutional contest did one group emerge victorious. Ireland's
constitutional approach appears preferable to the traditional good cause
hearings in the United States, because it requires individualized
determinations rather than placing the burden on an adoptee to prove
good cause, often without knowledge of the birth mother's wishes or the
intensity of her feelings.2 90 However, Ireland's recognition of the
constitutional rights of both birth mothers and adoptees may restrict the
government's options to try new approaches. That potential became
evident two years later, in the spring of 2000, when the Law Reform
Committee of the Law Society of Ireland issued a position paper on
adoption in which they revealed that the L0'T v. B. decision had
285. Id. at 354.
286. Id. at 348.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 379 (separate opinion of Barron, J.).
289. Despite the author's analysis above, it should be noted that the Law Reform Com-
mittee of the Law Society of Ireland reads the decision more narrowly, concluding that the
Chief Justice "appears to take the view that lawfully adopted children will not, under any
circumstances, be able to assert the right to know the identity of their birth mothers" a posi-
tion the Committee itself takes issue with. Adoption Law: The Case for Reform, at
http://www.lawsociety.ie/Adoption(report).htm (2000) (hereinafter LAW REFORM COMM. OF
THE L. SOC'Y OF IR.).
290. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
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significantly influenced their ultimate recommendations. The Committee
stated that although they favored giving adult adoptees an absolute right
to identifying information, and permitting birth parents to lodge a
contact veto, they read the L 0'T. decision to preclude this alternative,
and therefore opted for a disclosure veto system. While recognition of
the importance of the interests at stake is vital to effectuating the new
adoption paradigm, constitutionalizing the rights at issue could hamper
the flexibility necessary to resolve this sensitive issue.
Despite the potential constitutional concerns of the Law Reform
Committee, however, the current government of Ireland apparently has
not interpreted 1.0'T v. B. as restrictively. In May, 2001, the Minister of
Children, Mary Hanafin, announced that the Cabinet approved the Heads
of a Bill that would permit all adult adoptees access to their birth certifi-
cates and personal information from their files.2 9 Those adopted after the
legislation is enacted would also be entitled to relevant information
about their birth parents. In addition, responding to the Law Reform
Committee's recognition of the interests of many birth parents in tracing
their children, birth parents will have the right to a copy of the adoption
certificate and personal information from the file, regardless of when the
adoption took place. 293 A contact veto register would be created so that
adoptees and birth parents may register their wish not to be contacted.9
In accordance with other recommendations of the Law Reform Commit-
tee, counseling will be made available to both adoptees and birth parents,
and a state-funded voluntary contact register and tracing and reunion
service will be established, along with a National Search Service and
291. LAW REFORM COMM. OF THE L. SOC'V OF IR., supra note 289. The Committee rec-
ommended that adult adopted persons, their adult siblings, and birth parents should be granted
a qualified statutory fight to information, subject to a fight of adoptees and birth parents to
veto the disclosure of identifying information. Such vetoes could be registered with an Infor-
mation Veto Register administered by the Adoption Board, the Committee suggested. An
adoptee or birth parent wishing to register a veto would indicate such an intent by post, and
the veto would be confirmed after a personal visit from a qualified official who could explain
the issues involved and discuss non-identifying information that could be made available. A
veto could be revoked at any time, and would need to be renewed every five years, following
contact by registry personnel to ascertain the wishes of the party who lodged the veto. Be-
cause identifying information under this proposed scheme could be released upon request
unless a veto is in place, the Committee recommended an extensive media campaign to publi-
cize the veto system, as well as implementation of methods to inform affected parties of
attempts by others to access records or make contact, and to seek out those living in remote
areas or isolated conditions who may otherwise fail to make application.
292. Press Release, Dep't of Health and Children, An Roinn Slainte Agus Leanai, Re-
public of Ireland, Hanafin Announces New Draft Legislation on Adoption Information (May
24, 2001), at http://www.doh.ie/pressroom/pr200lO524.html. See also O'Morain, supra note
278.
293. Press Release, Dep't of Health and Children, supra note 292.
294. Id.
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National Files Index to be operated by the Adoption Board.295 The bill
would also extend information rights to those raised in protective care,
who were removed from their parents' custody but not adopted.296 Par-
ticularly novel is the proposal that birth parents will have the right in
adoptions concluded after the legislation is enacted to information about
their child's progress and well being while the child is under the age of
eighteen.
The disclosure of non-identifying medical and family background
information to adoptive parents is at present left to agency discretion and
not regulated by statute, although An Bord Uchtdla's current policies
direct agencies to provide adoptive parents with a medical report on a
short standardized form.297 Following recommendations of the Law Re-
form Committee, the proposed new legislation would create a statutory
right of the adoptive parents of a child under the age of eighteen to non-
identifying information on the child's medical and family background.
The Committee's report does not address the provision of information to
prospective adoptive parents, however, nor is there mention of this topic
in the description of the draft legislation.
Lack of attention to this issue may be influenced by the fact that
relatively few non-relative domestic adoptions occur each year (e.g., 93 in
1998)298 and most of these involve infants and toddlers. This, combined
with An Bord Uchtila's administrative policies that mandate disclosure of
some health history to adoptive parents, may have diminished the chances
that serious health risks have thus far gone undisclosed and caused severe
repercussions. Unlike the situation in the United States and England,
children in protective custody of the state in the Republic of Ireland have
only rarely been adopted,299 due to stringent legal restrictions on non-
consensual adoptions. Nevertheless, as calls increase to provide these
children with more permanent familial arrangements,3°° the provision of
statutory rights to prospective adoptive parents to receive full medical
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Telephone Conversation with Mr. Thomas Doyle, supra note 277.
298. LAW REFORM COMM. OF THE L. Soc'Y OF IR., supra note 289.
299. Paul Ward, Life, Death and Divorce, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY
LAW 287, 312-15 (Andrew Bainham ed., 1995). Tom Doyle, Executive Officer of An Bord
Uchtdla, indicates that only ten to twenty long-term foster children are adopted in Ireland per
year. Telephone Interview by Paul Ward with Tom Doyle, Exec. Officer, An Bord Uchtdla,
Dublin, Ir. (July 25, 2000). See also Dr. Kerry Joseph O'Halloran, Adoption in the Two Juris-
dictions of Ireland-a Case Study of Changes in the Balance Between Public and Private
Law, 4 IR. J. FAM. L. 43, 51, 53 n. 19 (April 2001) (Of the 400 adoption orders made in 1998,
only one involved a child with special needs and only one involved a child subject to a care
order.).
300. See, e.g., Geoffrey Shannon, Editorial, 4 IR. J. FAM. L. 1 (2000).
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and social history would ensure appropriate placements and enable
adoptive families to meet their children's special needs.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ON DISCLOSURE RIGHTS
During the past century, the scope of international law has extended well
beyond the conduct of foreign relations and regulation of territorial
boundaries that were its predominant focus in an earlier era. The
development of human rights treaties and customary norms, as well as
the rapid growth of conventions regulating transnational relationships,
has extended the impact of international law to the realm of family law,
affecting not only international adoptions, but the conduct of domestic
adoptions as well. This Section therefore extends our examination
beyond domestic law, and considers the impact of both global and
regional conventions, as well as customary international law and general
principles of international law, on the rights of adopted individuals and
their birth and adoptive parents to both identifying and non-identifying
information during and subsequent to the adoption process.
A. Identifying Information
It has frequently been asserted that the right of an adult adoptee to
know the identity of her birth family is a human right that must be un-
equivocally recognized and honored without exception.'O It is certainly
true that many would find such a statement true as a matter of moral im-
perative, but is it true as a matter of international law? A number of
international conventions, as well as customary international law and
general principles of international law, could potentially have a bearing
on the resolution of this question. Foremost among them is the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"),3 2 which has been frequently
cited by advocates of adoptees as the source of a right to identifying in-
formation. While such a right may be evolving under the CRC, its
legislative history does not confirm that creation of an absolute right to
such information was the original intent of the drafters.3 3 Moreover, sub-
301. See, e.g., Bastard Nation Action Alerts, at http://www.bastards.org/alert (last visited
Nov. 16, 2001); George Annason, Ethics in a World Ruled by Law and the Market Adoption,
Speech Summary (Nov 3, 1999), at http://www.bastards.org/bq/bq//edrep.htm; Denise Castel-
lucci and Damsel Plum, Ethics and Adoption, at http://www.bastards.org/documents/
world.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2001); Peter F. Dobbs, International Adoption: Opening Pan-
dora's Box, at http://www.bastards.org/bq/doddsl.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
302. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter
CRC).
303. See infra notes 309-37 and accompanying text.
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sequent practice under the Convention reveals conflicting interpretations
by various state parties and the absence of consistent recognition and
enforcement of such a right by the CRC's implementing body, the
Committee on the Rights of the Child. °4 The Hague Convention on Pro-
tection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption also regulates the retention of identifying information, but
does not mandate its release. °5 Implementing legislation in the United
States, however, may make some information transmitted in the course
of an international adoption available. Various regional conventions, such
as the European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Deci-
sions Concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of
Children, and the Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Con-
cerning the Adoption of Minors, focus on preserving confidentiality.
3 6
Recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, interpreting a
general right to privacy and familial life under the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, recog-
nize the importance of both rights to information and rights to privacy,
neither of which is unequivocal, and suggest a balancing approach.3 7
Moreover, the current practices of the nations of the world regarding re-
lease of identifying information are not sufficiently uniform to support
an absolute right to information under customary international law or
general principles of law.
Thus, examination of these conventions and doctrines in the follow-
ing subsections supports the conclusion that the right of adopted
individuals to identifying information and the right of birth parents to
privacy both receive some support under international law. While the
importance of access to identifying information for adult adoptees is re-
ceiving increasing recognition under international law, it can not yet be
said that an absolute right to such information is created by international
conventions, customary international law, or general principles of inter-
national law.
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child
One of the primary sources upon which proponents of open adoption
records rely is the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
30 8
Drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, the convention entered
into force on September 2, 1990, and in ten years has been ratified by
304. See infra notes 338-71 and accompanying text.
305. See infra notes 374-79 and accompanying text.
306. See infra notes 382-88 and accompanying text.
307. See infra notes 389-403 and accompanying text.
308. CRC, supra note 302.
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every nation in the world except the United States of America and Soma-
lia.3" The Convention's genesis was a draft convention introduced to the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights by the Polish delegation in 1978.30
A working group was appointed by the Commission and met annually
from 1979 through 1988 to revise the draft."
A review of the discussions and proposals of this group related to the
three articles of the Convention that have a bearing on the disclosure of
identifying information to adopted individuals, the reflections of scholars
who participated and subsequent academics who assessed the group's
work, and implementation of the Convention through states reports and
the work of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, suggest that the
CRC does not create an unequivocal right to disclosure of identifying
information. Moreover, despite references in Article 7 of the CRC re-
quiring implementation of rights in other international instruments, the
U.N. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protec-
tion and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster
Placement Nationally and Internationally, does not establish an absolute
right to identifying information that could become binding through Arti-
cle 7 of the CRC.312
a. Article 21
The first CRC article that must be examined is Article 21 on Adop-
tion. Under Article 21, states party to the Convention pledge that, if they
have a system of adoption, the best interests of the child shall be the
paramount consideration, and they agree to five explicit principles. Ref-
erence to disclosure of identifying information is notable for its absence
in this article. The legislative history of the Convention indicates that, in
1982, the report of the Working Group to the Commission on Human
Rights included a proposal by the United States to add language to the
article that would read:
The States Parties to the present Convention shall take all appro-
priate legislative and administrative measures to safeguard the
confidentiality of adoption records and shall permit access to
309. Cynthia Price Cohen & Susan Kilbourne, Jurisprudence of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child: A Guide for Research and Analysis, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 633, 635 (1998).
310. Id.
311. See Cynthia Price Cohen, Role of the United States in Drafting the Conventions on
the Rights of the Child: Creating a New World for Children, 4 LoY. POVERTY L. J. 9, 10, 18
(1998).
312. See infra note 372 and accompanying text.
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such records only by judicial order in accordance with applica-
ble law and procedures."'
A summary of the discussion indicated that "although it was agreed
that confidentiality in respect of family and civil status is on the whole
desirable for the sake of family privacy," the provision might create im-
plementation issues in many countries.31 ' Several delegates also thought
this provision was not appropriate within the Convention because the
question "had no direct bearing on the rights of the child."3 '5 The pro-
posal was not accepted by the Working Group. In response, the United
States submitted an alternate proposal in 1985:
The States Parties to the present Convention may take legislative
and administrative measures, where appropriate, to safeguard the
confidentiality of the adoption records.316
In 1986, however, the United States withdrew the proposal, with the
explanation to the Working Group that "since the relevant provision
adopted by the Group was neutral on the subject and did not require the
disclosure of adoption records, the amendment had been withdrawn on
the understanding that [the] delegation might return to it if any later
amendment to the Convention made it necessary.
'3 17
In 1988 Argentina circulated a report of the Latin American meeting
of NGOs, which included among other provisions the following:
In all circumstances, the adopted minor shall have the right to
know which is his natural family. This right shall be guaranteed
in the judicial proceeding."'
However, this provision was never incorporated into the final draft.
Thus, while the topic was raised and discussed at least twice during the
drafting of Article 21, neither the provision mandating disclosure nor the
provisions permitting or mandating confidentiality were retained.
Though the topic was of great interest, it appears no clear consensus
could be reached.
313. Radda Barnen, Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(1978-1989), art. 21, at 14 (excerpting the 1982 report of the Working Group to the Commis-
sion on Human Rights, $164-90, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/30/Add.1 (1982)).
314. Id. at 14.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 15 (excerpting U.N. ESCOR, 41st Sess., at Annex II, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1985/63 (1985)).
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b. Article 7
Article 7 of the CRC, addressing name and nationality, has been
suggested as a possible source for a right to identifying information. It
provides:
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire
a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be
cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights
in accordance with their national law and their obligations
under the relevant international instruments in this field, in
particular where the child would be stateless.
Most of the discussion and debate surrounding this article during the
drafting stage involved the terms under which a child would acquire a
nationality, and particularly the tension between the immigration laws of
the various potential states parties and the need to ensure that each child
acquired some nationality. However, an earlier draft of this article, pro-
posed by Egypt and many of the Arab nations, would have provided that
"[a] child shall have the right from his birth to know and belong to his
parents .... " Egypt suggested their proposal was essential to the psycho-
logical stability of the child.3 9
During the same time that this proposal was made to amend Article
7, these same nations objected to the language in Article 21 referring to
adoption, suggesting instead that Article 21 should address "alternate
care for a child who does not have a natural family."32 In the debate over
Article 21, those nations argued that the Islamic Shari'a (law) does not
permit or recognize the relationship of adoption, providing instead for
individual and collective responsibility for raising a child whose parents
cannot provide care through Kahfala (a relationship similar to guardian-
ship),32 which continues to recognize the child's relationship with his
birth family.
322
The Egyptian/Arab proposal to amend Article 7 was met with con-
cern expressed by representatives of the German Democratic Republic,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of
America because it conflicted with their laws providing for "secret
319. Barnen, supra note 313, at 16-17.
320. Id. at 19-20.
321. Id. at 20 (excerpting U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/l989/WG.I/WP.3 (1989)). This issue was
later resolved by adding language to Article 21 qualifying its application to states parties
"which recognize or permit the system of adoption." Id. at 4, 23.
322. See Imad-ad Dean Ahmad, The Islamic View of Adoption, 1999 ADOPTION
FACTBOOK III 245-46 (observing that under Islamic law, identity is defined by blood).
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adoption. 3 23 They suggested that the right to know one's parents could
not be applied everywhere.324 They also suggested that the use of the
word "belong" implied a concept of property that was not applicable to
children . 5
A representative of the United States suggested the current language
of Article 7, as an alternative to the Egyptian/Arab proposal. This current
language qualifies the "right to know one's parents" with the language
"as far as possible," a compromise text that was accepted by the Working
Group. 26 This language, combined with the obligation in para. 2 to im-
plement the right in accordance with national laws as well as relevant
international instruments, suggests that the Convention as ratified creates
no absolute right to access to identifying records.
c. Article 8
The third article bearing on this issue is Article 8, which addresses
Preservation of Identity. Article 8 provides:
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to
preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and
family relations as recognized by law, without unlawful in-
terference.
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the ele-
ments of his or her identity, States Parties shall provide
appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-
establishing speedily his or her identity.
This article was initially proposed in 1985 by Dr. Jaime Sergio
Cedra, 2 7 an Argentinian representative, and originally read:
The child has the inalienable right to retain his true and genuine
personal, legal, and family identity.
In the event that a child has been fraudulently deprived of some
or all of the elements of his identity, the State must give him
special protection and assistance with a view to re-establishing
his true and genuine identity as soon as possible. In particular,
323. Barnen, supra note 313, at 17.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 16-17 (excerpting U.N. ESCOR 45th Sess., [ 92-116, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1989/48 (1989)).
327. George Stewart, Interpreting the Child's Right to Identity in the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 26 FAM. L.Q. 221, 221 (1992) (citing Convention on the Rights of the
Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 U.N. GAOR Annex, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989), reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 1456 (1990)).
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this obligation of the State includes restoring the child to his
blood relations to be brought up.328
The proposal was inspired by the abduction of children in Argentina
between 1975 and 1983, in what has been referred to as the "dirty war,"
when several hundred children were either taken from their parents in
captivity, or taken at birth from their mothers, who were being held in
detention camps. After the junta, family members had great difficulty
trying to trace these children, and later discovered that many were given
to childless families of military and police officers to raise.3 29 Argentina
thus wished to establish a duty of states "to preserve or safeguard the
identity of the child" and to "establish appropriate mechanisms to rees-
tablish the child's identity when it has been partly or wholly deprived of
it.,,330
In 1986, Poland presented a modified version of Article 8:
1. The States Parties undertake to guarantee to the child the
right to preserve his true and genuine personal, legal and
family identity.
2. If a child has been fraudulently deprived of some or all of
the elements of his identity, the States Parties shall provide
the child with necessary assistance and protection, with a
view to speedily re-establishing his true and personal iden-
tity.
331
Poland's proposal was inspired by the historical separation of children
from their parents during the Second World War.
3 32
Thus, the focus of Article 8 was on the duty of nations to create
mechanisms to rectify situations in which children were wrongfully
separated from their parents. In response to arguments made during dis-
cussion of the proposal that it overlapped with matters already addressed
in the adoption article, now Article 21, language was inserted to reflect
that the right to preservation of identity is the right to be free from
"unlawful interference" in the right to preservation of name and family
328. Bamen, supra note 313, at 4 (excerpting U.N. ESCOR 41st Sess., annex II, art. III,
9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/64 (1985)).
329. Jaime Sergio Cedra, The Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child: New Rights,
12 HUM. RTS. Q. 115, 116 (1990); Geraldine Van Bueren, Children's Access to Adoption Re-
cords-State Discretion or an Enforceable International Right?, 58 MOD. L. REV. 37, 47
(1995) [hereinafter Van Beuren I]; GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 119 (1995) [hereinafter VAN BEUREN II].
330. Cedra, supra note 329, at 116.
331. Bamen, supra note 313, at 4-8 (excerpting U.N. ESCOR, 42nd Sess., TT 33-49,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/39 (1986)).
332. Cedra, supra note 329, at 116.
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relations as "recognized by law" and the duty to provide "appropriate"
assistance is invoked when a child is "illegally" deprived of elements of
her identity.333 Article 8's proponent, Dr. Cedra, in fact took care to dif-
ferentiate the article from matters covered in the article on adoption,
noting that the retention of children that had not been abandoned did not
lead in the majority of cases to the initiation of illegal or fraudulent
adoption practices." Thus, the qualifying language inserted into Article
8 diminishes its effectiveness as a source for an unqualified right to iden-
tifying information. Moreover, the context in which Article 8 was
proffered, in reaction to atrocities in Argentina and Poland, further sup-
ports its inapplicability to adoptions that do not involve the wrongful
taking of children.
Thus, the legislative history of the drafting of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child does not support the proposition that the articles ul-
timately adopted in the final text create an unequivocal right of access to
adoption records, although it seems clear that some delegations submit-
ted proposals that would have supported such a right. International
experts on the Convention seem to concur. Cynthia Price Cohen, who
participated in the drafting of the Convention from 1983 until it was
adopted in 1989, has stated that in her opinion nothing in the language of
the Convention or the intent of the drafters at the time created an abso-
lute right to identifying information. 335 Geraldine Van Bueren, Director of
the Programme on International Rights of the Child, also concluded that
although the Convention created many new rights, access to adoption
records "appears to have gone mostly unremarked." '336 Jaime Cedra, the
original proponent of Article 8, concluded in 1990 that the article was an
outcome of lengthy negotiations, and that the nature of the new right
created will depend on development of the ratifying nations' legal sys-
tems rather than the specific phenomena that initially prompted the
creation of Article 8.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 117.
335. Personal Interview with Cynthia Price Cohen, Executive Director of ChildRights
International Research Institute (May 24, 2001).
336. Van Beuren I, supra note 329, at 44.
337. Cedra, supra note 329, at 116-17. Dr. Cedra observed that the concept of identity
was not defined in the text, in part because the discussions of the proposal were influenced by
the desire of countries to exclude certain matters rather than to try to positively define the
right. Id. Some nations were concerned that the article might interfere with in vitro fertiliza-
tion or genetic engineering; others, that it might be interpreted to create obstacles to their laws
authorizing abortion; and others objected that the concept of "identity" was not recognized in
their national laws. Id.
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d. Subsequent Practice
Legislative history, such as that discussed above, plays a limited role
under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention,338 which is recognized in the
United States and abroad as establishing the norms for treaty interpreta-
tion." 9 According to the Vienna Convention, treaties must be "interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose."34° Subsequent practice, which establishes the parties' agreement
regarding interpretation, will also be considered, along with any relevant
rules of international law. 4'Therefore, it is important to look at how rati-
fying nations have regarded their obligations regarding access to
identifying information in adoption records, and how the duty has been
interpreted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Committee
charged with monitoring implementation of the treaty.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child is composed of ten ex-
perts elected by the nations that are parties to the Convention. It meets
three times per year to review periodic reports on implementation from
the governments of the state parties, as well as from international non-
governmental organizations. It then issues its own reports, entitled
Concluding Observations and Recommendations, for each country re-
viewed.34'2 As of January 2001, 202 initial and periodic reports had been
submitted to the Committee, of which the Committee had considered16343
Examination of the reports of state parties to the Committee on the
Rights of the Child regarding their implementation of Articles 7 and 8
reveals no clear pattern. Several nations that permit adoptees access to
338. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (here-
inafter Vienna Convention).
339. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
145, introductory note (1987). The Restatement generally regards the Convention as reflecting
the law of the United States regarding international agreements, departing from the Conven-
tion only in those few instances in which the Convention deviated or moved beyond accepted
customary international law. Id. The United States has signed the treaty but not yet ratified it,
due to a dispute between Congress and the Executive branch regarding the allocation of au-
thority to enter and terminate international agreements. Frederic Kirgis, Treaties as Binding
International Obligation, ASIL Insight (1997), at http://www.asil.org/insight9.htm.
340. Vienna Convention, supra note 338, art. 31.
341. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1, 145, art. 31 (1987).
342. Cohen and Kilbourne, supra note 309, at 638, 640-42.
343. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATEMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD TO THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE SESSION OF THE
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION ON CHILDREN, New York, 29 January-2
February 2001, 1, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/crcstat.htm.
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their records have reported that practice. 4" Similarly, some nations that
restrict access of adoptees to identifying information, in whole or part,
mention the restriction in their reports. 5 Many nations that practice
adoption do not mention their disclosure policies in their reports, 346 even
344. Initial Report of Iceland, U.N. CRC, T 129, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/i l/Add.6 (1995)
(stating that adoptee has right of access to adoption records and there is no minimum age-
some have accessed records as young as age 12); Initial Report of the Netherlands, U.N. CRC,
76, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/51/Add.1 (1997) (reporting both on access of adoptee, which is per-
mitted, and access of AID child, which appears to require balancing); Initial Report of
Germany, U.N. CRC, 26, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/1 l/Add.5 (1994); Initial Report of Malta, U.N.
CRC, 81, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.56 (1998) (granting right of access for adoptee at age
18); Initial Report of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, U.N. CRC, at 17, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.36 (1997); Second Report of Finland, U.N. CRC, [ 65, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/70/Add.3 (1998) (noting under Finnish law 'adoptee has right of access, unless it
would be against interests of adoptee or others); Initial Report of Liechtenstein, U.N. CRC,
20, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/61/Add.I (1999); Initial Report of Palau, U.N. CRC, in 28-29, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/51 /Add. 149 (2001); Supplementary Report to Second Periodic Report of Mexico,
U.N. CRC, 1 39, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.16 (1998) (reporting on measures to bring the
Federal and State legislation into line with the provisions of the Convention, a new federal
adoption law was described that provides that an adult adoptee who wishes to find out about
his natural family may obtain information from the civil registry with judicial authorization).
Cf Initial Report of Dominican Republic, U.N. CRC, 68, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/
Add.40 (1999) (stating that adoptive parents are required by law to inform adopted children of
their biological origins).
345. Initial Report of Canada, U.N. CRC, 188, 459 (Alberta), 712 (Ontario), 871
(Quebec), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/1 l/Add.3 (1994) (reporting on the policies of some of the prov-
inces regarding adoption disclosure, some of which permit disclosure only by court order or
with birth parent permission or through a registry, but it is not mentioned in the reports on
other provinces); Initial Report of Poland, U.N. CRC, 91 18, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/Add.1 1(1994)
(noting Poland's reservation to Article 7 on the ground that it maintains legal provisions ena-
bling the adopting party to keep secret the child's origin); Initial Report of Luxembourg, U.N.
CRC, 1 35, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.2 (1997) (stating that registration of births allows par-
ents of infants placed for adoption to not contain the name of the natural parents, at their
option). Cf Initial Report of Armenia, U.N. CRC, 19, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.9 (1997)
(reporting that Criminal Code provides that persons who divulge adoptions without the adopt-
ers' consent will be held liable; Initial Report of Belgium, U.N. CRC, 128, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/i l/Add.4 (1994) (observing that the Belgian practice of changing the name of an
adopted child does not violate Article 8, because it is recognized by law); Initial Report of
Monaco, U.N. CRC, 1 12, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.15 (2000) (stating that mother has op-
tion of leaving newborn with social welfare service and keeping her identity off of the birth
certificate); Initial Report of Uzbekistan, U.N. CRC, 125, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/41/Add. 8 (1999)
(stating that disclosure of adoption records is forbidden by law without the consent of the
adoptive parents).
346. E.g., Initial Report of Sweden, U.N. CRC, 9 61 U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.1 (1992)
(Sweden allows access); Initial report of Belarus, U.N. CRC, 142, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C3/Add.14 (1993); Initial Report of Republic of Ireland, U.N. CRC, In 137-38, 246,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/i I/Add.12 (1996) (Ireland law did not recognize a right of access at that
time); Initial Report of Italy, U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.18 (1994); Initial Report of
Czech Republic, U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/1 I/Add.ll (1996); Initial Report of United
Kingdom, U.N. CRC, 919 150-60, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/1 l/Add.1 (1994) (Great Britain, Scotland,
and Northern Ireland permitted access); Initial Report of Australia, U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/8/Add.31 (1996); Initial Report of Romania, U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.16
(1993); Initial Report of the Slovak Republic, U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/il/Add.17
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though some of them do make identifying information available to
adoptees. Some nations in which adoption is practiced reported on the
access of children conceived by artificial insemination by donor(AID) to
identifying information about the donor, but did not include information
about access to adoption records,347 even though in several instances
adoption records are accessible by adoptees in those countries.
Canada's approach to the Convention is of particular interest, as
many of Canada's provinces follow procedures similar to those of the
United States regarding disclosure of information, and do not permit
automatic access.348 Canada made a few reservations to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child when it ratified the Convention, but it did not
address the issue of non-access of adoptees to identifying information in
those reservations.349 When Canada submitted its report, the policies of
some of the provinces regarding restrictions on the disclosure of identi-
fying information were reported. Despite this revelation, the
nondisclosure of information to adoptees did not arise in the Summary
Record of the Committee meeting to review the report,350 nor was it
raised as a matter of concern by the Committee on the Rights of the
Child in its Concluding Observations.'
The Republic of Ireland, which did not permit adopted persons ac-
cess to birth records at the time of its review by the CRC, did not raise
the issue in its initial report on compliance with the Convention. The
Summary Record of the three sessions of the Committee held to review
the report reveals that Ms. Qedraogo, a Committee member, did ask the
representative from Ireland whether an adopted child had the right to
know his real identity and obtain information about his biological par-
ents.352 The Irish representative, responded that the right of adopted
children to know the names of their natural parents was restricted by the
current legislation, that a Constitutional Review Group had recom-
(1998); Initial Report of Cape Verde, U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/I l/Add.23 (2001); Initial
Report of Latvia, U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/1l/Add.20 (1998); Initial Report of Isle of
Mann, U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/i l/Add.19 (1998).
347. E.g., Initial Report of Austria, U.N. CRC, 149, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/il/Add.14
(1997) (reporting on Article 7); Initial Report of Sweden, U.N. CRC, 61, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/lI/Add.6 (1995); Periodic Report of Norway, U.N. CRC, 132, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/70/Add.2 (1998); Periodic Report by Denmark, U.N. CRC, 56, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/70/Add.6 (2000).
348. See supra notes 208-27 and accompanying text.
349. CRC, supra note 302.
350. Summary Record of the 216th Meeting, Canada, U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/SR.216 (1995).
351. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Canada,
U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.37 (1995).
352. Summary Record of the 437th Meeting, Ireland, U.N. CRC, 38, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/SR.437 (1998).
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mended that adopted children should have access to their birth records,
and that the Ministry of Health and Children had accorded priority to
that question.353 Again the issue of nondisclosure was not raised as a mat-
ter of concern in the Concluding Observations of the Committee.3"'
Ms. Judith Karp, a member of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child for the past six years, recently observed that the Committee some-
times, but not consistently, asks a question regarding the right of a child
to know her biological parents when it reviews the reports of state par-
ties.35 During her time on the Committee, Ms. Karp has stated that she
does not recollect any insistence on this issue, nor does she recall
whether in Concluding Observations she had raised this as a matter of356
concern. Noting that the time allotted the Committee to review each
nation's report does not permit entering into detail concerning adoption,
she attributed the Committee's failure to raise the issue more frequently
to the shortage of time rather than an indication that the Committee does
not regard disclosure of identifying information as a matter of imple-
menting the article relating to the right to know one's identity."5
The record of one discussion by the Committee, however, about in-
formation the child should receive (during childhood, presumably),
illustrated the complexity of both the issue and the Committee members'
perceptions regarding the Convention's mandates. During a review of a
report prepared by the Ukraine in 1995, one Committee member ob-
served that an increasing number of countries encouraged parents to
inform their children about adoption, rather than surrounding it in se-
crecy.358 The Chairperson of the Committee responded that the "question
of secrecy was a very delicate matter" recalling cases in other countries
in which children had committed suicide because they had unexpectedly
discovered they were adopted 5 9 She noted that more countries were
considering laws that would permit a child to discover his origins any-
time and, if he wished, to renew contact with the biological family, but
she observed the situation was complex and that might not always be in
the best interest of the child.3'6 Another Committee member mentioned
353. Id. at 52.
354. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Ireland,
U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.85 (1998).
355. Telephone Interview with Judith Karp, Member of Committee on the Rights of the
Child from Israel (June 4, 2001).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Summary Record of the 240th Meeting: Ukraine, U.N. CRC, 1 64, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/SR.240 (1995). Ukraine reported during the discussion that it does grant an adult
adoptee access to information regarding his origins when he comes of age.
359. Id. at$ 67.
360. Id.
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there was interest in an adoption data bank, but suggested that issues of
secrecy and access to computerized personal data must be balanced
against the right of people to know what information the data bank
stored about them.3 6' A third Committee member suggested that the right
to know parents from birth "as far as possible" was well phrased.362
When the issue of identifying information was raised in state reports,
it was evident that some nations perceived balancing, rather than an ab-
solutist approach, to be desirable, while others interpreted the
Convention more stringently. The Netherlands, for example, reported on
a 1994 opinion regarding the identity of AID sperm donors in which the
Netherlands Supreme Court held that "the general right of personality
underlying such fundamental rights as the right to respect for privacy, the
right to freedom of opinion, conscience and religion and the right to
freedom of expression also includes the right to know the identity of the
parents from whom one is descended," and referred specifically to Arti-
cle 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.3 63 Nevertheless, the
report goes on to say, the Court found that "[t]he right to know the iden-
tity of the parents from whom one is descended is not absolute. This
right must yield to the rights and freedoms of others if they weigh more
heavily in a given case.'64 Finland reported that an adopted child has a
right of access to documents to get information on his or her own bio-
logical background, but that access may be denied if it would endanger
the health or development of the child or would otherwise be against the
interest of the child or other private interests.3 65 The Canadian provinces,
which reported their various restrictions on access to identifying infor-
mation, also reflected their concern with finding the appropriate balance
of the right to privacy and the right to know one's biological parents.366
On the other hand, the German Report implied that its law, which per-
mits anyone over the age of 15 to inspect the state registers and obtain
identifying knowledge about her parents,367 was required by Article 8 of
361. Id. at$ 70.
362. Id. at 1 76. It appears that a question was also asked of a Chinese representative dur-
ing a Committee review of its state report about "the right of a child to know his origins [and]
the age at which the child could seek information on biological parents." Summary Record of
the 299th Meeting: China, U.N. CRC, 138, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.299 (1996).
363. Initial Report of the Netherlands, U.N. CRC, 76, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/51/Add.1
(1997).
364. Id.
365. Second Report of Finland, U.N. CRC, 65, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/70/Add.3 (1998).
366. See Initial Report of Canada, U.N. CRC, 712, 871, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ll/
Add.3 (1994).
367. Initial Report of Germany, U.N. CRC, 26, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/1 l/Add.5 (1994).
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the Convention, and Poland felt compelled to make a reservation to pre-
serve their law of "secret" adoption."'
The variety of state reporting practices and the lack of insistence by
the Committee that opening adoption records is compelled suggests that
subsequent state practice is not yet sufficiently uniform to conclude that,
despite the legislative history, the Convention should be interpreted to
create an unequivocal right to identifying information. Nevertheless, the
record does establish that many countries and the Committee see the
Convention as supporting a right to information about one's family of
origin, although the circumstances in which that right applies and the
extent to which it may be balanced with other rights and interests are not
sufficiently clear.
Scholarly assessment of the Convention as a source of an unequivo-
cal right to identifying information has been mixed. Some scholars have
argued that the principles of Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention support a
right of a child to know of his origins,369 or have attributed legislative
changes opening records in their countries to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.37 ° Often, however, scholars incorporate into their
arguments principles from the Convention recognizing the importance of
identity, yet concede that there may be circumstances in which the right
will not be unequivocally granted."'
e. Rights under the U.N. Declaration by Cross Reference
One final source under the Convention on the Rights of the Child
upon which to hinge a right to access to identifying information upon
demand might be the reference in Article 7 to "other international stan-
dards." The U.N. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to
368. Initial Report of Poland, U.N. CRC, 72, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.11 (1994).
369. See, e.g., SHATTER, supra note 11, at 527 (concluding that Article 8 requires afford-
ing adult adoptees a right of access to their birth records).
370. Wanda Stojanowska, Adoption: Revision of the Family and Custody Act, in 1995
THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 401, 402 (Andrew Bainham, ed. 1997) (dis-
cussing a recent change in Polish law permitting adult adoptees access to their records);
Cecilia P. Grossman, The Recent Reform of Adoption Law, in 1996 THE INTERNATIONAL SUR-
VEY OF FAMILY LAW 13, 15-16 (Andrew Bainham ed., 1998) (addressing reform in Argentina
law permitting adult adoptees access to their records); Ake Saldeen, The Rights of Children to
Speak for Themselves and Obtain Access to Information Concerning Their Biological Origins
Etc., in 1994 THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 441, 444 (Andrew Bainham ed.,
1996) (Sweden).
371. See Tshepo L. Mosikatsana, Children's Rights and Family Autonomy in the South
African Context: A Comment on Children's Rights Under the Final Constitution, 3 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 341, 370-71 (1998) (noting "adoptee's ight must be limited by birth parent's right
to privacy"); Van Beuren I, supra note 329, at 49, 51 (recognizing that the Convention sup-
ports a right of access, but also the possibility that a court could balance needs of parties if
birth parents object to disclosure); George A. Stewart, Interpreting the Child's Right to Iden-
tity in the UN. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 26 FAM. L. Q. 221, 233 (1992).
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the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster
Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally,37 2 though it is
not a legally binding treaty, could be used as a source for such standards.
Two articles of the Declaration are relevant:
Article 8-The child should at all times have a name, a national-
ity and a legal representative. The child should not, as a result of
foster placement, adoption or any alternative regime, be deprived
of his or her name, nationality or legal representative unless the
child thereby acquires a new name, nationality, or legal represen-
tative.
Article 9-The need of a foster or an adopted child to know
about his or her background should be recognized by persons re-
sponsible for the child unless this is contrary to the child's best
interests.
Since a child acquires a new name in adoption, the Declaration could
be interpreted to be satisfied by providing non-identifying information
about background, or it could be read simply to require that the child be
told he is adopted, which itself was an issue in many of the countries that
submitted reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child discussed
above. Given the ambiguity of the U.N. Declaration, its usefulness as the
core of a right to access on demand is doubtful. Thus, other international
instruments must be explored.
2. Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption
Drafted under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, the Convention on Protection of Children and
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (hereinafter Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption). 3  establishes norms and
procedures intended to govern international adoptions between its states
parties.37 ' The Convention entered into force on May 1, 1995 and has
now been ratified by over 40 nations.3 75
372. Adopted by G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 265, U.N.
Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
373. May 29, 1993, 2 Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Proceedings of the 17th
Session 523, 32 I.L.M. 1134 [hereinafter Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption].
374. See Rebeca Rios-Kohn, Intercountry Adoption: An International Perspective on the
Practice and Standards, ADOPTION Q., Vol. 1, No. 4, 1998, at 3.
375. As of June 13, 2001, 42 nations had ratified or acceded to the Convention, and 15
nations had signed but not yet ratified. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status
Sheet Convention #33, at http://www.hcch.netle/status/adoshte.html (last visited June 13,
2001).
[Vol. 22:587
An Adopted Person's Identities and Heritage
The Convention addresses the retention of identifying information,
but does not mandate that contracting countries unconditionally release
such information to adult adoptees. Under the Convention, each state
party is required to create a Central Authority, either a governmental en-
tity or an organization delegated with certain responsibilities by the
government, to perform a variety of tasks to facilitate appropriate inter-
country adoptive placement. Article 16 requires the Central Authority of
the child's country of origin to prepare a report including information
about the child's identity, adoptability, background, social environment,
family history, medical history of the child and his family, and any spe-
cial needs of the child. The sending country is required to transmit the
report to the receiving country, but is permitted to "tak[e] care not to re-
veal the identity of the mother and the father if, in the State of origin,
these identities may not be disclosed.'3 76 Article 30 requires contracting
states to ensure the preservation of information concerning the child's
origin, including the identity of the child's parents and medical history.377
They are also bound to ensure that the child or her representative "has
access to such information, under appropriate guidance, in so far as is
permitted by the law of that State."37 8 The Hague Convention therefore
does not require any contracting nation to modify its disclosure policies
with respect to identifying information.
The United States has signed the Hague Convention, the U.S. Senate
gave its consent to ratification on September 20, 2000, and implementing
legislation, the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000,"'9 was enacted on Oc-
tober 6, 2000 in preparation for ratification within the next year. The
Intercountry Adoption Act requires the federal government to establish a
case registry of all adoptions involving immigration or emigration of
children to or from the United States, regardless of whether the adoption
is covered under the Convention.380 Adoptee advocacy groups lobbied in
favor of the final legislation, which removed access restrictions in earlier
drafts and provides some ability of adoptees to access information held
in the federal records pursuant to the U.S. Immigration and Nationality
Act.
381
376. Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 373, art. 16, at 527.
377. Id., art. 30, at 531.
378. Id.
379. Pub. L. No.106-279, 114 Stat. 825 (2000).
380. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14912(e) (West Supp. 2001).
381. Bastard Nation, Bastard Nation Urges Congress to Proceed with Hague Convention
Ratification, at http://www.bastards.org/alert/bnhague.htm (March 20, 2000).
Summer 2001 ]
Michigan Journal of International Law
3. Regional Conventions
Earlier regional conventions specifically addressing the topic of
adoption appear to reinforce the policy of secrecy. The European Con-
vention on the Adoption of Children,8 2 which was drafted under the
auspices of the Council of Europe and entered into force on January 9,
1983, currently has 17 states parties.383 Article 20 provides that adoptions
shall be completed without disclosing to the child's natural family the
identity of the adoptive family. It also provides that adoption proceedings
are to take place in camera, and that adoption records must be confiden-
tial. The article guarantees that the adoptee and adoptive family "shall"
be able to obtain records of the fact, date, and place of the adoptee's
birth, but "not expressly revealing the fact of adoption or the identity of
[the] former parents. 384
The Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the
Adoption of Minors, drafted under the auspices of the Organization of
American States and entered into force on May 26, 1988, takes a similar
approach.38 Currently ratified by Belize, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, and
Panama, the Convention in Article 7 provides that: "Where called for, the
secrecy of adoption shall be guaranteed."3 6 The article suggests that
medical information on the minor and the birth parents should be com-
municated, with identifying information excluded.3 7
A more recent regional convention, the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child, devotes a specific article to adoption,
but does not address the disclosure issue.388
Recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights suggest
that Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter European Convention on
Human Rights) could also have some bearing on the disclosure issue in
Europe, and by analogy, in other parts of the world based on similar
rights protected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 389 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights affords
382. April 24, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 255.
383. For the text and status of the European Convention on the Adoption of Children, see
the official website of the Council of Europe, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/
CadreListeTraites.htm.
384. European Convention on the Adoption of Children, supra note 382, art. 20.
385. Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the Adoption of Mi-
nors, May 24, 1984, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 62, 24 I.L.M. 460.
386. Id. at 461.
387. Id.
388. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/249/49 (1990), art. 24.
389. Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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a right to respect for a person's "private and family life."'3 90 In Gaskin v.
United Kingdom,391 the European Court of Human Rights considered a
claim by the petitioner that his rights under Article 8 had been violated
by the failure of government authorities to grant him complete access to
case records concerning his maintenance in foster care during a substan-
tial portion of his childhood. The government had withheld information
that was given in confidence, and refused to release it unless the provider
of the information could be located and give consent to its release.392 The
Court found that the files could constitute Mr. Gaskin's principal source
of information about his childhood and related to his basic identity.393 It
therefore determined that Article 8 required striking a fair balance be-
tween the needs of the individual and the effective operation of the child
care system.3 94 Acknowledging the vital interest in receiving information
necessary to understand one's early childhood, and the importance to the
government to be able to receive objective and reliable information, the
court found that an appropriate balance required that an independent au-
thority should decide whether access should be granted when a
contributor failed to answer or withheld consent, rather than automati-
cally denying the information.9 The absence of such a procedure in Mr.
Gaskin's case was held to constitute a violation of Article 8.396 The Court
also determined that the freedom of expression protected in Article 10
prohibits a government from withholding information from a person that
others are willing to impart to him, but it does not provide a right of ac-
cess to government files in these circumstances.
Also of interest is a more recent decision of the European Court of
Human Rights, in which the court confirmed that the protection of per-
sonal data was also of fundamental importance to a person's right to
respect for private and family life.3 97 In Z. v. Finland, the applicant
390. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, Eur. T.S. No. 5. Article 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home,
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
391. Gaskin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10454/83, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 36 (1989).
392. Id. at 39.
393. Id. at 45.
394. Id. at 47.
395. Id. at 54.
396. Id. at 50.
397. Z v. Finland, App. No. 22009/93, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 371 (1997).
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claimed that release by the state of information concerning her medical
condition (HIV positive) violated her right under Article 8 to protection
of personal data.3 98 In determining whether her privacy rights had been
violated, the court considered whether the disclosures could be justified
by a legitimate governmental aim. 399 The court determined that requiring
certain testimony regarding her condition in the setting of a court pro-
ceeding was justified. No legitimate government aim, however, justified
the decision to make the trial record accessible to the public within ten
years, or to reveal the applicant's identity to the press with the details of
her medical condition. These latter governmental actions, the court con-
cluded, constituted a violation of Article 8. 00
Thus, Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights might
be asserted to support a right to identifying information on the part of
adoptees, as well as a right of privacy for those birth parents who wish
anonymity. Similarly, by analogizing to the interpretation of Article 8 in
Gaskin and Z., Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights ("ICCPR"), 40 which prohibits arbitrary or unlawful
interference with privacy, family or home, might be used to support
claims in nations that are parties to that Convention. 42 Gaskin would ap-
pear to support the proposition that neither right is superior, nor
unequivocal, and that when there is an objection to the disclosure, the
issue must be examined by an independent authority, balancing the inter-
ests of both parties if possible, rather than by automatic denial of the
request.
40 3
4. Customary and General Principals of Law
The international community has long recognized customary inter-
national law and general principles of law as primary sources of
international law, separate from treaties and conventions.4 ° Through cus-
tomary international law, nations are regarded as capable of creating
binding rules of law by implied consent through their international cus-
398. Id. at 385.
399. Id. at 393.
400. Id. at 396-97.
401. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 19,
1966). As of September 23, 2001, 144 nations, including the United States, were party to this
Convention. See http://www.unorg (visited on Sept. 23, 2001).
402. Article 17(1) of the ICCPR provides: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, not to unlawful at-
tacks on his home and reputation."
403. See generally Jane Fortin, Rights Brought Home for Children, 62 MOD. L. REv. 350
(1999).
404. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, T.S. No 993.
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tomary practice. Establishing the existence of a norm of customary in-
ternational law requires two elements: (1) the particular practice is
consistently and uniformly, though perhaps not unanimously, adhered to
by the international community; and (2) the practice is followed out of a
sense of legal obligation, often referred to as opinio juris, rather than
convenience or courtesy.05 Though detecting opinio juris is often
particularly problematic in the area of human rights, where norms often
concern a government's treatment of its own citizens rather than its rela-
tions with other nations or their citizens, some scholars have suggested
that opinio juris in this arena can be found in the "shared sense of the
moral reprehensiveness" that leads nations to collectively abandon cer-
tain practices and undertake others. 6
General principles of international law are derived by examining the
domestic law of many nations, in search of legal norms that can be
deemed so fundamental that they will be found in the major legal sys-
tems of the world.40'7 Although general principles are typically used to fill
gaps when issues arise that are not resolved by international agreements
or customary international law, one type of principle, categorized under
the doctrine of jus cogens, accepts the existence of certain norms as so
fundamental that they can invalidate customary law as well as the provi-
sions of international agreements. In effect, these norms are considered
so fundamental that they cannot be derogated by the consent of nations,
and are characterized by some as a modern version of natural law. °8 The
rights not to be subjected to genocide, enslavement, murder, prolonged
arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination are examples of
the kinds of peremptory norms that have been recognized by both inter-
national and domestic tribunals, including U.S. courts.4°
Though some may wish to rely upon customary international law or
jus cogens to assert the unequivocal right of an adult adoptee to identify-
ing information, it does not appear that the required level of international
recognition necessary to satisfy either doctrine has been realized at this
405. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-48 (3d ed.
1999).
406. Joan F. Harman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International
Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 655, 671 (1983).
See also Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservations to the Ban on the Death Penalty for
Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311, 1334 (1993).
407. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102, reporters note 1 (1987).
408. See Janis, supra note 405, at 55-59, 62-66.
409. Id. at 62-66; Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715-17
(9th Cir. 1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702, reporters note 1 (1987).
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point in time. Certainly, many countries provide adult adoptees auto-
matic access to their birth records or other identifying information. In
much of Western Europe,4  parts of Australia,41  Israel,4 2 and increas-
ingly in other countries,'' a right of adult adoptees to access is becoming
the legal norm. Nevertheless, most of the United States, 4 Canada, 5
New Zealand, 416 parts of South America,417 and many other nations 418 still
do not provide unequivocal access to all adoptees. Given the differing
perspectives of the drafters of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the failure of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption to
mandate disclosure, the conflicting or ambiguous positions of other in-
ternational conventions and instruments, and the recognition for the need
to balance privacy interests displayed by the European Court of Human
Rights and periodically in the implementing review process conducted
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the elements of opiniojuris
or characterization as a "fundamental norm," would be difficult to estab-
lish at this time to support an unequivocal right to identifying
information in all instances.
410. See TRISELIOTIS, supra note 58, at I (stating that Finland makes identifying infor-
mation available to adult adoptees); supra notes 240, 248 and accompanying text (stating that
the United Kingdom makes identifying information available to adult adoptees). Most of the
rest of Western European nations also make identifying information available to adult
adoptees. See supra note 91 and Press Release of Dep't of Health and Children, supra note
292. See also supra note 344, regarding the initial reports of states parties to the CRC report-
ing their disclosure laws.
411. N.S.W. L. REFORM COMM'N, REPORT No. 69, supra note 115, 2.22-2.35 (report-
ing on the law of New South Wales opening records to adult adoptees and birth parents, and
permitting each to file contact vetoes, and on the laws, as of 1992, in the other Australian
jurisdictions: Victoria-adult adoptees entitled to records; Queensland-access of adult
adoptees subject to disclosure veto; South Australia-access of adult adoptees subject to dis-
closure veto; Western Australia-open records system was anticipated in the near future;
Tasmania-adult adoptees had access only with consent; Australian Capital Territory-access
subject to disclosure veto was under consideration).
412. Stewart, supra note 327, at 228 (citing Adoption of Children Law, 5720-1960, No.
45 § 27(3), 14 Law of the State of Israel, 93, 97 (1960)), confirmed in Telephone Interview
with Judith Karp, Member of Committee on the Rights of the Child representing Israel (June
4,2001).
413. See also supra notes 344, 370, regarding the initial reports of states parties to the
CRC reporting their disclosure laws and recent reforms in response to the CRC.
414. See supra notes 95-133 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 210-23 and accompanying text.
416. Persons adopted before commencement of the Adult Adoption Information Act of
1985 are entitled to identifying information on their birth certificates only if no disclosure veto
has been filed. Adult Adoption Information Act, 1985, §§ 3-6 (N.Z.).
417. See Claudia Lima Marques, Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) in South
America and the Effect on Adoption, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 65, 79 (2000) (observing that secrecy
is the traditional approach to adoption in Brazil and most other South American countries,
although a few countries permit a court to give access to records in exceptional circumstances,
and Columbia provides for the right of a child to know its origins).
418. See supra note 345.
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International conventions have not specifically addressed the inter-
ests of birth parents to post-adoption identifying information. Moreover,
the disparity of approaches to granting birth parents access to informa-
tion enabling them to locate or receive information about their adopted
children, among the different nations, renders recognition of any type of
"right" on their behalf under customary international law or general
principles of law premature at this time.
B. Non-identifying Information
The critical importance of requiring collection and disclosure of
medical and social history at appropriate times has received less atten-
tion in international conventions than has the disclosure of identifying
information. Nevertheless, several more general provisions of the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child support the creation of such legal
mandates. The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption does require
collection and disclosure of medical and social history in international
adoptions. Unfortunately, the time frames for disclosure established by
the implementing legislation in the United States, the Intercountry Adop-
tion Act, do not adequately serve the interests of adopted children or
their adoptive families. These themes will be explored in greater detail in
the following sections.
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child does not directly address
the collection or transmission of health information in Article 21, which
addresses adoption, but good practices regarding such disclosure are
supported by the underlying requirement that the best interests of the
child must be the paramount consideration."' Moreover, the commitment
in Article 23 to provide special care and assistance to children with spe-
cial needs, and recognition in Article 24 of the right of a child to
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to necessary
medical assistance underscore the importance of collection of complete
medical histories and early transmission of this information to prospec-
tive adoptive parents.
2. The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption
The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption facilitates good
practice in international adoptions with the requirement in Article 16 that
a report on the background, social environment, family history, medical
419. CRC, supra note 302, art. 21.
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history of the child and birth family, and special needs of the child be
prepared in the country of origin and transmitted to the receiving coun-
try. Article 30 requires contracting states to preserve this information and
ensure that the child or his representative has access to it, as permitted
by the domestic law of each country. Testimony before the U.S. Foreign
Relations Committee when the U.S. implementing legislation, the Inter-
country Adoption Act, was under consideration, underscored the need for
this requirement, recounting the use of such records to find a Korean
birth mother for an adoptee with leukemia who needed a bone marrow
transplant, as well as the psychological satisfaction that the preservation
of records has afforded to other international adoptees when they
reached maturity.
420
The implementing legislation in the United States, while helpful in
directing attention to the issue, would benefit from stricter standards.
The federal Intercountry Adoption Act requires an agency to provide
prospective adoptive parents in a Convention adoption with a copy of the
child's medical records, including an English translation, if possible, no
later than two weeks before (1) the adoption, or (2) the date the prospec-
tive parents travel to the foreign country to complete all procedures
relating to the adoption, whichever is earlier.42 ' An earlier timetable for
parents traveling to foreign countries, when possible, would give pro-
spective adopters time to read, digest, and consider the information
422
and, when desired, to receive outside expert evaluation before making a
commitment.23 Moreover, the provisions relating to parents who do not
travel to their child's country of origin is inadequate. Two weeks prior to
a domestic adoption of an international child in such circumstances
would often occur many months after the child has been placed in the
custody of prospective adoptive parents, at a time when disruption would
be devastating to both the child and the family. When prospective adopt-
ers are not traveling to the country of origin, medical records should be
provided at the time the assignment is made, when possible. At the latest,
these records should be provided a substantial period of time before the
child is scheduled to be removed from her caregivers in her country of
420. Testimony of Susan Soon-Keum Cox, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Octo-
ber 5, 1999, FDCH Congressional Testimony.
421. 42 U.S.C. § 14923.
422. See Testimony of Barbara Holtan, Director of Adoption Services of Tressler Lu-
theran Services, October 5, 1999, FDCH Congressional Testimony.
423. See Testimony of Dr. Roland Steven, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October
5, 1999, FDCH Congressional Testimony (describing the many instances in which he has been
asked to evaluate medical records of children placed for international adoption and discovered
serious medical problems, despite assurances from agencies that the child was healthy, and
observing that he had seen approximately 2000 children with serious medical conditions who
had been adopted from institutions).
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origin, so that any information that would cause the adopters to decline
the assignment is available before the child's life is disrupted. Recent
experience with international adoptions in the United States, and the
high incidence of disruption that has occurred when prospective adoptive
parents have not been adequately prepared for or informed of their
child's special needs, highlight the need for earlier disclosure than the
legislation now provides.24
III. CONCLUSION-DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE REFORM
Despite some assertions to the contrary, international law does not
appear to require a monolithic approach to the complex issues surround-
ing the desire of many adopted individuals for an unequivocal right to
access to identifying information, on those occasions when such disclo-
sure is contrary to the wishes of birth parents.125 Neither has examination
of these conflicting interests under the constitutional standards of the
United States426 and the Republic of Ireland427 yielded an absolute man-
date favoring disclosure or confidentiality. Nevertheless, recent
international reform efforts, 428 and the exploration of this issue by courts
and administrative bodies charged with implementing relevant interna-tio al • 429
tional conventions, underscore the critical importance of identifying
information to many adoptees and a growing movement to afford it pri-
macy.
Although many adoptees never seek their records or a reunion with
birth family members,43 ° for others access to identifying information and
the possibility of a meeting is a compelling psychological need.43' In ad-
dition to fulfilling their sense of identity and ability to achieve closure,
424. See Testimony of Barbara Holton, supra note 422 (relating that her agency had re-
ceived 82 disruption requests in five years from families adopting from Eastern Europe,
placements her agency did not facilitate).
425. See supra notes 308-418 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 152-70 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 281-89 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 209-27, 291-96, 370 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 352-68, 389-96 and accompanying text.
430. In Scotland, where birth records have been open since 1930, it was estimated in the
mid-1980s that only 7% of adult adoptees sought information about their birth parents. In
England, following the opening of birth records to adoptees in the mid-1970s, one researcher
extrapolated from a two-year period that approximately 21% of adult adoptees would seek
their records. CARP, supra note 9, at 156-57. Another study in Great Britain estimated that
about 15% of all adoptees search at some point during their lifetime. Studies in Canada and
the United States have reported that 32 to 35% of adoptees desire to search. WEGAR, supra
note 9, at 63.
431. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 655 (1977);
Sachdev, supra note 69, at 58-59.
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location of birth family members is often a critical source of medical
history, which was often unrecorded in previous decades or has recently
come to light. Moreover, permitting access is consistent with the modern
paradigm of adoption that honors continuing connection with both birth
and adoptive families. Disclosure laws should therefore, at a minimum,
be created with a presumption favoring access by adult adoptees to their
birth records and identifying information concerning their families of
origin, in addition to providing all non-identifying background informa-
tion as a matter of right.
In accordance with that presumption, state governments in the
United States should open birth and adoption records to adult adoptees,
retrospectively as well as prospectively, implementing a contact prefer-
ence system similar to Oregon's 32 for birth parents who do not wish to
be contacted, and requiring medical information to be filed with any
"no-contact" preferences. However, consideration should also be given
to affording birth parents access to a judicial or administrative review
process to seek a good cause order to delete identifying information in
compelling circumstances, subject to the requirement that medical in-
formation be provided if such an order were to be issued. In order to
provide the opportunity to prepare for possible contact, or to seek a good
cause order, if desired, an advance notification system, such as the one
implemented by New South Wales, Australia,43 could be utilized to af-
ford birth parents notice that an adoptee has requested identifying
information.
Creation of a system for judicial or administrative override would
provide a court or administrative43 officer an opportunity to perform an
individualized assessment of the conflicting needs of the adoptee and
birth parent in those rare instances in which a birth parent strongly ob-
432. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
433. Several years after New South Wales, Australia enacted its open records law, it
amended its legislation to permit a birth parent (or an adoptee about whom identifying infor-
mation is released) to lodge an advance notice request, which would stay the release of
information for a period of up to three months after the request for information, during which
time advance notice would be afforded and the person who lodged the request would be able to
prepare for the release of information and any impact this might have on the person's family
or associates. Adoption Information Act, N.S.W.R., §§ 15A-15J, available at http://
www.austlii.edu.au/aulegis/nsw/consol-act/aial 9990230. The advantage of such a system is that
it delays release of information only in those instances in which a birth parent specifically desires
advance notice, rather than for everyone. However, such a system would need to be accompa-
nied by significant publicity efforts to alert birth parents to the change in the law and the
specifics of filing.
434. Ideally, if such authority were given to an administrator with particular expertise in
adoption, such as a director of a state registry system or a director of adoption services with a
state agency, a right of judicial appeal from the administrative decision would also be created,
with the ability to stay any disclosure pending resolution of the appeal.
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jects to disclosure. Recognizing the need for individualized review in
some instances is consistent with the approach suggested by the Irish
Supreme Court in L O'T4,' and the European Court of Human Rights in
Gaskin.36 Placing the burden on the birth parent to seek the order, and
creating a presumption favoring disclosure that requires the birth parent
objecting to disclosure, rather than the adoptee seeking disclosure, to
show good cause, is in accord with the recognition of the importance of
identity interests emerging in international law and the international
community. Yet, in those rare instances in which the severe psychologi-
cal or emotional damage that a birth parent would suffer as a result of
the disclosure outweighs the psychological need of a particular adoptee
to obtain information, the opportunity for a judicial or administrative
override affords some protection to the privacy interests of birth parents.
Moreover, in an individualized setting, a judge or administrative officer
might often be able to achieve a resolution that accommodates the needs
of both parties.
When accommodation cannot be accomplished, good cause orders
prohibiting disclosure, because of the burden placed on the birth parent,
would normally only be available in adoptions that occurred prior to en-
actment of legislation opening records. Only then would expectations
created by prior confidentiality laws be likely to have engendered a
situation in which the emotional health or current relationships of the
birth mother could be severely compromised by disclosure. It is difficult
to conceive a scenario in which a birth parent who relinquished a child
when open access laws were in force could overcome the presumption
and show good cause, but there might be rare instances involving risks of
domestic violence that justify leaving the option open in prospective
adoptions as well. 37 Geraldine Van Bueren, a prominent scholar in the
field of international law and the rights of children, has observed that the
provision in the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption permitting
states of origin to withhold information identifying the birth parents is
justified on the ground that in some countries of origin, confidentiality
may be a matter of life or death for the birth mother.438 While that would
rarely be the case in the United States and most Western countries, there
435. See supra notes 281-85 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 391-96 and accompanying text.
437. For example, even though birth records have been open to adult adoptees in Eng-
land since 1976, an English Court of Appeal upheld the refusal of the Registrar General to
release a birth certificate to an inmate of a mental institution, adopted as an infant, who had
been convicted of two murders, following assessment by two psychiatrists who concluded that
his birth mother might be at risk from him if the records were released. Exparte Smith, 2 Q.B.
393, (Eng. C.A. 1991), 1991 WL 839566 (Eng. C.A. 1991).
438. Van Bueren I, supra note 329, at 44.
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may be individual instances in which such concerns require individual
assessment.
Combining a contact preference system with the opportunity for a
good cause hearing and a method to request advance notification should
afford those birth parents who desire it some protection of their privacy
interests, and perhaps circumvent what is now widespread use of private
search methods, a system far more likely to result in an unanticipated
"knock at the door." Because advance notice requests will not be made in
most cases, the vast majority of adoptees would receive the information
they seek far more quickly than they now do in most states. Given the
opportunity for mediating conflicting needs and the presumption favor-
ing disclosure, almost all adoptees would eventually receive the
information they seek. Under the proposed system, the granting of orders
withholding identifying information from adult adoptees should occur
only on those rare occasions in which a birth parent could overcome the
presumption favoring disclosure, and show that her interests in confiden-
tiality strongly outweigh the interests of the adoptee in receiving
identifying information. While this approach permits balancing the needs
of two adults, it is balancing heavily weighted in favor of the adoptee.
Examination of the disclosure laws of other countries also reveals
that when identifying information is provided, it is often accompanied
by the opportunity for government-sponsored counseling from a social
worker trained to provide advice regarding the unique psychological is-
sues that accompany revelation and reunion.439 Although some search
programs in the United States operate in a manner that provides a similar
opportunity,"0 states that simply provide information through a Vital Re-
cords clerk may not make such counseling available. Because access to
counseling often assists both adoptees and birth parents to deal with the
emotional complexities of identity formation and reunion, provision of
such services at government expense, on a voluntary basis, should be
formally incorporated into U.S. statutory schemes.
Although some countries permit adoptees to have automatic access
to identifying information during childhood,4 ' the preferable approach
439. E.g., Adoption Act, 1976, c. 36, § 51 (Eng.); Adoption (Scotland) Act, 1978, c.28,
§ 45 (Eng.).
440. For example, when Oklahoma's confidential intermediary system and registry were
created, they were designed so that information is not received directly from an intermediary,
but rather from an employee of the state-sponsored program, who would be trained to provide
counseling regarding sensitive issues that may arise. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 7508-1.2,
7508-1.3 (West Supp. 2000).
441. See Adoption (Scotland) Act, 1978, c.28, § 45 (Eng.) (reporting age 16); Initial Re-
port of Iceland, U.N. CRC, 129 U.N. Doc. CRC/C/I 1/Add.6 (1995) (reporting no minimum
age to access records, and that adoptees as young as 12 have obtained records); Initial Report
of Germany, U.N. CRC, 26, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/I l/Add.5 (1994) (reporting age 16).
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would be to leave adoptive parents with control over access during their
child's minority, as most registry systems in the United States currently
do. Adoptive parents have the best opportunity to assess when access to
information would serve their minor child's emotional needs.
On the other hand, when adoptees reach the age of majority, adop-
tive parents should have no further control over the disclosure issue.
Though some earlier U.S. courts" 2 and the Irish Supreme Court" 3 made
references to taking into account the interests of adoptive parents, and in
fact some countries'4 prohibit disclosure without the adoptive parent's
consent, legal consideration of the desires of adoptive parents regarding
their adult child's search for information or contact with birth relatives is
not warranted. Adoptive parents have no privacy interests at stake that
are equivalent to those of birth parents. While adoptive parents may have
some concerns over the effect of a reunion on their relationship with
their child, research has shown that such relationships are rarely im-
paired in this manner."5 In any event, such concerns should be addressed
by counseling rather than nondisclosure. Just as parents in our culture
have no control over other legal affairs of their adult children, similarly,
adoptive parents should have no legal role in the disclosure issue.
Allegiance to a paradigm of adoption fostering connections with
birth as well as adoptive families requires that governments in the United
States give more attention to meeting the emotional needs of birth par-
ents as well as adoptees. Ireland's proposal for a statutory provision
entitling birth parents with periodic progress reports or letters, if they
desire them,"6 merits serious consideration. Provision of non-identifying
information carries no risks or burdens for the adopted child or adoptive
parents. Moreover, it would certainly be an important step in meeting the
psychological needs of birth mothers and acknowledge the importance of
their continuing link with the child whom they have placed.4"7 While
442. See Golan v. Louise Wise Services, 507 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y App. 1987); In re Sage,
586 P.2d 1201 (Wash. App. 1979).
443. See I.O'T. v. B., [1998] 2 I.R. 321 (Ir. S.C.).
444. See Initial Report of Uzbekistan, U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc. CRCIC/41/Add.8 (1999);
Initial Report of Armenia, U.N. CRC, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.9 (1997).
445. See Thompson, supra note 31, at 14-15 (discussing study in 1970s by Children's
Aid Society of Metro Toronto finding that adoptive relationships were not destroyed, and
many were improved); Sachdev, supra note 69, at 64-65 (discussing survey of 124 adoptees
who had completed a reunion with birth parents revealed a majority (61.7%) who reported no
change in their relationship with their adoptive parents, five who experienced a deterioration,
and the remainder who felt the relationship had improved considerably).
446. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND CHILDREN, supra note 292 and accompanying text.
447. See SACHDEV, supra note 49, at 130-33 (discussing survey of birth mothers, adop-
tive parents, and adoptees in late 1980s in Canada, and showing that an overwhelming
majority of all three groups favored release of information on adoptee's well-being to birth
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such communication obviously occurs now in many adoptions, establish-
ing statutory systems to facilitate it would assure birth parents of a
conduit to receive the information and give them a right to seek this non-
identifying information in those instances when it has not been pro-
vided."
Once an adoptee has reached adulthood, birth parents who have vol-
untarily placed children for adoption (i.e., children who were not in state
custody or protective care at the time of adoptive placement) should be
entitled to access to the adoptive identities of their children and to search
programs that would facilitate reunions, on the same basis as adult
adoptees. Many birth parents, like many adult adoptees, strongly desire
information or reunion with adult children from whom they have been
separated through adoption."9 Because many adoptees who do not initi-
ate a search also are not opposed to being found,45" birth parents'
emotional needs should be addressed in our statutory disclosure schemes
as well.
Some adult adoptees, however, do not wish to be contacted .45 There-
fore, a contact preference system, with an option for advance notice, and
a judicial or administrative good cause hearing to obtain a no-disclosure
order, should be implemented for these adoptees as well. The system
would essentially operate for them in the same way as the system for
disclosure to adult adoptees, with one major difference. If an adoptee
requests an order prohibiting disclosure, the presumption should favor
granting the adoptee's request. Alternatively, a simple disclosure veto
system could be implemented for adult adoptees. While adoptees would
rarely if ever have the "confidentiality" concerns that often trouble birth
parents who have kept their placement decision secret, they also may on
occasion find the prospect of a reunion or contact emotionally trou-
bling.452 Even though adoptive placement was a decision made with their
best interests in mind, they were not the parties who initiated placement.
mothers, and reflecting birth mothers contention that such information was "vital to their
peace of mind").
448. Various forms of open adoption also would serve to meet these needs and merit se-
rious consideration as well. Discussion of this major topic is beyond the scope of this paper. A
rich collection of scholarly work, however, addresses the topic. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell,
Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Prac-
tice, 75 B.U. L. REv. 997 (1995).
449. See SACHDEV, supra note 49, at 122-23 (discussing survey of Canadian birth moth-
ers, adoptive parents, and adoptees in late 1980s, revealing that many birth mothers "yearned
to see the birth child and wanted to be assured of its well-being").
450. See supra note 85.
451. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
452. See SACHDEV, supra note 49, at 123-24, 127-28 (reporting that some adoptees felt
that appearance by the birth mother would be "chaotic" or exacerbate stress they might al-
ready be undergoing at certain periods in their life).
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A contact preference system should serve the needs of most, but for
those adult adoptees who find the prospect of a potential meeting psy-
chologically disturbing, they should have the option to preclude
disclosure completely.
Birth parents whose children have been placed for adoption follow-
ing termination of their parental rights, or whose children were in
protective custody when they agreed to terminate their rights, also may
desire to locate their children as adults. In many cases such reunions
may be beneficial for both the children and the parents. Because the risk
of psychological or other harm to the adult adoptee is greater, however,
this group of birth parents should be required to go through a govern-
ment-sponsored search program, through which identifying information
and reunion assistance would only be provided with the affirmative con-
sent (as opposed to the mere absence of a disclosure veto or
nondisclosure order) of the adult adoptee.
Just as consideration of the experience of other countries and inter-
national institutions can offer valuable guidance to U.S. legislators, so
too may some of the U.S. statutes regulating the collection and disclo-
sure of medical and social history, particularly to prospective adoptive
parents, be worthy of examination by other countries. Implementation of
a scheme that fosters thorough collection efforts, requires preservation
and the ability to supplement records throughout the lifetime of an
adoptee, and mandates pre-placement disclosure of medical and social
history to prospective adoptive parents, as well as post-placement disclo-
sure to adoptive parents, adoptees, and when relevant, birth family
members, will best serve the interests of adoptees and their families by
fostering successful placements and appropriate medical care. The stat-
utes implementing conventions addressing international adoption,453 and
any future such conventions, should be drafted with these goals in mind,
to ensure that children who cross borders to their new adoptive homes,
and those adopted domestically, receive the best possible care when they
join their new families.
453. See supra notes 421-24 and accompanying text.
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